What’s next for Gaza? Either a hostage return or Rafah campaign

As contacts continued in an effort to achieve a new ceasefire and hostage release deal, the future of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza hangs in the balance.

Israeli leaders vowed that they would continue the military campaign until all the Hamas battalions have been defeated. With the operation in Khan Yunis almost complete, six Hamas battalions remain – four in Rafah at the southern tip of Gaza, and two in the area of the central refugee camps, Dir el Balah and Nusseirat.

However, international mediators hope that if an agreement is reached before the start of Ramadan on March 10 for an initial 45-day truce – during which up to 40 women, elderly, sick, and injured hostages will be set free, along with hundreds of Palestinian security prisoners – the parties will then be able to negotiate a comprehensive ceasefire bringing hostilities to an end, along with the release of the remaining hostages.

However, while Hamas insists that a final deal include an end to hostilities, Israel is still not prepared to commit to this.

In the absence of a deal, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are set to attack Rafah, where more than one million Gaza residents fled to escape the war.

“The world must know, and Hamas leaders must know, if by Ramadan our hostages are not home, the fighting will continue to the Rafah area,” War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz said. “We will do so in a coordinated manner, facilitating the evacuation of civilians in dialogue with our American and Egyptian partners to minimize civilian casualties.”

Gantz also addressed the warnings from world leaders to Israel against the potentially devastating consequences of spreading its military campaign to Rafah. “To those saying the price is too high, I say this very clearly: Hamas has a choice – they can surrender, release the hostages, and the citizens of Gaza will be able to celebrate the holy holiday of Ramadan.”

Of the 134 hostages who remain in Gaza, at least 29 are believed to be dead, and each day in captivity endangers those still alive. At least some are believed to be held in Rafah.

Rafah invasion or hostage deal

Before the surprise October 7 Hamas attack, Rafah, Gaza’s third-largest city, had a population of almost 250,000. Today, more than half of Gaza’s population is crammed into the area along the Egyptian border, after being encouraged by Israel to flee south to avoid the fighting.

For the estimated 1.3 million residents currently in Rafah, most in makeshift tent encampments, an Israeli military onslaught could be catastrophic.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly promised that civilians will be allowed to evacuate.

“Our heroic troops are now fighting in Khan Yunis, Hamas’s main stronghold. We’ve instructed the IDF to prepare also to operate in Rafah and in two camps in the center, the last strongholds Hamas has left. Here too, when the time comes, the IDF will act in compliance with international law and will allow the population safe passage out of the war zones.”

With much of Gaza already a wasteland after almost five months of intensive fighting, options are limited for relocation of another million refugees to (relatively) safe areas. The al Muwasi area along the Mediterranean coast, west of Khan Yunis, is the most likely option; but humanitarian organizations there are already struggling to cope with hundreds of thousands of refugees.

Another option is to allow the evacuees in Rafah to return to their homes in the northern Gaza Strip, with emphasis on the women and children. However, many of the homes in northern Gaza are no longer habitable, and Israel has ruled out a return of men to the north at this juncture.

Egypt’s biggest fear is that an Israeli attack on Rafah will force hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee across the border into the Egyptian Sinai – a scenario that has been publicly encouraged by some members of Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition.

In October, Egypt made it clear that it will not allow any refugees from the war to cross into its territory.

The border road between southern Gaza and Egypt (named the Philadelphi Corridor by an Israeli army computer) runs 14 kilometers from the Mediterranean Sea to Israel’s Kerem Shalom border crossing. The corridor is only 100 meters wide but is regarded by Israel as key to the future of Gaza.

Israel believes that the bulk of the weapons used by Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza were smuggled from Egypt via the Philadelphi Corridor either over ground or via tunnels, and that about a dozen tunnels are still in operation.

“The Philadelphi Corridor must remain in our hands, and it must remain closed. It is clear that any other arrangement will not be able to guarantee the demilitarization that we desire,” warned Netanyahu.

Israel controlled the corridor for 23 years after returning occupied Sinai to Egypt under the terms of the 1979 peace agreement between the two countries.

The smuggling tunnels developed into a massive source of income for Bedouin clans on both sides of the border (with Egyptian officials accepting bribes to turn a blind eye) after Gaza came under Palestinian control following the Israeli withdrawal in 2005. The phenomenon grew dramatically after Hamas seized power in Gaza in 2007, with some tunnels wide enough for vehicles to pass through.

Former defense minister Avigdor Liberman likened the situation to an open tap. “Somebody with a mop is constantly running around from one corner to the other trying in vain to dry the floor, but the water continues to flow.”

There were unconfirmed reports that Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar escaped into Egypt via the Rafah tunnels and may have taken some of the hostages with him.

Ideally, Israel would like to retain control of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing under any post-war arrangement, but Cairo has already warned that Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor will endanger bilateral relations.

Plan B is for the construction of a deep underground barrier on the Egyptian side of the border (similar to the underground barrier Israel built along its border with Gaza) to be financed by Gulf Arab states. Such a scenario would only be feasible if it came at the request of the Palestinian entity that will eventually take control of Gaza after the war.

Netanyahu says the war will continue until Israel achieves “total victory,” but according to the findings of a survey by the Israel Democracy Institute released on February 21, most Israelis believe such an outcome is unlikely.

It took the prime minister 139 days of fighting before he finally revealed his vision of “the day after,” the post-war arrangements for Gaza.

His proposals, presented to the security cabinet on February 22, called for the IDF to continue to prosecute the war until its objectives are reached. In the medium term, Israel will maintain security control indefinitely and the coastal enclave will be completely demilitarized.

Israel will impose what was termed a “southern closure” on the Gaza-Egypt border to prevent smuggling. Civilian administration and responsibility for public order will be based, as much as possible, on local figures with administrative experience who have no affiliation with countries or organizations that support terrorism.

UNRWA, the United Nations refugee agency, will no longer operate in Gaza.

The Palestinian Authority said the Netanyahu plan aimed to perpetuate Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesperson for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, stated, “Gaza will be part of the independent Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital, and any other plan is doomed to fail.” The Foreign Ministry in Ramallah said that the plan is “a formal declaration of the return of the occupation to the Gaza Strip and an attempt to gain more time to implement the expulsion plan.”

Prior to Netanyahu’s unveiling of his day-after plans, War Cabinet Minister Gadi Eisenkot had warned that there was increasing difficulty in achieving the war’s objectives due to the war cabinet’s failure to make “impactful and meaningful” decisions.

Eisenkot drew up a list in which he provided his evaluation of the status of the war’s objectives:

• Stripping Hamas of its military and governmental capabilities – partially achieved.
• Freeing the hostages – partially achieved.
• Securing an end to the war in which no threat is posed to Israel from Gaza – not achieved.
• Restoring security to the residents of the Gaza periphery communities – partially achieved.
• Improving Israeli citizens’ sense of personal security and national resilience– not achieved.

Washington hopes that a ceasefire in Gaza will allow the Iranian-backed Hezbollah to follow suit on the Lebanon border and withdraw its Radwan strike force from the border, enabling the 80,000 or so residents of Israel’s northern border who fled to return to their homes.

However, Israeli leaders, skeptical that Hezbollah will agree to such a deal, continue to threaten military action to move Hezbollah fighters to north of the Litani River.

An Israel-Hezbollah escalation threatens to plunge the entire region into a wider and much more dangerous conflagration, something that neither Iran nor the US seeks.

Hezbollah insist that there’s nothing to talk about before a ceasefire in Gaza is in place. A settlement in Gaza will either provide the key to unlocking a solution on the northern border or, failing an agreement, could unleash a much more deadly conflict. ■