MK Gadi Eisenkot reflects on war, leadership, and family tragedy - interview

In an interview with Walla, former IDF chief of staff and Member of the Knesset Gadi Eisenkot discusses the loss of his son, and his experience throughout the war, particularly during major decision-making moments. 

Tomorrow marks the anniversary of the death of Sergeant Major Gal Eisenkot in battle in Jabaliya. His father, former Eisenkot, has since adapted to a new and permanent title: a bereaved father. 

Unlike his other titles, this one lasts a lifetime. Throughout his 40 years in uniform, Eisenkot visited and consoled hundreds of bereaved families, attended countless funerals, and knocked on doors to deliver devastating news to families whose worlds had been shattered. One day, he found himself on the other side–not knocking on a door but standing behind one.

Walla asked Eisenkot how he was coping as the anniversary approached. "These days are very intense," he replied. "On Friday, we’ll commemorate his passing with family. On Saturday, there’s a memorial event at the CrossFit surf club in Galil Yam. In the evening, a gathering with friends."

You had a unique connection with him.

"Gal was our youngest child. I worried about him more than the others because he was always pushing boundaries. He had immense curiosity, interest, and a sense of adventure. He was passionate about fitness, extreme sports, triathlons, and surfing worldwide, as well as extreme skiing. He sought the most challenging places–the biggest waves, the steepest slopes. He lived life to the fullest, and as his father, I accompanied it with worry. I was very concerned about him. I always knew where he was and called him frequently."

He probably didn’t appreciate that.

"Not really. I tried to instill a sense of responsibility and safety in him and made him take extra care not only of himself but also of those around him. And that’s how he was–always caring for everyone, always looking out for others. Once in Thailand, one of the girls in their group fainted. Gal revived her, restored her pulse, carried her on his back, and evacuated her."

"He was a combat medic, almost a paramedic by training. When he enlisted, I understood immediately where this was headed. He was a combat soldier in the 551st Battalion and served in the reserves alongside soldiers from units like Maglan, the Paratroopers Brigade, and Duvdevan. I understood the implications. He was always on the front line. He’d tell me, ‘Dad, don’t worry. I’m in the medical team; I’m not in the lead.’ I’d respond, ‘Gal, from my experience, those at the back sometimes face more danger.’"

And then the war broke out. Did you manage to keep your composure?

"I tried to put on a brave face, mainly to reassure Hanna [his wife, Gal’s mother]. I told Gal, ‘Listen, you’re part of the strongest force; nothing can stand against you. But stay vigilant.’ The intention was to instill confidence in him. And I succeeded–he had confidence like four Chiefs of Staff rolled into one. But I admit, it was all a facade for me. Hanna stayed constantly updated through a network of mothers of soldiers and knew what was happening."

Gal fell in combat during an operation to recover the bodies of hostages. Do you think it’s appropriate to risk soldiers’ lives to retrieve bodies?

"I discussed this with Hanna. She asked me, ‘Do you think it’s reasonable for our son to die retrieving bodies?’ I told her, ‘In this case, it was justified to send them. I was aware of the intelligence and the level of risk, and it was a reasonable decision. If I were Chief of Staff, I would have also approved this operation. There are cases where the risk is too high, and then you don’t go ahead. But you never know how such operations will end. That’s part of it."

Did you have a sense that something terrible was about to happen?

"His death is linked to the previous hostage deal. He came home on its last day and was called back when it fell through after 24 hours. He managed to be home for one night, visited friends, and had dinner with us. At some point, he picked up our granddaughter and kissed her. Suddenly, I felt the need to photograph him–a strange feeling. I took four photos with my phone. The next morning, I woke him at 7 AM, drove him to Arlozorov Street, and he took a bus back to the assembly point. Our last exchange was via text. His last call was to his girlfriend, and then he texted me that he was turning off his phone. That week, he didn’t call me, even though he would sometimes ask his company commander to borrow the military phone to call my secure line. When he didn’t call that week, I understood they were extremely busy.

"On the morning of his death, Benny and I were traveling to the Gaza border. At the Yahalom Unit base, we were briefed on all the explosive devices captured in Gaza and the different types they encountered there. We then drove to the division headquarters for another briefing. About half an hour in, I noticed activity out of the corner of my eye. A female officer I knew entered the room, called the division chief of staff outside, and he returned looking shaken.

Then I saw Nadav Padan enter, glance at me, approach, and ask me to step outside with him. I understood immediately. He said, ‘Gal was critically wounded – possibly fatally. Go home.’ I told him, ‘Nadav, when someone is fatally wounded, it means they’ve passed. How did it happen?’ He told me it was an explosive device. At that moment, I switched to autopilot."

What do you mean by 'autopilot'? Your youngest son had just been killed. How can you describe your feelings in that moment?

"A feeling I can’t describe – like a suffocating weight. But I got into the car and began making phone calls. I called my eldest son, Guy, and said, ‘Listen, Gal has been killed. Go home and make sure no one enters the house until I get there.’ I called Pasco, my former chief of staff, who was on his way to the hospital in Ashdod, where Gal had been evacuated. He told me Gal arrived at the hospital with a pulse, and they fought to save him, but it wasn’t successful. I called Guy again to confirm he had reached the house and no one had entered."

What happened when you got home?

"I arrived at about 3:15 PM. Hanna was putting our granddaughter to sleep. One of my daughters was already there, and two more were on their way. The girls had planned to spend the afternoon with their mother. I told them, ‘Listen, Gal has been killed. He was hit by an explosive device. I believe he died instantly. He was evacuated to Ashdod. That’s it.’ No one could speak anymore. We just cried."

During the shiva, we were visited by Brigadier General (Res.) Vered Pomerantz, who now heads the Family Liaison Unit in the Ministry of Defense's Hostage Affairs Division. In the past, she was the legendary casualty officer of the Golani Brigade.

Eisenkot was one of the many she once persuaded to send their sons to Golani. "Only Golani. My son will not serve anywhere else," she’d told him and countless others. "When I hesitated," Eisenkot recalled, "she brought out of nowhere Uri Sagi, one of Golani’s legendary brigade commanders." And it worked. Her son Daniel became a Golani soldier. During the APC disaster in Shuja'iyya during Operation Protective Edge, he was killed. At the shiva for Gal, Pomerantz came to console Eisenkot. "Now you can finally look me in the eyes without lowering your gaze," she told him.

A Family’s triple tragedy

People say lightning doesn’t strike the same place twice. But it does. A day after Gal’s death, Gadi Eisenkot’s nephew, Maor Cohen Eisenkot (the son of his sister Sharon), was killed in battle in Gaza. Less than a month later, on November 17, lightning struck again – 700 meters from where Gal fell. Captain Yogev Pazzi, a beloved cousin and platoon commander in the Nachshon Battalion of the Kfir Brigade, was also killed.

It feels like a curse was placed upon your family.

"Yes, it’s difficult. Yogev’s death felt like a replay of Gal’s. When I was informed he had been killed, I drove home and told my children to gather. Two daughters were already with us, and I called Guy to come home from university. I told them, ‘Yogev has been killed.’ You have to understand–Yogev was like a younger brother to Gal. They were deeply connected in heart and soul. By the way, the first in our family to be injured was Omer, my brother’s son, an officer in the 5th Brigade, who was wounded early in the war. Two months ago, I attended his wedding. He walked down the aisle with his radio operator, who was blinded in the same incident where he was injured."

War Cabinet minister Gadi Eisenkot, eulogizing his son Gal, who fell in battle, a hero, fighting Hamas monsters in Jabaliya. pic.twitter.com/laizJdpaQO

— Eylon Levy (@EylonALevy) December 8, 2023

How do you cope? Honestly, this sounds inhuman.

"The night before Gal’s funeral, I sat down to write his eulogy. I decided to write as a father–not as a cabinet minister or a Chief of Staff. I wrote it in five minutes. During the shiva, I reflected a lot. I’ve seen hundreds of bereaved families. I told my family upfront: the pain is immense and enduring, and time does not dull it. Gal was the happiest person I ever knew. He always had a smile on his face. In my office, I have a picture of him sitting in the snow after skiing, smiling. He always smiled. After triathlons, I’d run to wrap him in a coat, and he’d be smiling.

But in the end, life goes on. There’s no choice. On the fourth day of the shiva, I was informed of a significant event. I left and went to the cabinet meeting, with the beginnings of a beard on my face. I think I challenged that cabinet quite a bit during the session. I didn’t come to quarrel–I came with good intentions. When it was my turn to speak, I said, ‘Don’t go easy on me because I won’t go easy on you.’"

Let’s go back to October 7, Saturday morning. Where were you?

"I was preparing to go for a morning walk when I heard the sirens and turned on the TV. Gal had slept at our house the night before. I woke him up and said, ‘It’s war.’ Just then, footage appeared of a white Toyota driving through Sderot. Gal asked me, ‘What’s that?’ I told him, ‘It’s a truck with terrorists in Sderot. This is war.’ He enlisted that day. Meanwhile, Benny Gantz, Chili Tropper, and I were discussing amongst ourselves. It was clear we would be entering the government. It took three days to arrange."

You joined the government on October 11, a date that will go down in history for the debate over whether to eliminate Nasrallah.

"That’s right. Benny [Gantz] called me that day and told me, ‘Today we’re signing, and tomorrow we’ll be sworn in.’ I reviewed the agreement–it was perfectly fine. I was getting ready to go home for a haircut when Benny urgently summoned me to the Kirya [IDF headquarters]. ‘Come immediately; there’s a critical discussion at 5 p.m.’ We entered the meeting, and I already understood what was on the table."

Although the story has been reported and published, Eisenkot refrains from explicitly stating what was discussed. However, it is known that the meeting centered on an operational opportunity to assassinate Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah’s entire Shura Council leadership. Israeli air force planes were armed and airborne, waiting for orders from the political echelon.

According to the plan, the assassination would trigger Hezbollah’s commanders and fighters to mobilize, prompting Israel to detonate 15,000 booby-trapped radios, killing between 10,000 and 15,000 operatives. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, backed by the entire security establishment, recommended executing the plan. Netanyahu hesitated and wanted to stop it. [Aryeh] Deri agreed with him, as did Ron Dermer. But Netanyahu needed significant support from experienced security officials. This is why Gantz and Eisenkot were urgently summoned.

"It was a very heavy, very serious discussion," Eisenkot recalls. "We found ourselves going from zero to one hundred without warning, in such a dramatic debate, with the small group that later became the war cabinet. At that stage, everyone spoke, sharing their opinions. We were still essentially private citizens, not yet sworn in. Netanyahu said, ‘Gadi, I want to hear your opinion.’

With my experience as a chief of staff and in such discussions, I suddenly realized there was no recording, no stenographer. I said, ‘Prime Minister, this is a critical discussion. It must be recorded, and a stenographer must be present. Decisions of enormous consequence are being made here. Intelligence chiefs should also be present.’ They brought in recording equipment and a stenographer, and then I spoke. Essentially, it turned out that I was the only one recorded in that discussion because everyone else had spoken before. Herzi, Gallant, everyone. Only I was recorded."

How did it end? We all know.

"At some point, towards the end of the meeting in the Prime Minister’s Office, we saw rumors on TV about dozens of Hezbollah drones landing in the Galilee. Alerts kept coming in. We rushed downstairs to the underground bunker. That’s where the matter was decided."

You helped Netanyahu avoid the strike that day. In hindsight, was it a mistake? Eliminating Hezbollah’s leadership just four days after October 7 could have shortened the entire conflict.

"Absolutely not. We knew the intelligence picture and understood that operational opportunities to take down Nasrallah would arise again. Yahya Sinwar had orchestrated the most severe attack on Israel since its founding, and we needed to deal with him first. A strike in Lebanon would have shifted our efforts northward when we still had 250 hostages in the south. There were other questions: Are we prepared for a war in the North? Is there a plan? Later, people told me we were ready with the 'Beepers Operation.' That’s complete nonsense. Most people had no idea about the beepers, which only became a possibility much later. The decision made that day was very correct. We needed to handle the South first. At that point, we were still clearing out terrorist cells from the area."

You’re ignoring the argument that an early, dramatic blow to Hezbollah would have shortened the process and positively impacted the southern front.

"Look, in war, you can’t play ‘what if.’ We worked on the northern plans for over a decade. It’s funny that people like [Itamar] Ben-Gvir now claim credit for everything. He didn’t even know about the beepers and only learned about them from the media. The process started back when Tamir Pardo was head of the Mossad. Credit for everything prepared in Lebanon belongs to leaders like Gabi Ashkenazi, Benny Gantz, Aviv Kochavi, and Herzi Halevi. Herzi deserves significant credit as former head of Military Intelligence for what was done during his time. The success in Lebanon is the result of years of planning, preparation, countless days and nights in command centers, and intelligence superiority. It’s a decade-long event. If Nasrallah knew just how exposed and vulnerable he is, he’d be much more cautious."

It’s a shame this wasn’t the situation with Gaza.

"On October 7, the government set four war objectives. On one hand, Netanyahu deserves credit for that. On the other hand, the objectives didn’t mention the hostages. This omission reflects the state of mind of the leadership at the time. The word 'hostages' didn’t even enter the government’s vocabulary during the first week. It wasn’t until October 16, five days after we joined, that the concept of 'returning the hostages' was formally introduced at our insistence."

How do you explain that?

"The mindset of those in leadership on October 7 was shaped by the trauma, shock, and failure they experienced. Some didn’t even believe it was possible to bring the hostages back. From the outset, Benny [Gantz], Gallant, Aryeh Deri, and I agreed with the defense establishment that the debate between focusing on the South versus the North had ended. We were heading south. The foundational state in the South was offense, while in the North, it was defense. I estimated it would take us one to two months to deliver the required blow in Gaza. It was clear to us that significant ground maneuvers were essential to achieve meaningful results–capturing territory, controlling the population, and cleansing the area. This was based on our experience in the West Bank during Operation Defensive Shield, which took two months to achieve operational control, followed by years of cleaning up."

But the plan went off track.

"That’s true. The original plan was about three weeks to a month of firepower from a distance, followed by three months of powerful ground maneuvers, and then transitioning to Phase C, where we are now. The problem was that the operation in Gaza stalled. As a result, the primary effort in the North only began two months ago. What they’re doing now is essentially reversing the timeline, leveraging the significant achievements against Hezbollah. But in the end, the plan deviated. We went North much later than intended."

How do you see the situation today, a year and two months after October 7?

"This was a defining moment for Israeli resilience. The blow we suffered on October 7 deeply damaged something very fundamental. Israel’s deterrence is based on three principles: the IDF is an invincible army, Israeli society is strong, united, and advanced, and we are America’s closest allies, making it unwise for anyone to challenge us. On October 7, Sinwar shattered the first principle. The other two principles were also under threat, but it became clear that Israeli society has a very high level of resilience, and the Americans, despite disagreements and disputes, stood firmly by our side. It took a year, but that was repaired."

So, did we win?

"Looking at the balance of achievements, there are significant cumulative successes. Hezbollah’s leadership was destroyed, and around 60% of the organization’s capabilities were eliminated. Hamas’s leadership was destroyed, with approximately 70-80% of its capabilities eradicated. We captured the Gaza Strip and control 100% of its perimeter. In Lebanon, we captured only 2-3% of the territory. We don’t control the perimeter, the crossings, or the country's interior. But after listing the achievements, you also have to account for the costs. Nearly 1,800 killed, tens of thousands wounded across expanding circles, and an entire region abandoned for over a year. No one could have imagined such an event. In early discussions, we didn’t even consider evacuating Sderot in the event of full-scale war. If necessary, we planned to station three brigades to defend it.

"At the strategic level, the IDF, Shin Bet, and Mossad achieved impressive results. But when you evaluate the eight updated war objectives, the prime minister can’t claim a single one was fully achieved. The reason lies in an unwillingness to make the tough decisions required to achieve those goals.

"It took me two or three months to understand," Eisenkot continues, "that this war had both overt and covert objectives. Within the broader cabinet, a divide emerged between those focused on the overt goal of dismantling Hamas’s organizational and governmental capabilities and returning the hostages, and those advocating for the conquest of Gaza, the imposition of military rule, and the resettlement of Israelis there. Today, they openly voice those goals, establishing new settlement cores. And you think, ‘Haven’t we learned anything?’ The most important thing now is to preserve solidarity and unity. After the shock, the massacre, the trauma–everything we’ve endured–is this the time to shatter our unity? Is this why we sent soldiers to die? The fact that the government is now introducing these goals through the back door points to a deep sickness."

How do you explain this to yourself?

"Israel has a very weak National Security Council. There are a few good people there, but the council cannot manage the strategic level. Netanyahu has three forums that I’m familiar with: the broader cabinet, which has formal responsibility and usually involves about 15 ministers. With all their aides and advisors, there are around 50 or 60 people in the room. The war cabinet is smaller and more efficient, but even there, between 20 and 30 people are present, with every minister bringing their aides. I was the only one who didn’t bring aides. The third forum is the war cabinet ministers, along with the heads of the security organizations and the chief of staff. Unfortunately, Netanyahu convened this forum only a few times."

When did things start falling apart?

"As long as we felt backed into a corner, there was unity. After the first hostage deal, confidence began to return, and then the leaks started. It was crystal clear where they came from. This created a very unhealthy atmosphere. I’m very experienced at this level, in cabinets and security forums. I’ve been attending these since 1999, for 25 years. And suddenly, I saw something was very off, compared to how I was trained.

The disputes with Netanyahu became bitter in January. We started pressing for the hostages’ return, for planning the day after in Gaza, for bringing in a governing body to replace Hamas, and for shifting focus North. It was clear to me there was no reason to keep five divisions in Gaza. There were also disagreements over the operational approach in the Strip. Why focus only on the north? Why not move towards Rafah and Khan Yunis?

"But you must understand, by January-February, it became clear there was no intention to move North and no rush to accelerate operations towards Rafah. We said, ‘We’ve already deployed five divisions; there’s no point in keeping such a large force in Gaza.’ Two divisions could remain while the others focused on the north.

Today, they tell us that if they had listened to us, they wouldn’t have killed Sinwar. But these are just hypothetical games. Killing Sinwar was always a matter of time–it would have happened sooner or later. Militarily, reaching Rafah wasn’t a big challenge, and it wasn’t even a Hamas stronghold. Benny [Gantz] and I believed we should shift focus to Lebanon by March or April. Benny wrote this in his famous memo and added a specific goal: to return residents to their homes safely by September 1. Netanyahu, Dermer, and Gallant thought we should stay in Gaza."

Who was right?

"We’ll never know. As I’ve told you, in war, you can’t predict how things will unfold. Broadly speaking, it would have been correct to forego the Hezbollah strike on October 11, concentrate efforts in Gaza with five divisions, achieve the necessary objectives by March, leave two divisions in Gaza, and redirect four divisions North. The plans were already approved and ready. As I see it, the prolonged stay in Gaza until just two or three months ago, and the delayed move North, were serious mistakes. All of this was written in a document I submitted to the cabinet on February 15–the same document leaked to Yaron Avraham."

What’s your opinion on the concept of ‘total victory’?

"I’m sure all cabinet members want total victory, and I assume the Prime Minister emphasized being on the brink of it mainly for public perception. I believe that instead of focusing on slogans, the effort should be directed toward completing operations in Khan Yunis, moving down to Rafah and the central camps, immediately promoting plans to return the hostages, and creating a governance framework that doesn’t involve Hamas. I think Netanyahu opposes this even today. He’s hesitant to make such decisions."

Initially, he was very wary of a ground maneuver in Gaza.

"That’s true. We saw in discussions his deep fear of ground maneuvers inside the Strip. He summoned Major General (res.) Yitzhak Brik several times, who only heightened his fears. I had a personal meeting with Netanyahu about this and realized it was challenging to influence him. He was genuinely afraid. I told him, ‘I’m confident the IDF will succeed, and my son will be in the first battalion.’ Gabi Ashkenazi also went to see him to reassure him.

On the way, he stopped by my place. There were even two ministers in the extended cabinet who opposed the maneuver. I won’t name names. Later, they retroactively changed their stance. Benny and I were clear: the IDF was capable of a successful ground maneuver, and no significant military achievement was possible without it."

What led to your departure from the government?

"We realized we had become a fig leaf and weren’t influencing decisions. The IDF used substantial force in Khan Yunis but didn’t move south. We pushed for a move southward, but it was stuck. Netanyahu wasn’t in a hurry. We understood we couldn’t make progress. So we left, with heavy hearts. We made an effort, tried to promote our path, but realized he didn’t want to return the hostages, didn’t want to discuss the day after, didn’t want to shift focus North, and didn’t want to pass universal conscription legislation. It became clear that while Ben-Gvir and Smotrich weren’t in the War Cabinet, they had more influence than anyone else, especially regarding the hostages."

Do you truly believe the hostages could have been returned? Was another deal feasible after the first one fell apart?

"Yes. Let’s look at the first deal. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich put on a show–at the last moment, Smotrich voted in favor, and Ben-Gvir against. In the second round, we pushed for a hostage framework starting in late January. But Netanyahu kept creating obstacles. Again, Sinwar is the main culprit and source of evil, but that doesn’t mean we couldn’t act. On April 25, an Egyptian delegation arrived. It was a significant moment. Our team received a mandate, and then there was the infamous conversation where Netanyahu backtracked behind Gantz’s back.

"This isn’t ancient history. We still have 100 hostages in Gaza. The issue remains urgent because, on May 27, Netanyahu presented his framework to the War Cabinet. It was titled: 'General principles for an agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian sides in Gaza regarding hostage and prisoner exchanges and sustainable quiet.'

"Just reading the first paragraph explains everything," Eisenkot says, quoting:

"'The framework’s goal is the release of all Israeli hostages in Gaza–civilians and soldiers, whether alive or deceased, from all periods. This will be in exchange for an agreed number of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, alongside sustainable quiet that leads to a permanent ceasefire, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, reopening of crossings, and enabling the movement of people and goods.'"

Eisenkot notes, "This paragraph is the entire story. Netanyahu went all the way with this. The framework included a permanent ceasefire and a phased Israeli withdrawal. This was in May. If a deal is reached now, it will be based on this framework. The problem is that months have passed in the meantime."

What happened with Netanyahu’s framework in that meeting?

"He distributed the document to all ministers, read out their names one by one: ‘Gadi? In favor. Benny? In favor. Gallant? In favor. Dermer? In favor. Deri? In favor.’ ‘Good,’ said Netanyahu, ‘everyone agrees.’ He instructed the negotiation team to pass the framework as it was to the intermediaries – Qatar, Egypt, and the US. But then a day passed, and another day, and on May 29, I was at the Dagan Conference when I began hearing leaks about a discussion on the hostages.

The narrative was that Benny, Gallant, and I wanted to retreat, but Netanyahu and Dermer stood firm against us. That’s when I realized he was starting to backtrack. So, at the conference, I made it clear for the first time: ‘This is Netanyahu’s framework.’ I publicly stated that it was his plan, and I told the audience, ‘The person who introduced it is Netanyahu. And now I’m hearing in the media that those who folded are us.’

"By the way, the Americans received a copy of the framework that same night. That’s why, when Biden realized Netanyahu was trying to escape it, he made the framework public and forced it out of the shadows. Two days later, Netanyahu went on 'The Patriots' , where he announced, on camera, a message that Hamas surely picked up on: that he wasn’t planning to honor the framework he himself wrote. He said he would only implement Phase A, with no commitment to the following stages. He claimed that Benny, Gallant, and I were trying to impose a ceasefire on him, and he wouldn’t agree to any deal that didn’t allow him to resume fighting after Phase A."

Eisenkot shakes his head. "But that’s the thing – he wrote 'permanent ceasefire' in the framework himself. I’ve never even used the term 'ending the war.' I’ve always advocated for a two-to-three-month ceasefire to bring the hostages home, followed by resuming the fight. He insisted that we vote on his framework, the very framework he now denies. In hindsight, I understood why he refused to bring this framework to the broader cabinet. He knew exactly what he was doing."

How did Hamas respond to the framework Netanyahu disavowed?

"On July 2, Hamas responded that they would agree to the framework on the condition that there would be no resumption of fighting after Phase A. After all, if we resumed, we wouldn’t receive the remaining male hostages and soldiers. Then Netanyahu launched a public relations campaign, claiming that if we proceeded with the framework, we would only get some of the hostages. And so, we went back to square one: Hamas are villains–they have their objectives–but we are the stronger side. We won. We could now go for demilitarization in exchange for reconstruction, expelling Hamas’s leadership–even though there’s barely anyone left to expel–and ensuring that the next administration in Gaza isn’t Hamas.

All of this was detailed in Netanyahu’s own framework, which he himself distributed to the media that night. The framework explicitly states that civilian governance in Gaza would fall to the international community and local actors with administrative experience unaligned with states or entities supporting terrorism."

Now they’re discussing another partial hostage deal.

"Today (Wednesday), many hostage families came to the Knesset, where they once again had to rely on media leaks to learn about a possible partial deal. What is a partial deal? Simply implementing Phase A of Netanyahu’s framework. When will the future agreement come? Every security expert agrees that the conditions are ripe for a comprehensive deal now. There’s no reason to delay. The achievements and conditions in Gaza are significantly better than in Lebanon. The risk in Gaza is far lower than in Lebanon, yet in Lebanon, a ceasefire was agreed upon, and here it wasn’t.

What is he afraid of? Ceasefires can always be broken. It seems like he’s trying to buy more time instead of executing the full and proper deal. I hope I’m wrong, but I believe he doesn’t want a comprehensive deal. How long can we keep hiding behind Sinwar and Hamas? Yes, the Americans also said Hamas is blocking a deal. But Israeli citizens elected you, not Hamas. This failure happened on your watch. It’s your job to bring them back. The security establishment agrees it’s possible. If we don’t return them, it will be a permanent mark of shame on us."

No matter how we look at it, you saved Netanyahu on October 11.

"I don’t agree. We saved the country. Look, I entered that room on October 11 and saw how deeply affected everyone was. Gallant deserves credit for being the only one projecting strength and stability. You don’t want me to describe how Netanyahu looked, how Dermer looked, how the National Security Council looked, or the others in the room."

Actually, I do.

"That day, I left the bunker around 2 a.m. My phone was flooded with hundreds of WhatsApp messages and calls. Many people congratulated me on joining. Gal, my son, also called to congratulate me. I told him, ‘Gal, these were the eight most significant hours of my security career.’ Looking back, maybe I exaggerated. Or maybe I didn’t. Later, we went down south. I saw Be’eri, Nir Oz. I was stunned by the destruction. The fact that Hamas managed to capture parts of the country, that citizens in a sovereign state with a powerful IDF fought all day to hold onto their bomb shelter doors to stay alive–that’s a lesson that needs to endure for generations.

I call it the Conventional Begin Doctrine: the entire region must understand that anyone who captures Israeli territory and harms its citizens in this way will pay an unbearable price–with their lives, their leadership, their centers of power, and their people. That’s the blow they suffered in Gaza and the Dahiyeh. That’s the price tag that must be levied on anyone thinking of conquering parts of Israel."

Moments before tragedy

At Be’eri, while still in shock from the sights of destruction and the burned kibbutz, Eisenkot received a phone call from his nephew, the son of his sister, a doctor at Soroka Hospital. He informed him that Omer, another nephew, the son of his brother, had been severely wounded by a mortar in the Gaza border and was being airlifted to the hospital. At that point, he did not yet know that this would be the family's least difficult case that year.

I want to press you about October 11. Do you think that if you hadn’t joined, the country would have collapsed or been conquered? No. In the end, the ones you truly saved were Netanyahu.

"Again, these are 'what-if' games. What’s certain is that no one had the confidence to move to action, least of all Netanyahu. We bolstered that confidence. We brought the experience of two former chiefs of staff, integrated the return of the hostages into the objectives, and were the driving force behind the first deal. That happened because we came from the outside. We didn’t experience the trauma of October 7 from within.

We had nothing to prove or to fix. We insisted that bringing the hostages home was not a weakness but a strength and a basic duty. I’ll tell you–the trust of the soldiers in the leadership during those days was very low. I received responses from dozens of directions saying it was good we joined. In every tour, every place we visited–divisions, brigades, commands–people approached us and said that the fact that the two of us entered without hesitation and stood by them gave them confidence. Try to remember the shock and trauma. At that point, the fact that two former chiefs of staff joined was a strategic event."

Your departure was also controversial. You’re criticized for both entering and leaving. You’re under fire for everything.

"We didn’t leave lightly. Our departure was conditional. Benny wrote a detailed letter to Netanyahu. We didn’t want to leave just for the sake of leaving but to steer the cabinet in the right direction, to balance the influence of Ben Gvir and Smotrich. We hoped for dialogue–hostages, moving northward. But there was no dialogue, and there was no listening. From his perspective, we were no longer essential. We were a nuisance. They briefed against us nonstop, as if we didn’t want to advance to Khan Yunis, blocking things here and there–everything opposite of the truth. Today, they’re trying to explain that since we left, there’s been momentum. It’s just a shame this momentum came with a 7–8-month delay. Had we moved north in March, the residents would already have returned by September. The blow we could have dealt in the north then would have been far more significant. Lieberman mentioned it in one of his interviews–the main plan involved communication devices and bunkers, an operation planned for many years. But Netanyahu now tries to create the impression that he and Dermer planned it over the past year. In summary, we left because we had no choice. We refused to be a fig leaf. We hoped our departure would push him in the right direction. In practice, the opposite happened."

Yes, but the military achievements are impressive.

"These are operational achievements. But as prime minister, you also need strategic achievements. You need to fulfill the war’s objectives as quickly as possible and at the lowest cost. Even now, he can’t say that even one of the eight goals has been achieved. A 60-day ceasefire in Lebanon is the required achievement? Why not aim for a simultaneous ceasefire in both the North and South through a UN Security Council decision under US dominance?

In the North, this would be based on a reinforced 1701 resolution, and in the south, on an improved Netanyahu framework–with the Philadelphi Corridor sealed with an underground wall, reconstruction in exchange for demilitarization, and a US-Israel agreement ensuring Iran never achieves nuclear capabilities, alongside building an Israeli-Sunni regional alliance. This is an opportunity to significantly enhance the IDF’s capabilities, stabilize US-Israel relations, heal Israeli society for generations, establish a national security doctrine, strengthen the IDF for future challenges, enhance the ability to manage prolonged campaigns, boost the economy, enact a universal conscription law, reinforce governance, and, of course, bring the hostages home. That’s what victory should look like."

Meanwhile, look at the chaos around us–the insane legislation, the ongoing assault on gatekeepers, the military, and all systems.

"I call it the extremist worldview of the spirit of Ben Gvir, Smotrich, and Karai. Some mistakenly call it religious Zionism. This is not religious Zionism. It’s what will drag Israel into deep social division, multi-front attrition warfare, and international delegitimization. They aim for the return of settlements in Gaza, a binational state in Judea and Samaria, annexation, and the continuation of the ongoing struggle in Lebanon. All this instead of what I outlined above. Netanyahu makes partial decisions in every area and tries to buy time."

This week, they plan to pass the Feldstein Law in its preliminary reading.

"This is utter madness and a total loss of direction. This law, by Milvitzky and Amit Halevi, would allow any soldier in Military Intelligence, or an employee of the Shin Bet or Mossad, to directly transfer intelligence information to the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers. Whoever decided on this isn’t just burning barns–they’re also destroying Israel’s intelligence superiority. It’s clear there’s no preservation of secrecy and chaos across the agencies. When I was Chief of Staff, I demanded 6,000 to 8,000 polygraph tests annually in the military to safeguard secrecy. The first question in a polygraph test is whether you’ve shared intelligence information with an unauthorized person. That question will no longer even be asked."

Netanyahu claims that information was withheld from him.

"The Prime Minister has access to all the material. His intelligence aide is authorized to access every database. He doesn’t need favors from anyone. This law is merely a gesture to reassure Feldstein that he’s being looked after. And for that, they’re sacrificing our intelligence superiority. Does Netanyahu not understand this? He understands it perfectly. Does he really want to destroy Israel’s intelligence system? Yesterday, I addressed this in the Knesset. I was a military secretary 25 years ago; I was chief of staff. Without intelligence superiority, we have no capabilities in the region. We have no purpose here. What bridges the asymmetry on our fronts today is intelligence superiority, and they’re burning it down. There’s no justification for this.

In his nine-minute speech, the Prime Minister said it’s unacceptable for highly classified information not to reach him. Let’s assume this happened. Then issue a directive requiring that all highly classified information reaches you. It might require a few extra desks in the office, but it’s doable. But to give a sweeping authorization to anyone to leak raw intelligence? Have they lost their minds? I’ve quietly spoken with Likud MKs, urging them to show statesmanship and protect the IDF. I hope it will have an impact. I keep reaching out and speaking to them.

I hope that tomorrow, Avi Dichter, Yoav Gallant, and Nir Barkat won’t raise their hands to enable any junior officer to leak documents. They mustn’t participate in destroying the intelligence superiority built since the days of the Palmach’s Arab Division. Someone has decided to blind Israel and undermine its capabilities. I want to see Dichter vote for something like this, allowing any Shin Bet officer to take classified materials. I can’t believe it will happen. I can’t believe it. Losing trust in people has its limits. There’s only so much incompetence and spinelessness one can tolerate."

Voting on the Feldstein law

The next day, the vote took place. Dichter and Barkat voted "in favor." Eisenkot was agitated: "The law passed an hour ago," he told me in a follow-up phone call. "I thought it would be hard to surprise me after two years. In the end, Dichter, a former head of the Shin Bet, votes in favor of severely damaging Israel’s intelligence superiority, while all the Arab MKs opposed this harm. It seems there’s always more to learn about our politics. If this law is enacted, it will be a fatal blow to our ability to safeguard secrets. And at 64 and a half, I’ve learned something new about the cynicism of Israeli politics."

Do you believe Netanyahu didn’t know what Feldstein and Orich were doing?

"Look, Ronen Bar is a brave man, but I’m sure that if they had pushed a bit further, it would have reached Netanyahu. Orich is Netanyahu. We know Netanyahu. The Israeli Prime Minister is not the US President; he’s not the supreme commander–he’s first among equals. We reminded him of that in the cabinet–the responsibility is collective, not his alone."

Shortly before you spoke in the Knesset, Minister Dudi Amsalem accused you of shrinking the military. And this isn’t the first time you’ve faced such accusations.

"Look, it’s not even funny. Nine years ago, the Prime Minister came to us with the Brodet Report, the literary name for the Netanyahu Report, which proposed cutting IDF service from 36 months to just 24. Netanyahu established the Brodet Committee precisely for this purpose–to significantly shrink the army.

It was blocked at the time thanks to good Likud members. All four who helped stop it – Bogie, Kahlon, Steinitz, and Gallant – paid a price later. They were cabinet ministers and prevented it. Netanyahu wanted to cut the army by an entire year. They stopped him. I handed over an IDF larger than the one I received. That’s a fact."

They want to dismiss the Attorney General. Do you believe it’s possible?

"Shlomo Karai issued a letter today with signatures from 13 MKs calling for her dismissal. Look, Gali Baharav-Miara sat next to me in the cabinet. She demonstrated impressive backbone. She’s very security-minded in her positions. She didn’t block us from anything. She’s an island of stability.

I don’t understand what they want from her. I hope Gideon Sa’ar won’t be a pushover and will stand firm to prevent them from dismantling the state. These people have no boundaries. Yesterday, I spoke with a few Likud MKs."

And yet, the chaos continues, intensifying daily. The government’s assault on democracy is escalating.

"What’s troubling now is the madness of Ben Gvir and Smotrich, who are exploiting the immune system’s weakness to launch an autoimmune attack on the state. Settling Gaza now – is that what will rebuild solidarity in Israeli society? Annexing over two million Palestinians – is that the cure? Avoiding passing a conscription law with personal and criminal sanctions–is that what will restore solidarity?

All this instead of ending the war from a position of advantage, building a long-term security strategy, maintaining our qualitative edge over our enemies, and enacting a conscription law. This week, there was cause for concern when Hezbollah’s fire wasn’t answered in Beirut but in a few villages. That’s worrisome."

You occasionally call on security officials to take personal responsibility and resign. Aren’t you overlooking the fact that Netanyahu isn’t resigning, isn’t forming a commission of inquiry, and isn’t calling elections? The departure of these officials would only enable him to appoint loyalists.

"Look, it’s clear that the villain in this story is Netanyahu, and the people he’s sacrificing are Herzi Halevi and Yaron Finkelman. I love both of them deeply. I admire Herzi – he was an excellent head of Military Intelligence, an outstanding Southern Command leader, and even he knows that this excellent man is responsible for the greatest failure we’ve experienced on October 7.

On the other hand, he deserves immense credit for how he stood firm from that dark hour onward, like an immovable rock. If someone takes pride in the cumulative balance of achievements, the first to receive credit should be Herzi, Ronen Bar, and Dedi Barnea–especially Herzi and Ronen, who started from an incredibly challenging position.

But still, if responsibility is not taken soon, from the division commander to the prime minister, we might as well erase the word 'responsibility' from the Hebrew language. My example is Udi Adam, a close friend of mine, the Northern Command leader during the Second Lebanon War, who was responsible for both the failure and the achievements. On the day the ceasefire took effect, he submitted his resignation to Chief of Staff Halutz.

The same applies to Southern Command leader Yaron Finkelman. I love Yaron, but he is responsible for the failure. Period. The fact that ‘Toladano and Military Intelligence told me this and that, and I didn’t go home for a year’–it’s all true. I admire him for that and for his wartime performance. But in my opinion, Yaron should have followed Udi Adam’s example during the first lull. The time has come for all these good people to take that step and not wait to be dismissed."

But you’re overlooking the risk that the departure of these capable people, when no one in the political echelon takes responsibility, would leave the system exposed to reckless appointments. We’ve already seen this with the police.

"Yes, but we must insist on the concept of responsibility. I demand it from Netanyahu, above all. He’s supposedly so strong and heroic in Filber’s polls? Let him go to elections and seek the public’s trust. You see how he avoids attending ceremonies because he and others in his government are afraid to face the public. Sometimes, they even reach out to me, asking if I can talk to families to let them attend.

I still very much hope that the Israeli government has enough responsibility left to appoint the right people to replace those who resign. I also hope that one day the police chief realizes he’s been deceived. What’s happening there is that the police are essentially run by Kobi Yaakobi. He’s the Prison Service Commissioner, but anyone wanting to advance is aligned with Yaakobi. At some point, the police chief will understand this. Meanwhile, in all these investigations, it’s clear I underestimated when I described a sub-criminal culture. It’s actually a super-criminal culture."

A year and two months later, even a state commission of inquiry is no longer relevant.

"Anyone who thinks they can pull a stunt with some sort of pseudo-state commission of inquiry is gravely mistaken. They found some useful idiot to propose setting up a crooked committee that would decide that a state commission is off the table. This won’t pass. It must not pass. Without a state commission of inquiry, there will be no repair. Elections must be held, with the opposition putting egos aside. Whoever can lead the largest party should form a system that will fix Israel."

Oh, you’ve set me up perfectly for this. How many times in the past year have people come up to you and said, “Gadi, you need to be number one”?

"A lot. And I listen to them and tell them it’s irrelevant. There are no elections right now, our party isn’t in a terrible place–we’re polling at 19 or 20 seats. It’s not what it used to be, but it’s not bad. For me, the idea of 'Israel first' is genuine and deeply ingrained. Whether it’s Gadi or Benny leading, it’s less important than the need to establish a government that will take Israel to a better place.

Any decision about leadership will come from that necessity, not from blind loyalty. My loyalty is to the State of Israel. I have tremendous respect for Benny. He knows how to share leadership, and it’s a joint effort under his guidance. He sees me as a senior partner. Look, Lapid doesn’t say, 'Ram, Ben, Barak, and I,' whereas Benny sees me as a partner in the journey. He founded the party; he’s the first, and I need to do everything I can in the meantime to ensure we’re a worthy opposition and a major party."

You’re not really succeeding as an opposition.

"We failed as an opposition in not being able to retain Gideon Sa’ar or bring decent people to our side. I’m in touch with them. There are decent people in the political system who understand the situation, who know that the State of Israel is more important than Netanyahu, and they see where he’s taking this country. He’s done what he’s done; he’s responsible for the greatest failure since the state’s founding. He’s deepened societal divides, brought an extremist Kahanist party into the halls of power, and endangered the Zionist project. They understand this. They see the disaster of Ben Gvir, a man who has failed in everything he’s done but still manages to enjoy support. I hope people wake up and realize he’s an empty vessel. When you see his ridiculous behavior, like a poor man’s version of Netanyahu, you can’t miss that he’s someone from the minor leagues trying to play in the NBA. Now he’s boasting about killing Nasrallah. Even humor has its limits."

Are you still an optimist?

"Look at our young people. In this war, we’ve rediscovered them. My son Guy told me that ever since Gal fell, he reads every eulogy for every fallen soldier. I asked him what he discovers in them. He told me the recurring theme is giving, volunteering, love for friends, family, and country.

At the funeral of Yogev, my nephew, the secretary of the community his parents helped establish in the Negev, Giv’ot Bar, read a post he had written. As I listened, I realized it was a love letter. I thought he had written it to his partner. It began like this: 'Hey, my love. It’s me. Yes, I know – it’s been a long time since we last saw each other. I’ve been away for a while. Don’t think for a moment it was easy for me without you. You know how much I love you. But you need to know and remember–it was for you. For us.'

And it goes on and on, and suddenly you realize he’s writing this letter to the country, after returning from a year of service for the Jewish Agency in Chicago, just before his enlistment. This was a 22-year-old kid, an active partner in establishing a new settlement in the Negev. His father was an officer in the Paratroopers, his mother a tough Golani instructor.

I’ll tell you something else. When Gal was killed, another soldier, Eyal Berkovitz, fell with him. From their regular service, Gal would always talk about Berko. Gal was from the Shayetet, Berko from Sayeret Matkal, but they served together in the same team in Maglan during their regular service and later in reserves. Berko became the team commander. Gal wasn’t one to give out compliments easily, but he spoke about Berko with superlatives.

When Gal was killed, I realized another soldier had fallen with him. When I got home, I was already informed that the second casualty was Berko. I probably knew this before his parents. He was born during their mission in New Zealand, grew up in Susya, and was in his first year of medical school, recently married to Michal. They fell together – a soldier from Herzliya and a soldier from Susya - different worldviews, but they died together. They have a shared photo standing in Gaza holding the Israeli flag.

Their team members from Rafah just sent me a picture. They recreated that photo on a wall, with Gal and Berko holding the flag in life, and in death.

When I met Berko’s parents, his father came to me and said, 'Gadi, nice to meet you, you were my battalion commander.' His mother, a school principal, came to the Knesset one day, to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, to speak with MKs. It was the most powerful experience I’ve had since becoming a Knesset member. She spoke about her son Berko, a Torah scholar and brilliant young man who could have been a great rabbi but chose to enlist in Sayeret Matkal, Maglan, and the reserves, ultimately falling in defense of the homeland. There was dead silence in the room–not even a mosquito buzzed. Even the ultra-Orthodox MKs sat silently and listened.

So if you ask me what encourages me, it’s that – these people, who are here. We must be worthy of them."