Israel’s challenges in long-term control of Philadelphi corridor - analysis

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid out plans on Monday to keep control of the Philadelphi corridor along the Egyptian border: The corridor is important to make sure that Hamas cannot return as a threat. He also made bold claims about how Israel wouldn’t leave the area for many years to come, and that, “anyone who wants us to leave the Philadelphi Corridor undermines the war’s objectives; did our soldiers fall in vain, only for us to let Hamas rebuild?”

The Philadelphi corridor has always been important for Hamas, which has demanded that Israel leave it for a reason. Hamas wants to return to control the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, which is key to the overland route supplying Gaza in the past. Through this border, it controls Gaza by making the civilians dependent on Hamas. The UN and international organizations have often partnered with Hamas in various ways because it controls the border. For instance, some NGOs have allowed Hamas to place gunmen on aid trucks.

The challenge for Israel, now that the political leadership has decided that the Philadelphi corridor is essential for security, is figuring out how exactly to secure it. Israel has been shifting its goals in this war since October 7. In the beginning, the political leadership appeared to claim that “there won’t be Hamas in Gaza” after the war. Yet it quickly became clear that the IDF would not be utilized to replace Hamas with another entity. Israel instead conducted raids into areas and then withdrew.

In late October, the IDF captured the Netzarim corridor, separating Gaza City from central Gaza. Since then, the IDF carved out a route across Gaza and has used various divisions to secure it. Troops removed threats and created a zone of control that it could police. Beginning in February and March, politicians began to claim that Israel would also take over Rafah – which the international community opposed.

Israel chose not to go into the corridor along the Egyptian border, despite suggestions by some experts in Israel that this should have been an early focus. Instead, Hamas controlled it for the first six months of the war. Only in May, after Hamas fired projectiles at Kerem Shalom, did the IDF surge into the Philadelphi corridor.

It then took more than three months to defeat the Rafah brigade, the remnants of which likely moved back to Khan Yunis after the IDF withdrew in April. This has let Hamas control most of Gaza, despite ten months of war – the central camps, areas in northern Gaza, most of Khan Yunis, and the Mawasi humanitarian area. Israel’s policy now appears to be shifting toward controlling the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors.

Controlling corridors presents challenges. Hamas has controlled Gaza for more than a decade, laying out terror infrastructure including hundreds of miles of tunnels, rockets, RPGs, and improvised explosive devices.

Now, the IDF has many advantages in Gaza: a plethora of technology – drones and electro-optical cameras that use all sorts of technology that can help spot terrorists; Israeli military and defense tech increasingly also uses artificial intelligence; and Israel also has drones and precision mortars.

It has all sorts of ways to secure its forces in Gaza. Nevertheless, history tells us that securing a static defensive line is not easy.

SECURING A LINE is difficult. Long walls, like those used by Byzantium or Athens, grow vulnerable over time. In addition, even if Israel is not inclined to build a lot of infrastructure in the Philadelphi corridor, securing a border is complex. Israel could choose to use remote-controlled vehicles and put sensors above and below ground. However, those types of sensors largely failed to prevent October 7, meaning they are vulnerable.

Long term goals

So what will be the goal of securing the Philadelphi corridor in the long term?

Will it be to stop underground smuggling, or to deal with the overland trade of dual-use goods that Hamas uses to build tunnels?

In order to understand what needs to be done, it is essential to understand how Hamas turned Gaza into a terror empire. If the war does wind down and reconstruction begins how will Israel prevent aid being diverted to Hamas?

This is more complex than just having Humvees patrolling the Philadelphi corridor.

More concerning is that Israel has sent forces into the corridor before, during the Second Intifada. Hamas has learned in the past that small daily attacks can grind down Israel in a war of attrition. Israel learned this in the security zone in southern Lebanon in the 1990s and it eventually caused its withdrawal.

At the end of the day, an army that is sent to secure a border is often not the best way to secure it; soldiers become complacent. Consider the results on the Jordanian border: The Iranians have begun to find ways to smuggle weapons to terrorists in the West Bank, including M-4 and AR-type rifles, numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

How can Israel control Philadelphi if it can’t control Jenin? The fact is that Israel’s experience securing the border with Sinai, against drug smuggling for instance, and securing the border with Jordan or the West Bank, leaves much to be desired.

Unless the units sent to the Philadelphi corridor are different and the focus learns from challenges on other borders, it’s plausible that this will be a difficult long-term mission. In addition, Hamas and other terror groups have already begun harassing attacks on the IDF. Hamas thrives off these attacks.

Each video it can produce of a sniper shooting or an RPG fired at an IDF vehicle is propaganda. Even when Hamas has attacked vehicles where the active protection system works and stops the projectile, Hamas still claims a “hit.”

All Hamas has to do is sit and wait. An enemy like Hamas has done this before. Its senior leadership such as Yahya Sinwar is from Khan Yunis. They know how to sit and wait. Then they choose the time and place of their attack on opportune targets.

These challenges are not reasons to give up on Philadelphi. However, these challenges must be analyzed and acknowledged. The lesson of the Jordan Valley is an instruction. Israel has communities in the Jordan Valley and the Kingdom of Jordan is a western-backed country that ostensibly is at peace with Israel. However, the smuggling to the terror groups in the West Bank continues. As Philadelphi looms, those sent to patrol it will need to learn lessons from what has worked and not worked in the past.