How has Maj. Gen. Avi Bluth handled extremism, terrorism in the West Bank? - analysis

Closing in on five months into his role as commander of IDF Central Command, with responsibility for the West Bank, is the area more or less safe than before Maj.-Gen. Avi Bluth took on the job?

There are no clear answers, and there is contrary evidence pointing in both directions, depending on which anecdotal evidence you focus on and how you measure the impact of outside factors. But Bluth has definitely already put his own stamp on the role.

In judging his success or failure, the analysis – and The Jerusalem Post has checked in with a variety of sources and data on both sides – needs to look at various factors: Are levels of Palestinian terrorism against Israelis in the West Bank up or down? Are levels of Jewish extremist violence against Palestinians up or down? Is the law regarding illegal building by both sides being enforced? What is the general perception of whether there is order?

According to the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), there has been no real change in serious Palestinian terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria since Bluth took over on July 8 from his predecessor, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yehuda Fuchs.

During July, there were 12 terrorist attacks, up from eight in May and five in June. There were 10 in August, six in September, and eight in October, the center reported.

April was actually the worst month of 2024, with 16, but the basic trend has been a large number of serious Palestinian terrorist attacks – far larger than before the war started in 2023, with neither Fuchs, nor Bluth so far, getting control of the situation.

Of course, the war is only one way to measure these statistics, especially because violence in the West Bank had spiked already as of March 2022 with several waves of terrorism.

So, looking back to include the 2022 wave of terrorism, when there were 86 terrorist attacks, and 2023 when there were 182, the current year is somewhere in the middle.

But this is not the way Israelis really want to measure their security. The 2022-2023 period was viewed as a disaster in terms of the level of terrorism in Judea and Samaria and far beyond “acceptable very occasional” levels.

The 86 terrorist attacks in 2022 were much more than the 34 in 2019, 40 in 2020, and 54 in 2021.

The 98 serious Palestinian terrorist attacks so far this year are on pace to reach anywhere from 105 to 110 for all of 2024. Apart from the largest spike in 2023, the last time serious terrorist attacks would have broken the 100 level would be in 2016.

The bottom line is that 2024 has been a stark failure in restoring security and order compared with almost every other year in the past decade.

And this is taking into account the better-looking statistics for the West Bank; the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) says there have been eight serious attacks in September, 26 in August, and 27 in July – higher numbers than the ITIC.

This would not be the perspective of Bluth and the IDF. They would emphasize statistics that during the current war, the IDF has killed 750 terrorists in the West Bank, 70% of whom were holding weapons (some could be shot while trying to escape and where arrest is not realistic).

Their records indicate only 3% of those killed by the IDF in countless gunfights in urban areas were civilians. This is a huge increase of killing terrorists in the West Bank, while still not killing, in relative terms, a substantial number of civilians.

In addition, Bluth believes investing more in intelligence collection and arming the various Jewish communities has improved security in the area.

Furthermore, the Post has learned that they believe the biggest trend to watch is the increase in airstrikes and large-scale anti-terrorism operations since Bluth has taken over.

Sometimes this has meant an increase in killed terrorists as opposed to those arrested. It has also meant a significant reduction in successes from organized terrorist groups, especially from Hamas.

Bluth’s view is that any Palestinian terrorist success needs to be framed not just in terms of there being an increased broad motivation for terrorism in Judea and Samaria due to the ongoing war, but also due to a specific push by Iran to inflame the West Bank.

According to Iran, the West Bank is an ideal place to use terrorist proxies against Israel. It believes it is the hardest location for Israel to establish a definite link to Tehran, and it avoids the major losses the ayatollahs have taken on during two head-to-head rounds with Israel in April and October.

Also, Bluth thinks West Bank Palestinians – both because of Iran and the ideology naturally surrounding them – were highly provoked into violent action after Israel managed to kill Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

Furthermore, Bluth knows that anytime there is a successful terrorist attack, it can lead to a new wave of copycats. He has prided himself on squelching any attempt to turn one or two attacks into a new wave with a series of sometimes preemptive large-scale and longer IDF raids into the West Bank.

Under Bluth, the IDF has entered Jenin in larger numbers around six times, including the largest raid in the late summer, which lasted for around 10 days, the Post has learned.

According to defense sources, many of the recent terrorist attacks that have succeeded have been lower-grade ones, such as single-person rammings, as opposed to more organized shootings by several terrorists.

Moreover, the IDF under Bluth has preempted terrorism in other situations, such as just before Rosh Hashanah, when it killed 14 terrorists in Tulkarm who were planning a huge “anniversary-style” terrorist attack for October 7, 2024.

These preemptive attacks did not end terrorism in the West Bank, but they have prevented Hamas and other terrorist groups from destabilizing the West Bank, enabling the military to stay more focused on the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon.

Bluth would also say while much of the IDF’s focus has been on Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm in the northern West Bank, there has still been enforcement activity against terrorism in the southern West Bank, including Hebron.

Of course, such a defense of Bluth’s record raises the obvious question: Will terrorism in the West Bank dissipate after the Lebanon ceasefire? The same logic that says terrorism has been harder because of the surrounding conflicts would dictate that with the nearby fighting ending, Judea and Samaria should also become quieter.

Jewish extremist violence

Statistically, the picture human-rights groups present of Jewish extremist violence is also negative both before and during Bluth’s tenure.

By the way, why refer to the term Palestinian terrorism versus the term Jewish extremist violence?

First of all, there are incidents of Jewish terrorism when Jews have killed Palestinians in cold blood; in such cases, Jewish terrorism is the right term.

But as a phenomenon, these cases are very few, and most Jewish extremism problems are issues of vandalizing and burning property and physical beatings. While clearly criminal and violent, they have not led to anywhere near the same number of deaths of Palestinian civilians as there have been deaths of Jewish civilians.

There are also cases in which soldiers have killed Palestinian civilians, but most of these are by mistake. Instances in which they acted illegally have led to prosecutions.

In any case, according to the International Crisis Group, there have been 1,289 incidents of Jewish extremists (not soldiers) attacking Palestinians or their property since October 7, 2023, leading to 378 injuries and 16 fatalities.

By comparison, there were 400 such incidents in 2021 and many fewer in the years going back to 2016.

Likewise, there were closer to 100 injuries in 2021, with hardly any in some years going back to 2016, and fatalities ranging much lower, between zero and five.

These statistics are not that hard to understand, given that there have been three mass Jewish violent attacks on Palestinian villages between February 2023 and August 2024.

The first two were in 2023 against Huwara, between Nablus and to Ramallah; and Turmus Aiya, near Ramallah. They were under Fuchs, but the most recent one in Jit on August 15 came on Bluth’s watch.

Around 100 Jewish extremists entered the northern West Bank village of Jit, firing bullets and tear gas and torching cars and homes, killing a Palestinian and wounding several others.

This would have been bad enough if it was the first such incident. But given the earlier two incidents, it is difficult to see how the IDF, under Bluth, allowed this to happen.

If 100 Palestinians marched on a settlement in Judea and Samaria, the IDF would probably flood the area with troops and drones for months or years to make sure it would be literally impossible for it to happen again.

While there are plenty of excuses and finger-pointing among the IDF and other security services, the bottom line is that neither the IDF nor Bluth had enough troops or drones in the area to stop such a large convoy of Jewish extremists until they had already done significant violence and damage.

Regarding the 3% civilians killed in IDF operations against Palestinian terrorists in urban settings, the military would say this is much lower than on any other front. Critics would argue that killing 25 to 30 civilians is too high in comparison with the low level threat presented by West Bank terrorism.

Another sign that Bluth does not yet have control over the situation came when he was attacked and chased by dozens of Jewish extremists during a visit to Hebron on November 22. This came only a few weeks after two female soldiers were wounded by Jewish extremists at Givat Assaf when the military tried to prevent them from destroying Palestinian olive groves.

Jewish expansion and Palestinian property destruction

Bluth is less fully responsible for some of the issues relating to alleged land theft by Jewish extremists, the building of illegal outposts on Palestinian land, or enforcement to bulldoze such outposts.

Operationally, he gives the order if an outpost is to be bulldozed, and his soldiers are supposed to prevent destruction of property.

But Bluth’s view is that these issues, and some issues that the police should handle, also implicate the IDF’s West Bank Civil Administration, which now passes the ball on this to Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich.

Neither IDF Central Command nor the Civil Administration have provided statistics about how many illegal Jewish outposts have been taken down during Bluth’s era.

It is public knowledge that the IDF has demolished an illegal outpost at Oz Zion multiple times, including about two weeks ago, after Jewish extremists illegally rebuilt it.

An attack by Jewish extremists on the Palestinian town of Beit Furik, near Nablus, in which some property was torched, was prevented from being a much larger and worse incident by quick moves by the IDF to block a larger group from joining in the attack, the Post has learned.

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), Israel approved nearly 13,000 new housing units in Judea and Samaria in 2023, as well as the erection of an unprecedented number of new illegal outposts. Since the beginning of 2024, Israel has declared new state ownership of almost 6,000 acres of West Bank land, more than in any previous calendar year, the ICG reported.

Furthermore, Jewish extremists have destroyed nearly 23,000 Palestinian-owned trees, the ICG said, adding that extremists together with IDF activities have led to 1,378 Palestinians being displaced.

In some instances, Israel’s position is that the Palestinians built illegally, but the government and the military do not share numbers on the issue. Meanwhile, the Palestinians say they almost never get approval to build anywhere.Some of these issues are political and have no criminal side to them, while some have a clear criminal element to them.

A large problem that again goes beyond what Bluth can handle alone is that many Israeli defense and legal officials have acknowledged that enforcement against low-grade Jewish attacks on Palestinians and their property has always been weak. Furthermore, it has gotten much worse under National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, they say.

There are some cases in which the Shin Bet arrests Jewish extremists when a Palestinian is killed, and those often lead to prosecutions. But many Jewish attackers, especially with lower-grade violence, are never caught.

The IDF has admitted it could do more, but no one is expecting that Bluth will succeed more than his predecessors. Some believe that with his extra personal focus on attacking Palestinian terrorists, he may pay even less attention to Jewish attacks.

Among other issues, the government’s limiting of Palestinian workers from the West Bank coming into Israel to around 10,000 as opposed to the prewar numbers of 210,000 is viewed by defense sources as causing significant increases in Palestinian violence. But this is another political decision.

Generally, the Palestinian Authority is viewed as working better with Israel than before the war. But it is still too weak to assert its authority in certain portions of the West Bank, and this reality weakens the security environment.

With all that, there are probably more questions than answers about where things stand under Bluth, and four months is still a short time to compare with much longer-term trends of violence.

The real test will be whether he can restore greater stability now than the broader war is coming to a close.