What happened to the US's temporary pier in Gaza? New report sheds light

The dismal end to the US temporary pier has brought into view the need for many lessons to be learned from the decision and process that went into the initiative. Envisioned as a quick fix to a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, the plan to use the US military to build a temporary pier to move aid into Gaza from the sea was hamstrung by many problems from the start.

It was not well thought through. It was too slow and ineffective to work. Nevertheless, US soldiers made a go of it. Now it has been dismantled and is on its way back to Virginia.

In the wake of the dismal results from the pier, a new report looking at what happened has been released. The Office of the Inspector General at the US Agency for International Development has released a report on “USAID’s Gaza Response: External Factors Impaired Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance Through the JLOTS Maritime Corridor.”

It is worth noting that this report is just one of several reports about this pier that will appear. The US military will need to look at many aspects of the operation.

USAID has been involved in providing humanitarian support in Gaza since the early days of the war. After Hamas attacked Israel, “USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance worked with the United Nation’s World Food Program (WFP) to provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza through land crossings in Israel and Egypt,” the report said.

This took place during the initial two weeks of bombing that Israel conducted in October and the first months of the ground operation that began on October 27.

Complicating factors

The IDF began its campaign in northern Gaza and asked more than one million people to evacuate toward a humanitarian area in southern Gaza. Then in December, the IDF also began operating in Khan Yunis. This pushed more people to evacuate toward the humanitarian area on the sea in southern Gaza.

Eventually, Israeli leaders also announced they would launch an operation in Rafah, where more than one million people were located. Many of those people were already displaced. The international community opposed this operation. When images emerged of desperate people trying to get food from a truck convoy, it became clear that the situation in Gaza was desperate.

This set in motion the temporary pier plan. The report said: “In March 2024, President Biden directed the Department of Defense to establish a temporary maritime corridor to deliver aid to the Gaza coast to supplement land-based humanitarian aid operations. The Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) modular system would transport aid from Cyprus via a series of vessels, a floating platform, and a temporary pier affixed to the beach. USAID requested Department of Defense support through JLOTS for about 90 days, with a goal of feeding or assisting 500,000 people each month.”

The pier would cost more than $200 million. It would also take weeks to cross the ocean because four US army vessels would need to travel to the Mediterranean to construct the pier and operate it.

The plan was complex. Multiple ships would need to get to the coast of Israel. The pier would be affixed to the shore, and then goods could be transported from Cyprus. The pier was apparently not intended for sea conditions in which swells were more than a meter. However, this is the kind of sea state that is relatively common in the Mediterranean.

By May 16, the pier was affixed to the shore. Israel helped by securing the area on the land side and also clearing an area for humanitarian aid to be gathered and then trucked inland. This was part of the Netzarim Corridor that Israel was controlling south of Gaza city, so Israeli forces were in this area anyway.

The complexity of having the US military build a pier, along with the weather and with USAID and other organizations involved and the Israeli military on the land side, created so many variables that it was clear that this would be a challenge. Every plan does not survive contact with the enemy, so the saying goes. In this case, the “enemy” was the weather and other logistical problems.

The pier ran into problems quickly. The WFP paused delivery of aid on May 19 and resumed it on May 21, adding to the chaos. On May 25, a small storm caused the pier to be dismantled, and several small portions ran aground on the Israeli coast. This caused several days of pulling the pieces of the pier – in fact, a tugboat section of the pier – off the coast by the USAV Matamoros, one of the US ships involved in the operation.

The pier operated again from June 7-9 and from June 19 to July 17, when it was finally dismantled. During this time, the IDF had already launched an operation in Rafah, and it had also opened new crossings for aid to northern Gaza. In addition, the IDF launched a raid into Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza, an area several kilometers from the pier, which led to controversy regarding the pier.

In fact, the pier was never popular with any of the sides. The pro-Palestinian side didn’t like it, claiming it was papering over a dire situation in Gaza. Many voices who support Israel also felt it was a failure and potentially endangering the lives of Americans and IDF soldiers because it was a target for Hamas.

In some cases, trucks were looted. Overall, the chaos and the need to dismantle and reattach the pier made it less relevant for aid delivery. The report concluded: “In the 20 days JLOTS operated, 8,100 metric tons of assistance were delivered through JLOTS to Gaza. This was enough to feed 450,000 people for 1 month, according to USAID, at a time when access and security constraints hindered aid deliveries and distribution through traditional land routes.”

USAID had limited control over the decisions regarding the pier, the report said, including “where it would be located, and who would provide security on the beach and during transportation of JLOTS-delivered aid. These issues, coupled with high winds and rough seas in the Mediterranean Sea near the Gaza coast, impaired the Agency’s ability to deliver the intended amounts of aid through the maritime corridor.”

The report is not the final chapter. This is merely a report showing that USAID tried to utilize this pier, and that it was largely unable to do enough with it. The real story will relate to the US military and some of the decisions about why this concept was used in the first place.

There are lessons to be learned here. It appears this capability that the US possesses has many limitations. The concept of a temporary pier is a good one, but if it only works when the seas are calm, then it is limited.

The decision to send the pier came at a time when there was increasing chaos in Gaza. This was after the first phases of the IDF’s ground operation and before the Rafah operation in May. The US wanted to send a pier as a quick fix so that when the Rafah operation began, people would have enough food arriving. This was because of expected disruptions to the Rafah crossing.

This all makes sense, and it’s unfair to judge the operation too harshly. There were many other factors involved. However, it is clear that the land crossings that Israel eventually opened in northern Gaza actually were the best solution.

There was no compelling reason to bring food to a temporary pier when there are many working piers in Ashdod. Ultimately, this is where the aid arrived, and the temporary pier proved it was not capable of doing most of the mission envisioned.