The politics and policy behind Gideon Sa'ar's public pivot - analysis

Minister-without-portfolio MK Gideon Sa’ar argued in the Knesset plenum on Monday that his decision to rejoin the government was a patriotic move. Sa’ar explained that he left the government in March over what he said was a “stumbling” war effort in Gaza, but that the aggressive action against Hezbollah in the past two weeks indicated a paradigm shift.

He added that his views in favor of expanding military action in the North and against a ceasefire were far more prevalent in the coalition than in the opposition. However, Israel’s security situation required him to put aside his criticism of the government’s performance in general, and of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in particular.

There is no reason not to believe in Sa’ar’s sincerity. But the context, timing, and manner of his decision indicate that there is far more than idealism at play.

Sa’ar was optimistic about his United Right party after its better-than-expected performance in the February municipal elections. This contributed to his decision to break away from MK Benny Gantz and leave the government in March.

But for months he has consistently not passed the electoral threshold in polls. This, coupled with the fact that a merger between the anti-Netanyahu right-wing parties did not occur, paved the way back into the government.

As recently as two weeks ago, sources in Sa’ar’s party said that he would not suffice for anything less than becoming defense minister. However, the failed attempt to appoint him as defense minister left him more politically vulnerable than before.

Sa’ar became a persona non grata in the opposition and simultaneously lost credibility with supporters who despised Netanyahu. In this weakened position, Sa’ar was forced to drop his central demand and agreed to enter the government for a measly minister-without-portfolio position, a seat in the National Security Cabinet, and a promise from Netanyahu to join small security consultations.

Sa’ar also agreed to enter the government without a signed coalition agreement. On one hand, this benefits him as he does not have to commit to voting with the coalition on issues such as a bill to provide an exemption from IDF service for at least part of eligible haredim, or the 2025 budget. On the other hand, however, Sa’ar was not promised a seat in the Likud in the next elections and does not have much leverage now that he has already joined the government, leaving his political future still unclear. The fact that Sa’ar was willing to enter the government without this promise is another indication of his diminished bargaining power.

Personal vendettas were at play here as well. Sa’ar noted in his speech in the Knesset that he had repaired his relationship with Netanyahu. This is astonishing, considering that prior to the war he had called Netanyahu’s leadership a “disaster” and fiercely criticized the government as a whole.

ON THE flip side, the enmity between Sa’ar and opposition leader MK Yair Lapid was on full display in the Knesset plenum, with both exchanging emotionally charged accusations. Sa’ar’s relationship with Benny Gantz and MK Gadi Eisenkot was also noticeably bad since he broke away from Gantz in May.

Sa’ar’s entry also affects Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who will now have a potential replacement breathing down his neck. According to a source in the opposition, undermining the defense minister in wartime is the opposite of patriotism – and the move is more an act of “weakness and desperation” due to the lack of public support.

How will Sa’ar’s entry into the government affect Israel’s war policy and other central policy issues?

First, Sa’ar will likely put his weight down in favor of increased military aggression in both Gaza and Lebanon. His presence will be a counterweight to more moderate figures in the small security consultations, such as Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Shas chairman MK Aryeh Deri.

Second, in an interview with The Jerusalem Post in late August, Sa’ar said that he would not support a hostage deal that would block Israel’s ability to defeat Hamas in Gaza and replace it with another governing body. This, coupled with Sa’ar’s strong support for increased aggression against Hezbollah, means that he is unlikely at the moment to support a deal that would include ceasefires in Gaza, Lebanon, or both.

Perhaps he would consider a deal under certain conditions, including the release of a large number of Palestinian prisoners – yet Hamas’s attempts to ensure it remains in power mean that Sa’ar’s presence is unlikely to hasten a deal to free the remaining hostages.

Finally, Sa’ar’s presence could counter some of the government’s recent attempts to reenact its controversial judicial reforms. As the former justice minister, Sa’ar has been an outspoken critic of the reforms and will oppose them in the government as well.

He is unlikely to join the chorus of ministers who routinely attack Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara, as Sa’ar himself appointed her to the position. In addition, now that Sa’ar will be coming into contact frequently with Justice Minister Yariv Levin, he may even be able to convince Levin to stop avoiding electing a chief justice and new High Court judges.