Why do Israelis turn against their own? Experts uncover how Iran recruits spies

Seven Israeli citizens from Haifa and northern Israel, originally from Azerbaijan, have been arrested on suspicion of spying for Iran. The group, which includes a military deserter and two minors, allegedly completed 600 espionage tasks over two years. They gathered intelligence on military sites, such as the Kirya headquarters and Ramat David airbase.

According to authorities, they were in contact with Iranian agents through a Turkish intermediary and received payments in cryptocurrency and cash.

Experts shed light on how Iran recruits spies, who is most vulnerable to recruitment, and the techniques used, along with the motivations behind cooperating with Iranian operatives.

The motivation

Uri Bar-Joseph, a professor of international relations at Haifa University, outlined three common motivations for espionage: ideology, money, and pressure. In the case of Iran, Bar-Joseph believes the main incentive is financial. “In the case of Iran, my guess is that it’s not ideology, and it’s not pressure. It’s money—what the Iranians offer,” he said.

Bar-Joseph noted that it is unlikely for Iran to successfully recruit well-integrated Israelis. "If you try to do it with a normative Israeli—someone born here, who went to the army—it most likely won’t work,” he said. Instead, intelligence agencies tend to focus on those who don’t fit this profile.

Beni Sabti, a researcher in the Iran program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and coordinator of the podcast Voices from Iran, explained that Iranian intelligence often preys on new immigrants’ feelings of isolation. Sabti, who immigrated from Iran 40 years ago, emphasized that financial gain or criminal backgrounds aren’t the only factors at play.

“Some immigrants to Israel may be dissatisfied with their situation after immigrating. They miss their home, as moving from one country to another isn’t easy,” Sabti explained, stressing the challenges of adjusting to a new culture, language, and environment.

Sabti further explained that Iranian intelligence specifically targets these feelings of isolation and discontent.“When there’s a person who comes and hugs you and understands your psychological problems, this makes you closer to them. This is the trick that the Iranians use,” Sabti explained. “They look for angry people who are not satisfied with Israel and its attitude—not politically, but socially and emotionally. These grievances could stem from small incidents, such as difficulties communicating due to language barriers or feeling insulted because of cultural beliefs or even an accent,” he added.

“If someone feels embarrassed at a bank because they can’t speak Hebrew, or they feel excluded due to their appearance, these small slights can become a matter of honor,” Sabti said. “Over time, these incidents accumulate, and the person becomes angry at Israeli society.”

The process

Sabti noted that this process of exploitation often starts with psychological manipulation.

“They first offer comfort, providing psychological support and understanding,” Sabti explained. This initial attention can feel like an emotional lifeline for someone struggling to integrate, and over time, it becomes addictive. “It’s like a drug,” he said. “The attention feels good, and you grow more attached to it.”

Once trust is built, the requests start. “It might begin with small tasks, like taking a photo of a mall. It seems harmless at first, but it escalates,” Sabti added. “You receive small rewards, maybe $100 or $200, but once you’re hooked, the missions become bigger, with larger payouts.”

Bar-Joseph compared this to cases in the US, where even highly trusted FBI and CIA agents were recruited by foreign adversaries purely for financial gain. “We had spies who did it only for money, and they passed all security checks,” he said. “If it could happen to Americans working for the Soviets and Chinese, it could happen to Israelis too.”

Sabti further explained that cultural ties play a key role in Iranian recruitment efforts, making immigrants from regions like Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan particularly vulnerable. “They may speak Russian, but culturally, they are closer to Iranians,” he said. “They share similar traditions and attitudes, making it easier for Iranians to build trust.”

Beyond these tactics, Sabti emphasized that Israel’s current approach to the issue is inadequate.

“There’s a kind of naivety in how Israel handles this,” Sabti warned. “When I immigrated, all they wanted to confirm was that I was Jewish, and that was it. Today, we can’t afford to be so naive.”

He pointed out that new technologies and evolving espionage methods add to the challenge. “With apps that self-destruct messages and smartphones, even a 9-year-old could become a spy,” he said.

Sabti believes that preventing such recruitment requires a more comprehensive approach, addressing the social and emotional needs of new immigrants. He proposed establishing personal connections with immigrants, much like Israel supports lone soldiers.

“If we had people regularly visit these families and pay attention to their issues, it would make a big difference,” he suggested.

Sabti stressed the importance of recognizing warning signs. “If someone expresses some discontent with Israel or feels persecuted, it’s a red flag,” he said. Instead of responding solely with investigations, Sabti suggested involving mental health professionals. “It’s better to have a psychologist or someone talk to them and understand what’s wrong,” he advised. “Even addressing the issue slightly is better than doing nothing.”

“We need to be more accepting and supportive, helping people adapt to life in Israel,” Sabti urged. “It’s a small step from feeling dissatisfied to doing something against your country,” he warned. “Sometimes, just offering a bit more support can make a big difference.”

The recent case involving seven Palestinian residents of east Jerusalem accused of collaborating with Iranian operatives highlights additional motivations in Iran's recruitment strategies.

These individuals, aged 19 to 23, were indicted for allegedly plotting to assassinate an Israeli nuclear scientist and a city mayor. Like Israeli Jewish immigrants, they too may experience economic hardship and social isolation. Living under complex sociopolitical conditions, Palestinian Jerusalemites often face challenges that can make them susceptible to recruitment through financial offers and emotional manipulation. Moreover, political and ideological factors related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may further motivate them to cooperate with Iranian agents. This combination of economic vulnerability, social marginalization, and political grievances likely distinguishes their motivations from those of Israeli Jewish recruits.