IDF kills Hassan Nasrallah: Five ways the strike changes Israel's war - analysis

The airstrike on Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on September 27 is a major game-changer in more than 11 months of war. It has the potential to upset Iran’s plans and weaken Hezbollah. Here are five ways the strike may affect the war and the region.

Iran’s most experienced ally targeted

Hassan Nasrallah was Iran’s most experienced ally in the region. The Hezbollah leader had been key to Iran’s plans in the region for decades. In the last several years, he had grown even more powerful. Iran sought to create a multi-front war against Israel in the wake of the October 7 attack, and Nasrallah helped lead that war.

Nasrallah had grown to become the senior leader of Iran’s numerous proxies. He would often host Iranian officials and would also invite representatives from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to Lebanon to coordinate their attacks on Israel. He also sought to muster the Houthis in Yemen to threaten Israel, and he coordinated with Iraqi militias.

The Hezbollah leader had worked with other key Iranian-backed leaders in the region. In recent years, Iran has seen many of them killed, including Qasem Soleimani of the IRGC and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. With those key leaders off the table, Nasrallah was increasingly filling many shoes. Now those shoes are apparently empty.

Hezbollah in disarray

Hezbollah is in disarray. The group has suffered numerous losses to its top leadership in recent days. On September 20, its Radwan force commanders were killed. This represented the loss of 16 key leaders in the terrorist group. In subsequent days, it also lost the head of its drone unit. The loss of Hassan Nasrallah basically cuts the head off the whole organization. It is unclear if Hezbollah had preparations for this scenario.

Hezbollah still has a vast quantity of weapons, including rockets, drones, anti-tank missiles, and precision guided munitions. However, without a clear chain of command or leadership, it will be in chaos and disarray. The group has struggled to respond to Israel’s attacks since the exploding pagers on September 17. It has seen itself suffer one unprecedented blow after another. This keeps the terrorist group off balance.

Hezbollah and Iran now know Israel is serious

Israel’s willingness to call Hezbollah’s bluff and go all in with airstrikes in Beirut illustrates how serious Israel is about achieving its goals in the North. Israel’s cabinet approved adding the goal of returning residents to northern communities to the goals of the war in mid-September. Israel then proceeded immediately to begin cutting Hezbollah into pieces.

Hezbollah did not expect this. It believed Israel would continue to be on the defensive. Hezbollah also likely believed reports in Israel that Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, known for being a hawk on Hezbollah, would be removed. Instead, Gallant has led the body blows that Hezbollah is now suffering.

Hezbollah got complacent and got used to striking at Israel. Now it sees how serious Israel is. However, Hezbollah cannot climb down from the tree. It has claimed it will continue to support Hamas. It can’t stop that support without feeling shame. At the same time, it now doesn’t have strong leadership who can make bold decisions.

Hezbollah expected to dictate the terms to Israel

Hezbollah believed that it was the driving force of this war. It had been attacking Israel for 11 months. It believed that Israel would be pressured into a ceasefire and would then stop fighting in the North. Hezbollah expected that it would keep its arsenal largely intact. It did not expect Israel to force Hezbollah onto the defensive. The group was not ready to go on the defensive and was ill prepared for this kind of war.

Hezbollah had always expected that in any war with Israel it would choose the time and place of the war. It also expected to have the initial initiative. Now its plans have been destroyed, and it has lost so many key commanders that it will take time for it to get back up and sort itself out. Having expected the war to be low intensity and end with a Hezbollah victory, the group’s arrogance appears to have brought it close to ruin.

Hamas and Iran’s other proxies now see Israel’s resolve

Hamas had expected to survive this war and continue to control Gaza. It saw how Israel was fighting a cautious war in Gaza, and it expected that eventually a ceasefire would be forced on Israel. Hamas was happy to see Hezbollah pressuring Israel from the north. For 11 months, Hamas got used to having Hezbollah as a strong ally, able to threaten Israel with 150,000 rockets.

Now Hamas sees that Hezbollah is unable to contend with Israel’s blows. It also sees that Hezbollah’s rocket threat may have diminished. Hezbollah has rarely been able to fire more than a few hundred rockets a day, a lot less than the several thousand that estimates believed Hezbollah could unleash.

Hamas now must wonder if it will soon suffer similar blows to Hezbollah. It has also seen its leadership, such as Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa, eliminated. Hamas assumed that it could cling to power by simply continuing to exist. Now it has seen Israel’s resolve and has seen its key ally in Lebanon weakened. Hamas must now wonder whether its decision to attack on October 7 has turned into a disaster for it and Iran’s group of proxies in the region.

Instead of an endless threat to Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah have now seen Israel take the initiative.