The Gaza quagmire: Israel's biggest obstacles against Hamas are in diplomacy

A total of 10 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) brigades were operating across the entire Gaza Strip at the end of May– the highest number of troops in the coastal enclave since early January, as the military warned that at least six more months of fighting will be required in order to ensure that Hamas will not be able to reassert its rule over Gaza.

Troops have already returned to areas of previous fighting, in some instances for the third time, after Hamas terrorists managed to reestablish a presence.

Fierce clashes took place in the Jabalya refugee camp, north of Gaza City, where, based on precise intelligence, troops located the bodies of seven hostages in tunnels, and brought them back to Israel for burial.

However, the main focus of the military campaign was in the southern city of Rafah, on the Egyptian border. More than a million residents had fled to Rafah to avoid fighting in other areas of Gaza during the first six months of the war, and the international community, led by Washington, had warned Israel against acting in Rafah, fearing mass civilian casualties and a humanitarian disaster.

After much hesitation, Israel eventually moved on May 7, capturing eastern neighborhoods of the city, the Palestinian side of the Rafah crossing to Egypt, and parts of the strategically important road which runs along the Egyptian border, dubbed the Philadelphi Corridor in Israeli military parlance.

Over the following weeks, Israeli troops advanced cautiously into other areas of Rafah, killing hundreds of terrorists and destroying scores of Hamas tunnels and military installations.

“Hamas has been holding our hostages in Rafah, which is why our forces are maneuvering in Rafah,” said IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari in a statement. “We’re doing this in a targeted and precise way.”

Washington had estimated it could take up to four months to evacuate civilians, but almost a million residents left Rafah within a fortnight of the start of the IDF operation, most to the designated humanitarian corridor Israel set up in the Mawasi region along the Mediterranean coast, formerly the site of the Gush Katif settlement bloc.

Four Hamas battalions remained in Rafah on the eve of the IDF operation – the last of the 24 battalions Hamas had on the eve of the war; but their fighting capabilities are less significant than the elite Gaza City and Khan Yunis battalions that have already been defeated (another one or two battalions remain in the central refugee camps).

But, just as important, is control of the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor, which Hamas used to smuggle arms and other goods over the years, both over ground and via a vast tunnel network from the Egyptian Sinai to Gaza. More than 50 smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt were discovered by troops in the first two weeks of the Rafah operation. Closing down this oxygen line, it is hoped, will significantly impair Hamas’s ability to maintain a future insurgency in Gaza.

Israel isolated by diplomatic setbacks in its war against Hamas

With the Gaza war in its seventh month, Israel has suffered a tsunami of diplomatic setbacks, increasing the country’s isolation.

First was the decision on May 20 by International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Karim Kahn to issue arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, along with three Hamas leaders – Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Ismail Haniyeh. Khan accuses Netanyahu and Gallant of the war crimes of extermination, starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, and intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population.

The prosecutor’s request is now being discussed by the three ICC judges. If they come to the conclusion that there is a likelihood of conviction, they will issue the warrants, aimed at bringing Netanyahu, Gallant, and the Hamas leaders to trial in The Hague. If the arrest warrants are issued, it would mean that Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, would not be able to visit close Western allies without risking arrest.

The prime minister described the decision as “a moral outrage of historic proportions,” calling prosecutor Khan one of the “great antisemites in modern times.”

US President Joe Biden said it was “outrageous” to apply for arrest warrants. There was “no equivalence – none – between Israel and Hamas,” he stressed.

The second diplomatic blow came two days later when Norway, Ireland, and Spain announced they would formally recognize a Palestinian state on May 28. They said the decision was not against Israel nor in favor of Hamas, but rather in support of peace.

The recognition has no practical implications but was seen as another measure increasing Israel’s isolation.

“The intention of several European countries to recognize a Palestinian state is a reward for terrorism,” said Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Eighty percent of the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria support the terrible massacre of October 7. This evil cannot be given a state. This would be a terrorist state. It will try to repeat the massacre of October 7 again and again; we will not consent to this. Rewarding terrorism will not bring peace, and neither will it stop us from defeating Hamas.”

Israel reacted angrily, recalling its ambassadors to all three countries for “consultations.” The ambassadors of the three countries in Israel were summoned to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem for a diplomatic dressing down, where they were shown the short film of the Hamas kidnapping of terrified women soldiers, some with blood on their faces, from the Nahal Oz base on October 7.

Slovenia, Belgium, and Malta are expected to follow suit. Most of the world already recognizes the state of Palestine. In May, 143 of the 193 members of the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of Palestine joining the UN, something only states can do.

Only nine European countries had previously supported Palestinian statehood, and most of those made the decision in 1988 when they were part of the Soviet bloc.

Both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority welcomed the recognition.

The third diplomatic setback for Israel came on May 24 when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague (a separate body to the ICC) ruled that Israel should stop its military offensive in Rafah after South Africa claimed that Israel’s actions there amounted to a “genocidal” operation and threaten the survival of the Palestinian people.

Israel issued a statement calling the decision “false, outrageous, and disgusting,” making it clear that the military operation in Rafah would continue.

“Israel has not and will not carry out military operations in the Rafah area that create conditions that could lead to the destruction of the Palestinian civilian population” read the statement, stressing that “Israel will continue its efforts to allow humanitarian aid to enter the Gaza Strip and act in accordance with the law to reduce, as much as possible, the harm to the civilian population.”

The Palestinians and their allies are now expected to turn to the UN Security Council to try to pass a resolution to impose a ceasefire on Israel for all of Gaza or for Rafah specifically. Israel expects the US to veto the motion. However, this will come at a political cost that Israel will have to pay.

Far-Right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir called on the government to reject the court ruling.

“The irrelevant order of the antisemitic court in The Hague should have only one answer: the occupation of Rafah, the increase of military pressure, and the complete destruction of Hamas,” he said.

Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, considered close to Netanyahu, warned that the court ruling will fuel the fires of antisemitism raging across the world because people will assume that the charges carry weight. “But the charges are totally false, and the prosecutor didn’t even bother to learn the facts,” he stated.

Opposition leader Yair Lapid slammed the government, stating that this ruling “could and should have been prevented.”

Israeli officials expressed concern that the ICJ ruling will make it more difficult to achieve progress to release the hostages as part of a ceasefire package. As long as a Security Council resolution is pending, Israel fears that there will be no incentive for Hamas leader Sinwar to renew ceasefire contacts.

The diplomatic blows came as criticism mounted over the refusal by Netanyahu to even discuss a “day after” post-war plan for Gaza. His stance led to two dramatic news conferences in May – first by Defense Minister Gallant, and 10 days later by war cabinet member Benny Gantz, whose centrist National Unity party had joined the emergency war coalition immediately after the October 7 attack.

Gallant’s news conference on May 15 was merely a public airing of his differences with the prime minister that have been expressed in war cabinet meetings for months and leaked to the media.

Seven months into the war – the second longest in Israel’s history – he warned that the refusal by Netanyahu to discuss the creation of an alternative to Hamas rule in Gaza could reverse the military achievements of the ongoing conflict and lead to Israel being sucked into the Gaza quagmire with no realistic exit strategy. The defense minister warned against a scenario in which Israel would be forced into a long-term military occupation in Gaza, along with assuming responsibility for the needs of the 2.3 million residents.

Echoing calls by military and intelligence chiefs over recent months, Gallant said an alternative to the Hamas rule must be found immediately and put in place. “The ‘day after Hamas’ will only be achieved with Palestinian entities taking control of Gaza, accompanied by international actors, establishing a governing alternative to Hamas’s rule,” he said, urging the prime minister to make “tough decisions,” warning that “indecision is, in essence, a decision.”

In response, Netanyahu remained defiant. “I will not replace Hamastan with Fatahstan,” he said. ”Talk about the day after the war, while Hamas is still intact, is pointless.”

Netanyahu was not budging. He won’t even discuss alternatives until Israel achieves “total victory” against Hamas, although such an outcome has never been clearly defined.

There are four options for a post-war Gaza, and none of them is good for Netanyahu: Hamas retains its control; the IDF occupies Gaza, and Israel takes responsibility for the civilian population; Palestinians with no links to Hamas take control (meaning, in all likelihood, the Palestinian Authority or elements connected to the Ramallah government) supported by Arab states and the international community; or Somalia-like chaos ensues, with armed gangs ruling the streets.

Netanyahu’s avoidance of an in-depth debate on the “day after” in Gaza is entirely because of pressure from the Right-wing flank of the government. The two far-Right parties – Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Strength), led by Ben-Gvir; and Religious Zionism, led by Bezalel Smotrich – urged Netanyahu to replace Gallant and threatened to pull out of the coalition if Israel agrees to any role for the Palestinian Authority, which they consider a terrorist entity just as dangerous as Hamas.

The far-Right, along with some members of the prime minister’s own Likud party, would like to see a return to Israel’s occupation of Gaza and, ideally, when the time is right, to re-establish Jewish settlements that were uprooted as part of prime minister Ariel Sharon’s disengagement in 2005 when Israel left Gaza.

But in order to establish military rule in Gaza, the IDF will need a number of divisions, which it does not have, particularly if it must maintain the current high state of readiness for war in the North and a high level of activity in the West Bank.

The entire professional level of the security establishment, along with most of the war cabinet, believes the post-war arrangement debate is essential. The Biden administration has also been urging Israel for months to discuss the “day after.”

However, despite Gallant’s throwing down the gauntlet, Netanyahu will always choose his own political survival over what many perceive as the national interest. He will continue to procrastinate, avoid decisions, and will focus on stressing what there should not be, not what there should be.

Benny Gantz in his press conference told Netanyahu that if a plan for post-war governance of Gaza is not formulated and approved by June 8, his National Unity party will withdraw from the government.

“Personal and political considerations have begun to enter the most sacred parts of Israel’s defense,” Gantz said, presenting no less than six strategic goals that the prime minister must meet before June 8: the return of the hostages from Gaza; the overthrow of Hamas rule and demilitarization in Gaza; the establishment of a joint US, European, Arab, and Palestinian administration that will manage Gaza’s civilian affairs and form the basis for a future alternative governing authority; the repatriation of residents of northern Israel who were evacuated from their homes, as well as the rehabilitation of Gaza border communities; the promotion of normalization with Saudi Arabia; and the adoption of an outline for military service for all Israeli citizens, including the haredi ultra-Orthodox community.

“Prime Minister Netanyahu, I look you in the eye tonight and tell you: The choice is in your hands,” Gantz said. “The Netanyahu of a decade ago would have done the right thing. Are you willing to do the right and patriotic thing today?

“The people of Israel are watching you. You must choose between Zionism and cynicism, between unity and factionalism, between responsibility and lawlessness – and between victory and disaster.”

The Prime Minister’s Office’s response made it clear that Netanyahu had no intention of meeting Gantz’s conditions. “While our heroic soldiers are fighting to destroy Hamas battalions in Rafah, Gantz chooses to issue an ultimatum to the prime minister instead of issuing an ultimatum to Hamas.

“The conditions set by Benny Gantz are laundered words whose meaning is clear: the end of the war and a defeat for Israel.”

The expected demise of the wartime coalition is unlikely to lead to the immediate overthrow of the Netanyahu government, which still has a Knesset majority of 64. However, it will mark the clearest indication to date that the sense of national unity that coalesced after the tragedy of October 7 is unraveling, and it is likely to mark the renewal of anti-government protests demanding new elections.

The fighting is raging in Gaza and along the northern border with no end in sight; the fate of the hostages is increasingly desperate with negotiations deadlocked; Israel appears more isolated than ever before; and national unity is evaporating, with growing calls for a new election. A depressing snapshot of Israel in the summer of 2024, with no indication of a leadership to steer a course out of the mess. ■