Why CNN’s view of Hamas’ readiness is crucial but misses some huge issues - analysis

CNN’s analysis of how successful the IDF has been in dismantling Hamas’s 24 battalions is crucial.

It is crucial because it may move the global media beyond the overly simplistic question of whether the IDF and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have succeeded or failed against Hamas.

The Jerusalem Post and other Israeli media have been delving into this question much more on a spectrum and looking at specific factors for months, but with CNN accepting that there are at least three categories of Hamas’s battalions' status, the global media may start to see the greater nuance in the situation.

That said, the CNN article's level of nuance is still flawed. It reduces the analysis to three “lump sum” categories instead of sharing with the reader the full complexity of the situation.

CNN defines the 24 battalions as: three ineffective (two northern Gaza, one Rafah), eight effective – three northern Gaza, two central Gaza, one Khan Yunis, two Rafah), and 13 degraded (seven northern Gaza, two central Gaza, three Khan Yunis, one Rafah).

The analysis does reveal some of the factors that CNN used to arrive at their conclusions, and to their credit, CNN has some access to the view from Hamas’s side as well as from the Israeli side.  

Challenges in dismantling Hamas battalions

However, there is no way around the fact that the central information in the analysis is based on which areas the IDF has had to return to for reinvasions and how hard the IDF said the fighting was in those areas.

To set a baseline, the IDF declared northern Gaza under operational control in mid-January and central Gaza and Khan Yunis under operational control in early February. The IDF then withdrew from northern Gaza in rounds starting in mid-January and had withdrawn from Khan Yunis by April 7.

It declared Rafah under operational control in late June.

Between mid-March and now, the IDF has had to return to almost every sector, other than Rafah, which it has not yet left.

Based on the IDF having to return and IDF sources telling the Post that Hamas is succeeding in gaining new recruits despite its losses in battle, the argument could be made that none of Hamas’s battalions are dismantled.

But this is, again, a simplistic analysis.

When the IDF first invaded northern Gaza in October, it was met by more than 10,000 Hamas forces organized by sector, by specialty (rockets, anti-tank missiles, drones, naval commandos, lookouts, sharpshooters), with full intelligence and communications apparatuses, with full tunnel networks, and with several dozen seasoned commanders.

It took three weeks and five IDF divisions of tens of thousands of soldiers on the front and many more nearby encircling Gaza, in order to defeat the Hamas forces and take over the area.

Khan Yunis achieved control by deploying seven brigades and around 7,000 soldiers and carefully penetrating Hama’s tunnel network for close to two months.

Most of the recent reinvasions since March have involved one brigade of around 1,000 soldiers, and full re-penetration and achieving control has occurred within hours.

The fact that the IDF can retake these areas so much faster and with so few troops is not just a mathematical tactical issue; it means that the vast majority of reservists who were called up for the first few months of the war are at home, working, or back in university.

Most will need to do rotations of some weeks at some point, but that is not the same as having to serve for three to five months straight.

Hamas’s fighting numbers as organized groups are also smaller. Instead of 10,000, usually, Hamas fights in groups of 5-10, with some situations reaching groups of 50. Calling 50 Hamas forces with no experienced commander (most experienced commanders are now dead or hiding in tunnels cut off from their forces) just “degraded” misses the point. A more accurate definition would be “existing but on life support.”

The IDF’s success also has changed the strategic picture in terms of rockets and tunnels.

Yes, Hamas managed to fire 15 rockets on Monday, and a few weeks ago, they fired around 20 rockets from Khan Yunis in one day.

But none of these rockets killed anyone, and almost all of them fell into open fields near the Gaza border. Basically, since January – for seven months – Hamas’s rocket threat has been reduced from a strategic threat that could hold most of Israel hostage to an annoyance that most Israelis barely notice.

Likewise, Hamas’s tunnel network, while it could take the IDF years to destroy all of it, is no longer in any position to come close to facilitating a surprise attack on Israel, and has been reduced so much in its effectiveness, that Mohammed Deif came above ground in mid-July long enough for the IDF to kill him.

So if CNN’s bottom line is that 21 out of 24 Hamas battalions are a threat, then this is wildly misleading.

On the other hand, Netanyahu’s claims of being close to absolute victory are also wildly misleading.

Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, former war minister Benny Gantz, and almost all top IDF officials believe that Netanyahu should have brought in 7,000 Palestinian Authority security forces, working with the UAE, Egypt, CIA, and NATO, around February-March to replace Hamas.

By failing to do so, they believe Netanyahu has allowed Hamas to gain thousands of new recruits and to at least attempt to reconstitute itself.

At Shifa Hospital in mid-March, Hamas gathered nearly 1,000 of its forces, though after they were all killed (200) or arrested (800), the terror group has not had more than around 50 of its forces in one place at any time, and usually more like 5-10 in small cells.

According to Gallant, Gantz, and the IDF, the roughly half-dozen IDF reinvasions became more necessary and faster only because Netanyahu did not bring in the PA and international help.

Netanyahu has made it clear that he prefers a weaker Hamas in Gaza than he does a stronger PA, whereas the defense officials prefer the reverse – even if all involved believe that all of these choices are bad ones.

From dozens of IDF briefings, the real picture is that there is probably one area in each of the four sectors: northern Gaza, central Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah, where there are larger (50 at a time, or many small groups of 5-10) Hamas forces ready to fight, and the other 20 battalions are either dead or on life support.

This does not mean that they cannot come back. They have shown that they can within only a few months, just as the IDF has shown that within a few hours, it can re-destroy any such Hamas minor progress.

But this sidesteps the main question: who will run out of gas first: Israel and the IDF or Hamas? If Israel and the IDF get tired first, either of losing soldiers or pressure from the US or from the international courts, then Jerusalem will need to make more concessions to Hamas about the post-war era. If Hamas gets tired first, because its forces are weaker now than even in mid-January/February and it has lost four of its five top leaders other than Yahya Sinwar, it will need to make more concessions about the post-war era.

As things stand, Israel defeated Hamas militarily but let it live politically, which has opened the door to trying to return militarily, but then the Jewish state has stepped in to block that opening.

Both sides are much more tired now than even a few months ago, so the question remains: Who will blink first?