What’s next in Gaza after Rafah? - analysis

Starting on the evening of May 6, the IDF has been operating in Rafah for six weeks now. Its first goal was to secure the Philadelphi Corridor along the border with Egypt. This was accomplished within three weeks. Now, the IDF is fanning out into Rafah city, its environs, and its neighborhoods, and when this operation is finished, there will be a large question mark regarding what will come next.

IDF chief spokesman R.-Adm. Daniel Hagari hinted at the existing challenges in an interview he gave to Channel 13 News on Wednesday. “To say that we are going to make Hamas disappear is to throw sand in people’s eyes. If we don’t provide an alternative, we will only have Hamas in the end,” he said.

The Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, said something similar last month: “We are now operating once again in Jabalya. As long as there is no diplomatic process to develop a governing body in the enclave that isn’t Hamas, we’ll have to launch campaigns again and again in other places to dismantle Hamas’s infrastructure. It will be a Sisyphean task.” Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and former war cabinet minister Benny Gantz have both called for a day-after strategy for Gaza.

What comes next?

The battle of Rafah will end, perhaps even by the end of the month, which will pave the way for this monstrous question demanding a viable answer. If the IDF chooses to withdraw from the urban areas of Rafah, Israel will be left in control of two corridors in Gaza – Netzarim and Philadelphi. These were both seen as strategic and important areas to control when Israel managed Gaza from 1967 to 2005. So Jerusalem is replicating some of the methods it has used in the past; there is no reason to reinvent the wheel in Gaza.

But Israel doesn’t want to govern the cities of Gaza the way it did in the 1970s and 1980s. It also doesn’t want to end the war and leave completely. Some have suggested that it conduct a policy similar to the one in the northern West Bank, using raids to keep the terrorists in check.

Israel has apparently abandoned the policies that its leaders floated at the outset of the war, such as “Hamas is ISIS” and “Hamas will be no more.” These talking points would have called for replacing Hamas. It has also abandoned the idea of “bubbles” in Gaza, where local authorities would be given control. Further, it is unclear if Israel is even interested in a force in Gaza that would be backed by Arab states.

This leaves many questions as to what comes next. If there is no ceasefire and the IDF continues to control parts of Gaza, or even if there is a ceasefire and the IDF maintains some control, what will happen? It does not seem that Hamas will be defeated.

The security cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has defined the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities as one of the goals of the war. The Prime Minister’s Office reiterated this on Wednesday. Still, the terms “military and governing capabilities” are quite broad. Because of that, there are many junctures along the way, and in the future, Israel will be able to claim “mission accomplished.” But that won’t necessarily mean that Hamas has been defeated.

And, once Rafah is figured out, questions will loom about central Gaza. Israel has never fully operated in El-Bureij, Nuseirat, Deir el-Balah, or Maghazi, as Hamas’s control there was deep, and it continues to be a threat.

For instance, the raid into the Nuseirat refugee camp to free four hostages this month illustrated how the area is teeming with terrorists. It has always been a major recruiting ground for Hamas. Indeed, as has already been exposed, many men from Nuseirat played a role in the October 7 massacre. Therefore, these areas in central Gaza, known as the “central camps” because they grew out of refugee camps established in the 1950s, clearly represent Hamas’s home turf.

There are also concerns that Hamas members left Rafah and went back to Khan Yunis, the hometown of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. Additionally, some of them may have relocated to the humanitarian area of Al-Mawasi. Rocket fire from Gaza has increased slightly in the last few weeks, illustrating that terrorists continue to possess 107mm rockets as well as mortars and other weapons, such as the Yasin 105 rocket and RPGs. It will be hard to declare victory in Gaza as long as rocket or mortar fire continues to be directed toward Israel’s border communities.

If the IDF chooses to reenter northern Gaza, going into areas it has already operated in, like Beit Hanun, Shati, Zeitun, or Shejaia, this will raise questions regarding Hamas’s ability to rebuild its networks quickly.

If the IDF goes back into Khan Yunis, this will raise similar doubts. All of this will point to how this war may be conducted in the future. Will it continue to use the sandpaper doctrine of slowly grinding down Hamas with each pass the IDF makes over these areas? If so, is there an objective, or merely diminishing returns in terms of what is found each time this happens again?