Can Israel's defense heads trust Trump to secure a good nuclear deal with Iran? – analysis

There is a heated and crucial debate going on within the defense and political establishments in Israel over whether US President Donald Trump will cut a mediocre new nuclear deal with Iran.

Depending on the exact details of the deal and the specifics of its implementation, a new Trump deal could push Iran back from a nuclear weapon for a period of years without Israel having to risk a major airstrike or it could hamstring the IDF from acting during a unique and historic window of opportunity for attacking the program.

Some Israelis hopeful Trump will not agree to unfavorable Iran deal

Some Israeli officials are optimistic and believe that Trump will not agree to any deal that Israel would view as a bad deal, such as something similar to the terms of the JCPOA 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

They note US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s reference to B-2 bombers with bunker buster bombs moving into the region and Trump’s many tough threats against the regime.

Portions of Israeli military intelligence appear to be in this camp.

Some Israelis afraid Trump will cut a bad nuclear deal

Other Israeli officials are pessimistic and are voicing deep concern that Trump will cut a deal along the lines of his deal with North Korea during his first term as president.

That deal was heavy on dramatic meetings, announcements, and symbolic gestures to claim diplomatic victories, but in practice had little impact in getting Pyongyang to reduce its nuclear weapons program.

Part of the concern is that Trump himself has sent mixed messages, part is that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sent a mix of messages about his expectations from Trump, and part is that other US officials have given mixed messages.

Trump himself, in October 2024, before the US election, had called on Israel to attack the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program.

However, upon winning and taking office, he has consistently said he would prefer a new deal with Tehran and would like to hold Israel back from attacking Iran’s nuclear program.

In fact, a number of Israelis have wanted to attack Iran’s nuclear program since Israel easily destroyed its five S-300 anti-aircraft defense systems in April and October 2024, such that waiting for Trump’s green light has already delayed Jerusalem for several months.

Leading the negotiating team is Steve Witkoff, who, while he is a clear friend of Israel’s, various Israeli sources have indicated that he is not familiar with many of the tricky technical details of the Iranian nuclear file.

Also, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may be willing to agree to some kind of a deal with some concessions in light of the current aggressive posture by both Trump and Israel, but there is no way he would agree to the “Libya model,” which Netanyahu keeps extolling.

Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Libya completely gave up its nuclear weapons program to avoid the threat of US military force.

However, in subsequent years, the US and other countries intervened to assist Libyan rebels in overthrowing and killing Libya’s leader Muammar Gaddafi.

Due to the end result, Khamenei would never make the same “mistake.”

In other words, if he compromises on his nuclear program, it is to try to stay in power.

Giving away his nuclear program completely would be seen as tantamount to paving the road for him to be overthrown like Gaddafi, such that there would be no incentive for this.

Trump and Witkoff know Khamenei’s position and are entering talks anyway, which means, according to top sources, they are very likely ready to make serious concessions toward the Islamic Republic beyond what Netanyahu and Israel would suggest.

According to those Israeli officials with a pessimistic view, Trump is looking for at least some symbolic new “win” so that he can claim he got a better deal than the 2015 JCPOA version, even if he does not really solve Tehran’s nuclear threat.

What can Iran offer Donald Trump?

For example, Iran could offer Trump that it will close or even destroy certain nuclear facilities that it got to keep under the JCPOA. Trump could then claim that he obtained something from Tehran that had never been achieved before.

But if all or even many of the uranium-enriching centrifuges were moved from the closed facility to a new facility or to storage for eventual installation at a new facility, then Iran’s nuclear program would remain intact no matter what Trump might announce.

Also, Iran could offer to detach, disassemble, or destroy a larger number of older-style centrifuges, which it was allowed to keep under the JCPOA, because it now has a fleet of far more advanced centrifuges and needs far fewer of them to enrich sufficient uranium for nuclear weapons.

In another clever move, Khamenei could give up on centrifuges and significant portions of his enriched uranium, but conceal enough enriched uranium for one or more nuclear bombs at some later date.

Trump, Israel, and the world would not necessarily know because the IAEA has been half blind about Iran’s nuclear program since the 2021-2022 period when Tehran started to shut off some surveillance cameras and fire some key nuclear inspectors.

Netanyahu has not helped expectations.

The feeling that was given after his meeting with Trump, despite public messaging that he hoped Trump would get Iran to agree to a Libya-style end to its nuclear program, was that he got no clear promises from the US president.

Trump and his top officials have not said a word about the Libya model.

Further, Netanyahu purposely excluded top defense officials from his briefing to the security cabinet on his meeting with Trump, seemingly wanting to package the meeting as a success without the ministers hearing dissenting viewpoints from within the defense establishment.

Moreover, sources have heard from other US sources that there are no promises that any new nuclear deal with Iran will fulfill Israel’s expectations.

If Trump does reach a mediocre deal with Khamenei, sources are concerned that this could hamper the IDF and the Mossad from acting against the program going forward.

Such limits on Israel would potentially squander whatever remaining period of time in which Iran remains much more vulnerable to attack, and could allow Tehran the time it needs to rebuild anti-aircraft defenses or make it harder to attack its key nuclear elements, by hiding them deeper underground.

While Israeli officials disagree heavily on what Trump will do next, they seem to be unanimous that if Trump does cut a deal, their hands will be tied to an even greater extent than they might have been under a less pro-Israel president.