Vigilance over panic: Israelis defiant to maintain normalcy in the face of threats

More than a week after twin high-profile assassinations in Beirut and Tehran set the region, and the country, on edge, Israel has settled into what could be best described as a state of routine vigilance – a condition of habitual alertness.

Preparedness, in other words, has been woven into daily life.

But preparedness should not be mistaken for panic. Despite the impression one may glean from some news reports and incessant speculation about when, where, and how Iran and Hezbollah, separately or together, might attack, it would be wrong to say the country is panicking.

It is not panicking. Brisk sales of solar phone rechargers, home generators, bottled water, canned tuna, and peanut butter are signs of preparedness, not panic.

Panic is people falling over themselves to leave the country, refusing to leave their homes, staying off the roads, not going to the beach, cafés or malls. That is not what Israel is experiencing.

The country is not at a panicked standstill, despite what Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah might have his listeners believe. “The Israelis’ anticipation over the past week is part of the punishment, part of our response, and part of the battle,” he said in a speech Tuesday night.

His words led to a typical Israeli reaction: He thinks he is going to disrupt our daily life; we’ll show him by partying harder.

“What is the appropriate Zionist response right now, in the face of the Iranian revenge?” asked KAN journalist Akiva Novick in a half-humorous, half-serious Facebook post. Once, Novick said in reference to Nachman Shai, the IDF spokesman during the First Gulf War and the tense period during that Scud-rocked period, the country was told to drink some water.

Today, he said, taking a gulp of beer, “We say drink beer. I’m not kidding. That is one of the best ways to prepare for the revenge from Iran and Nasrallah.”

Drink beer not because of the alcohol’s numbing effects, he stressed, but “because our enemies have one clear goal: that we will walk around here in fear, with our heads down, be bummed. Therefore, our normal life here is something to fight for. Go out, enjoy yourself, buy things, drink beer, smoke drugs, with medical permission, of course. Buy wine from the Golan Heights and support the farmers there. Our soldiers are risking their lives so we can do just that.”

Novick made clear that he was not minimizing the need to be prepared – buy bottled water, prepare the safe rooms – “but don’t give up on your fun; it has strategic importance.”

And he’s right. Hezbollah and Iran are aiming to paralyze the country, and it is a strategic necessity to ensure that they don’t do it.

NOVICK’S REMARKS evoke memories of times past, such as the weeks preceding, and the time during, the First Gulf War in 1990-1991, when anxiety permeated the nation, and the public – fearing the worst – taped up windows and donned gas masks in anticipation of chemical-laced missiles. Now is not the only time the country has prepared for worst-case scenarios in the face of threats by enemies.

The same was true of the tense waiting period before the Six Day War, a three-week period that earned its own moniker, tekufat hahamtana, the waiting period. This was a period of anxiety, uncertainty, and preparation within Israel as the country faced the imminent threat of an all-out regional war. Egypt had closed the Strait of Tiran and kicked UN peacekeepers out of Sinai, and the rhetoric from the Arab countries was chilling.

Operation Cast Lead

The period leading up to Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008 was also an anxiety-filled one, as constant rocket fire from Gaza created a sense of urgency and fear, with the country bracing for the necessity of a widespread military campaign but not knowing how Hamas would respond. Israel is schooled in this kind of anxious anticipation, and – as such – it does not shut down; there is a sense of “been there, done that.”

Nevertheless, there are some characteristics now that distinguish the current waiting period from similar periods in the past.

The first is that this period is unfolding in the midst of a 10-month-old war that has already taken a significant psychological toll on the population. Unlike previous periods of relative calm before major conflicts, the current situation has been marked by ongoing fighting, long stints of reserve duty, and rocket fire on the country for 10 months.

While this prolonged strain can lead to psychological fatigue, affecting the country’s overall resilience and ability to cope with additional threats, it has also resulted in increased calls for the government to take preemptive action – driven in part by the sentiment that “enough is enough.” These calls were not as prominent after the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi in Damascus in April, even when it was also clear that Iran would retaliate, though not as massively as they eventually did.

ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT difference this time is the heightened international involvement aimed at containing the fallout from the killing of Hezbollah’s chief of staff Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Fearing that the current crisis could lead to a much wider conflagration, the international community is involved in ways not seen during previous periods of anxious waiting.

The most glaring example is in 1967, when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran and expelled UN peacekeepers from Sinai, with hardly an international peep.

The US, distracted and preoccupied at the time with its own affairs – the Vietnam War, US race issues – did little to tamp down matters. Washington did not honor previous commitments to Israel to keep the Strait of Tiran open, and then-US president Lyndon Johnson did nothing to prevent the removal of the UN forces from Sinai.

Contrast that with the current situation. Even though the US is distracted, as it was in 1967, with domestic issues – first and foremost the November presidential elections – it has taken strong proactive steps, such as dispatching an aircraft carrier, 12 warships, and a fighter jet squadron to the region to deter Iranian aggression. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, meanwhile, is working the diplomatic channels aiming for a similar result.

The Americans are not the only ones involved. The Russians, too, are reportedly using their leverage on the Iranians to try to dissuade them from a dramatic response, with Russian President Vladimir Putin dispatching his Security Council secretary, Sergei Shoigu, to Tehran to speak with the country’s leaders.

This contrasts greatly with the period before the Six Day War, when the Soviet Union played a significant role in escalating tensions. At the same time, the Russians are also reported to be providing the Iranians with their advanced air defense systems.

The involvement of the Russians and their siding here with Israel’s sworn enemy stands in stark contrast to the bromance Putin and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu developed during a large part of the last decade.That relationship, which led to the establishment of a deconfliction mechanism in Syria where Israel would coordinate with the Russians before striking targets in Syria so as not to accidentally harm Russian interests, deteriorated when Putin invaded Ukraine.

While Israel was careful in the beginning of that war to remain neutral, because of its interests in maintaining good ties with the Russians due to their massive presence in Syria, that position gradually shifted as the Russians became more reliant on Iranian arms – first and foremost drones – in their war effort.

While at one time Russia’s and Iran’s interests conflicted in Syria, as Russia withdrew forces from Syria to focus on Ukraine their interests aligned. And as their interests aligned, Israel’s relations with Russia took a nosedive.

The reported efforts of Russia to put a lid on Iran’s reaction, therefore, are not a throwback to the golden days of the Putin-Netanyahu relationship or a reflection of any concern on Putin’s part that some of the more than one million Russian-speakers in Israel, one of the largest Russian diasporas in the world, might be hurt in an Iranian attack. Rather, they have to do with cold Russian interests.

If Iran attacks Israel in a dramatic way and Israel responds in kind, or if Israel preempts, there are a number of strategic targets it could hit, including oil installations, ports, and arms facilities.

While a strike on oil installations, hitting at the Islamic Republic’s ability to produce oil, would not necessarily affect Russia’s interests, hitting Iranian ports – as Israel did in Yemen last month in relation to a Houthi attack – or arms manufacturing facilities could significantly hurt the Russians.

Russia has become increasingly dependent on Iranian ports, a result of Western sanctions that limit Russian access to European markets, meaning that Moscow has pivoted south, establishing trade routes through Iranian ports on the Indian Ocean to connect with India and the Persian Gulf. Hitting these ports would be highly detrimental to Russian interests.

Equally detrimental would be if Israel targeted Iranian arms manufacturing sites, especially those producing drones and artillery shells, which Russia has – since the beginning of the Ukrainian war and the Western sanctions – become much more reliant on.

Even as the US and Russia are scrambling to contain the conflict in various ways, Israelis, after a few days of catastrophizing and even as they relentlessly follow the news and prepare for various scenarios, are continuing to go on with their lives – both because that’s just their default mode and as an act of strategic defiance.