IDF should begin military campaign to destroy Hezbollah, MK Gideon Sa'ar says

Israel should embark now on a military campaign to root out Hezbollah from southern Lebanon because waiting to do so will only increase the destructive danger the Iranian proxy group poses to Israel, United Right Party head Gideon Sa’ar told The Jerusalem Post.

“Israel has to destroy Hezbollah at some point,” so “it’s better not to delay,” he said.

He spoke just days after an IDF preemptive strike in Lebanon took out hundreds of Hezbollah missiles and drones as they were set to be launched against central and northern Israel.

In the aftermath of the attack, Hezbollah dialed down its oral threats against Israel, explaining that this had been its retaliatory attack for Israel’s assassination of high-level commander Fuad Shukr at the end of July, and that it was not at the moment planning on launching another one.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said, however, that the organization could later revisit that decision.

From his office in Modi’in, Sa’ar, who was a member of the war cabinet until he quit the government coalition in March to protest the government’s military decisions, presented his argument for decisive action against Hezbollah now.

The United States has sought a diplomatic resolution to the IDF-Hezbollah war that began one day after Hamas’s October 7 invasion of Israel and has prevented over 60,000 Israelis from living in their homes in northern border communities.

The Biden administration believes that a Gaza hostage and ceasefire deal would also pave the way to a diplomatic agreement that would restore calm to northern Israel.

Sa’ar, however, who has long believed that Israel should have embarked on a military campaign against Hezbollah, is of the stance that this only delays the inevitable.

He thought Israel should have preemptively attacked Hezbollah’s missiles in 2016 or 2017 because its military buildup at the time had already crossed “Israel’s redlines.”

It would have been even better to have gone after Hezbollah over a decade ago, when it was distracted by the Syrian civil war and active there, he said.

“We should have done to them what they are doing to us now,” by forcing Hezbollah to fight on two fronts, he said.

Continuing the war of attrition between Israel and Hezbollah and delaying a military campaign would “force Israel to a point of decisive action at a less optimal moment,” rather than at a time of its choosing, he said.

Hezbollah, a non-state actor which has entrenched itself in Lebanon, poses the greatest conventional military risk to Israel, far more so than Iran, said Sa’ar, who is also of the opinion that Israel should not be afraid to directly attack the Islamic Republic as well.

Time is not on Israel’s side in its existential battle with Hezbollah and Iran, particularly given that the Islamic Republic, which is also threatening a major retaliatory strike on Israel, is close to becoming a nuclear state.

At a moment when the international community is urging Israel to resolve the dangers to its borders through peace and normalization agreements, Sa’ar doesn’t believe that is possible.

He supports a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia and think it is important, he just doesn’t believe it will protect Israel against existential military threats, most specifically those from non-state actors such as Hezbollah.

“The Iranians have not been harmed by this war of attrition [with Israel], and Hezbollah can also weather it easier than we can,” Sa’ar said.

“Israel has three strategic choices here,” he said. “It could cave, but I don’t recommend it.”

“We could remain in this endless war of attrition, but our enemies can keep it up longer than we can,” he said.

“The third option is to act decisively,” which is the path he would take, particularly if Iran launches a second direct attack against Israel, such as it did in April.

“We cannot make do with a ‘boutique’ response,’” Sa’ar said, alluding to the IDF strikes later that month against Iranian military sites that were considered a constrained response.

“It has to cause significant harm,” Sa’ar said.

Among the options he listed was to hit at the heart of the Iranian economy by harming the country’s oil industry, which funds the Islamic Republic’s terrorist proxy groups, he explained.

Steps should also be taken to reduce Iran’s nuclear capacity and hit its strategic assets, Sa’ar said.

Israel has to cause enough harm so that the Islamic Republic would think twice before taking steps against the Jewish state, he said.

The focus should also lie in Iran

Israel should also focus on “bringing down” the governmental regime in Tehran, Sa’ar said, a step it has not so much focused on.

Israel, he noted, has caused delays in Iran’s nuclear program through its actions against it, but it has not, at the end of the day, prevented Iran from getting to the point where it is on the edge of becoming a nuclear power.

“We are now at a point where Iran has made significant advances in its uranium enrichments and capability to produce a nuclear bomb,” he said.

Sa’ar did not provide a blueprint for bringing down the Iranian regime, nor did he put forward any practical steps toward doing that.

Toppling the Iranian regime is also a topic Israel should be discussing with the US, which has a joint interest in seeing a new form of government in Iran, he said.

“In our dialogue with the US, we have to put the regime’s survival on the table,” Sa’ar explained.

The Islamic Republic should feel as if it has to choose between its own survival or its nuclear program, he stated.

“We can’t allow Iran to become a nuclear state, and you don’t have to explain why,” he said, as he noted that the Western world has certainly become understanding of the Iranian threat since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022.

Iran has backed Russia, supplying it with arms, drones, missiles and intelligence, he noted, in a conflict where the West has supported Ukraine.

Israel does not use this situation enough to attempt to sway the global community regarding the dangers of a nuclear Iran.

The attacks by the Iranian proxy group the Houthis against cargo ships in the Red Sea, harming international commerce, have also highlighted the problem, he said.

“The same Iranian [terrorist] apparatus acts not only against Israel but also the shipping in the Red Sea, so people are beginning to understand the issue better,” he said.

Sa’ar said he was mindful of the timeline created by the US elections in November and the entry of a new president into the White House in January.

A new administration in January will be less likely to support Israeli military moves, given that it will be just settling into power, he said. Israel would have to take into account that it was setting up a new relationship at the start of what would be a four-year term, rather than the situation that exists now, where the Biden administration is ending its stint in power within less than half a year, he said.

While obviously the threat from Iran is acute, he said, the greatest conventional challenge remains Hezbollah, which would use any period of calm to increase its military prowess.

One has to weigh the benefits of a delayed response against the danger that would be posed by an all-out war with Hezbollah a few years down the road, he said.

“Hezbollah’s firepower would be that much greater, and the danger that much more serious,” he stated.

It’s also important, he stated, to create a situation that would allow residents of the North to return home. A particularly important step to take would be the creation of a buffer zone, he said. This would include IDF forces on the Lebanese border to prevent an October 7-style attack against Israel by Hezbollah, he added.

One of the reasons that October 7 happened is that no such buffer zone was created in Gaza, he said.

“Without placing the IDF in southern Lebanon, you can’t return the residents of the North to their homes,” he said.

Sa’ar, however, said he is opposed to Israeli civilian settlement of southern Lebanon, nor does he believe that Israel should rebuild the 21 settlements it destroyed in Gaza when it withdrew from that enclave in 2005.

“I opposed Disengagement [from the Gaza Strip]. I believe it was a mistake, but don’t think there should be [an Israeli civilian] return,” he said. “There is no international consensus for this.”

Also, Israel’s focus should be on rebuilding communities in the South and the North that were destroyed by the last 10 months of war.

“But I do want to restore something that was once part of our defense, the idea of a buffer zone,” he said.

“It’s not acceptable to end the war [on the northern border] if [Hezbollah’s special] Radwan Force can return to the border and look into the [Israeli] homes there without a telescope,” he said.

Regarding the war in Gaza, Sa’ar said that Israel was “proceeding” in its goal of destroying Hamas, albeit not fast enough.

He reiterated a position he has stated many times in recent months, that Israel was not doing enough to counter Hamas’s governing capabilities. For example, Israel is de facto enabling Hamas members to take responsibility over the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Strip – thus maintaining the population’s dependence on Hamas for basic services. Instead, in the interim, Israel needs to take over the humanitarian distribution itself, or at the least prevent Hamas from controlling it, Sa’ar argued.

A governing alternative for Hamas will become possible only once Hamas is destroyed, Sa’ar added, saying that people attempting to replace Hamas without eradicating it first were “deceiving themselves.” There will come a point in time where this will become possible, but it could take a year or two, Sa’ar said.

He also criticized people who are “toying” with the idea of bringing back the Palestinian Authority to rule Gaza, for a number of reasons.

First, the PA itself has said that it will consent to reentering Gaza only as part of a general agreement over a Palestinian state in the West Bank with east Jerusalem.

Second, all of the defense officials he spoke to said that the PA was currently finding it difficult to govern parts of the West Bank, and that it would not be able to effectively govern Gaza.

Third, the PA maintains its “pay for slay” policy, incites violently against Israel in its education system, and is engaged in “legal warfare” against Israel in international institutions, and thus should not be strengthened.

Sa’ar said that the reason Israel has not come forward with an alternative governing proposal is that it has become stuck on the PA question, which he admitted was a “real point of contention,” as the rest of the world views the PA, “despite everything,” as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. He said that if a new generation of moderate Palestinians would emerge and change the PA, Israel could consider cooperating with it, but the existing leadership doesn’t seem willing to do so, and is not necessarily capable of doing so.

The PA is an “existing fact” in Judea and Samaria, Sa’ar said. Unlike others in the right-wing camp, however, he opposes the attempt to topple the PA there.

However, the PA should not be strengthened either, and should not be given statehood, Sa’ar said. He argued that the reality on the ground is that the PA is unpopular, and jihadists hold more sway. If Israel were to retreat from the West Bank, it would only be a matter of time before Hamas overthrows the PA, as it did in Gaza in 2007, Sa’ar argued.

Sa’ar added that the idea of a demilitarized Palestinian state is “laughable,” particularly given the vast amount of illegal weapons already in the West Bank, including in Areas A and B under direct PA control.

Israel would need to intervene and reenter the West Bank again, should a Palestinian state be created, Sa’ar said. Statehood would then be “the continuation of the conflict by other means,” he said.

Sa’ar’s call for an offensive against Iran and Hezbollah requires a large amount of public trust, but polls since October 7 have shown that Israelis have very low trust in the government. Asked whether the first strategic move should be to replace the government, Sa’ar said that the question was “excellent,” but that Israel could not afford to wait for “lab conditions” to carry out necessary military operations.

“This is a bad government... it is bad at running the war, bad at [running] the economy... it is difficult to find something it isn’t bad at, and I’ve seen many governments,” Sa’ar said.

But “you cannot tell security problems to wait for two years” until the next election, and in his view, the current government is not going to fall in the near future, Sa’ar said.

“If you ask the people of Israel, the majority of which do not have trust in the government... whether to conduct an operation in the north, the people would say yes, and understand why.”

Even most leaders of the opposition parties support such a move, Sa’ar said, adding that while he prefers that a different government should run the war, “the war is now,” and therefore the problem cannot wait. The more time that passes without attacking Iran or significantly harming Hezbollah, the more they will be able to prepare, and even attempt to open new fronts, such as on the Syrian border or by attempting to topple the Jordanian government. Israel therefore cannot afford to wait, Sa’ar stressed.

Still, ministers such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir have taken steps that defense officials said could lead to a deterioration in the security situation. If members of the government itself are acting in ways that damage security, there is still a question of how it can be trusted in an all-out war in the north.

Sa’ar himself has reportedly considered the idea of entering the government if offered the post of defense minister. This could give the coalition 68 seats – enough to remove Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit Party’s six MKs from the government and coalition.

Asked why Sa’ar does not condition any entry into the government on Ben-Gvir leaving it, Sa’ar said, “I have spent enough time in political life to know not to engage in theoretical speculations. It could be an interesting theory if I predicted that [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu had any intention to give up any one of his coalition partners, including Ben-Gvir. Since I do not predict that this is the situation, why should I engage in speculation? It isn’t interesting.”