Israel's Rafah operation hurts Egypt's plans - opinion

Al-Ahram newspaper recently reported that Egypt had provided tens of thousands of psychological support sessions for Palestinians injured since the onset of the war in Gaza. This seemingly minor news story is part of a comprehensive media and PR campaign to demonstrate Egypt’s commitment to the Palestinian cause.

Since October 7, Egypt has found itself at the epicenter of the conflict. Sharing a border with Gaza since Israel’s disengagement in 2005, Egypt fears a mass exodus of Palestinians fleeing – or being expelled – over that border into Sinai. Such a scenario would pose a significant security and humanitarian threat to a country already struggling with a large, impoverished population and which has only recently overcome the threat of Islamic State cells among the Bedouin in the Sinai Peninsula. Additionally, Egypt already hosts around half a million refugees, mainly from Sudan and Syria.

Egypt is also grappling with severe economic issues. Revenues from the Suez Canal have plummeted due to Houthi attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Straits, tourism has dropped off, natural gas revenues are declining, and poverty rates are rising due to escalating prices. Ending the war is, therefore, a high priority for Egypt. However, the conflict also provides President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi with an opportunity to restore Egypt’s leadership in the Arab world.

Since the war began, Egypt has spearheaded mediation efforts between Israel and Fatah, working alongside Qatar. While Egypt has played a mediatory role in all previous wars and crises between Israel and Hamas since 2007, its current involvement appears to be more extensive.

Egypt utilizes several assets in its mediation efforts. First, the direct relations it maintains with both Israel and Hamas allow it to pass on messages quickly and reliably. Second, the Egyptian General Intelligence Service has maintained working relations with Hamas leaders for many years. Lastly, Egypt’s relations with the Biden administration constitute an additional asset. While Egypt lacks financial and economic leverage, Qatar supplements this with its own resources and strategic relationships. 

However, Egypt is considered as a more trustworthy or “objective” intermediary in the eyes of Israel and the United States. Egypt’s interests overlap with Israel’s in terms of weakening Hamas, though Egypt would prefer to see an upgraded Palestinian Authority (PA) installed in Gaza, a stance Israel currently opposes.

Egypt’s involvement extends beyond mediation. It is a crucial player in the transfer of humanitarian aid to Gaza via the Rafah crossing. The Egyptian media provides detailed reports on the number of aid trucks passing through, underscoring Egypt’s role in alleviating the humanitarian crisis. Additionally, wounded Palestinians from Gaza are treated in Cairo hospitals, albeit in limited numbers.

Egypt seeks end to war and restored calm 

Egypt’s policy aims to end the war to bring calm to Gaza, prevent a refugee influx, and stabilize its economy. In addition, Egypt hopes to garner two significant foreign policy dividends.

FIRST, IT seeks to bolster its standing with the Biden administration as an important and trustworthy ally. This is particularly important given the likelihood that the United States will sign a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, which could elevate Saudi Arabia as the most important US ally in the region. Improving its position with the US might also reduce American criticism and interference regarding the Sisi regime’s human rights record.

The second potential dividend relates to Egypt’s standing in the Arab world, which has declined over recent decades. The rapid pace of population growth, a relative lack of fossil fuel resources (apart from natural gas), and the consequences of the Arab Spring have led Egypt to focus more on internal affairs. 

In contrast, the rich oil and gas states in the Gulf – particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar – have become the leading Arab countries. 

Leadership in the Arab world is also linked to mediation in regional conflicts. This role holds particular prestige in the context of the Palestinian issue, which is crucial in Arab politics and in bolstering the legitimacy of national leaders. While the UAE is focused on providing humanitarian aid and Saudi Arabia is advancing its defense agreement with the US (and possibly normalization with Israel), Egypt is deeply engaged in mediation.

Egypt has presented Israel and Hamas with multiple proposals for ending the war, the most significant of which were put forward in December 2023 and April 2024. 

Confident about the latest deal, Egypt found Hamas altering the proposal to better suit its own interests. In response, Egypt tried to force Israel’s hand by ceasing or delaying the delivery of humanitarian aid via the Rafah crossing (controlled by Israel on the Palestinian side), threatening to downgrade diplomatic relations, and expressing support for South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice in The Hague alleging genocide in Gaza.

Paradoxically, Egypt stands to benefit from almost any outcome. If the Rafah operation is prevented and a deal is reached, this will be largely credited to Sisi, thus elevating Egypt’s prestige. If Israel proceeds with the Rafah operation and succeeds in eliminating Hamas, this also aligns with Egypt’s interests, though it will not say so publicly. 

The real problem arises if neither outcome materializes.

Until now, Israeli-Egyptian relations have succeeded in overcoming many obstacles and challenges, but the Rafah operation could be a tipping point. From Egypt’s perspective, it risks sending Palestinians fleeing into its territory, exposing it to severe criticism in Egyptian and Arab public opinion and further destabilizing the region.

The failure of Egypt’s mediation proposal also damages its efforts to lead an Arab solution to the conflict. Israel’s Rafah operation risks being a “dune” too far in Israeli-Egyptian relations, straining the delicate balance that has maintained their cooperation thus far.

The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim - The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.