How does IDF reservist protest impact potential strike on Iran? - analysis

The IDF has repeated in recent weeks at all levels, from IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, to IDF Air Force Chief Maj.-Gen. Tomer Bar, to others, that it is still ready for war if necessary.

This is part of a message to Israel’s enemies that they should not make the mistake of testing the IDF’s resolve at this time just because there is a movement of reservists protesting government policy by declining their reserve duty.

And we have continued to hear from time to time about likely attacks by the IDF in Syria against Iranian proxies despite the reservist protests.

Former IDF chief Aviv Kohavi told The Jerusalem Post in January that there were basically weekly attacks, with over 52 in 2022.

But how would the current around 700 air force reservists protesting impact a sudden large war with Iran?

Would Israel be able to keep up with its most updated strategy and goals in such a conflict?

Would the IDF reservist strike harm Israel's strategy to fight Iran?

The Post understands that in 2022 and 2023, there has been a sea change in how the IDF conceives of a potential strike on Iran’s nuclear program, with the number of targets ballooning to new highs far beyond the nuclear program.

There was always an expectation that the IDF would need to eliminate anti-aircraft defenses as part of any attack on the Islamic Republic’s already numerous and spread-out nuclear facilities.

But the IDF now has a relatively new special unit working on drumming up a much larger number of Iranian targets related to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other aspects of the country’s national power.

It is unclear how much the IDF would try to focus more of its firepower on the IRGC which is considered more radical and ideologically committed to expansionist and terrorist policies, as opposed to the Iranian armed forces, viewed as less ideological and more professional and even focused defensively.

In recent decades, both the US and Israel have also opened larger campaigns with attempts to eliminate top enemy officials, whether Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 1991 and 2003 or top Islamic Jihad leaders in Gaza this past May.

The IDF has not publicly disclosed its plans in this regard.

In terms of the volume of targets, a recent joint drill with the US discussed around 100 aircraft departing and refueling from the base where the drill was held twice per day.

Any attack on Iran would be different because the farther distance would require midair refueling, but Israel and the US have clearly prepared for scenarios where massive numbers of aircraft would attack targets across Iran in unprecedented numbers.

The goal would be both to reduce Tehran’s capabilities for attacking Israel with ballistic missiles and drones, as well as to coerce the ayatollahs into a quicker ceasefire once Israeli goals regarding the nuclear program were achieved.  

Even if the IDF can maintain its routine operations minus around 700 air force reservists, could it maintain the same number of targets in a larger war with Iran?

Or would Israel need to make more choices about which targets it could hit and which it would need to pass on, due to reduced forces?

Most are betting that in such a situation, all of the reservists would show up for battle.

But would they all be able to and would they all be at the same level of effectiveness in a highly complex mission far from Israel’s borders if they have been off from flight missions and drills for weeks or longer?

The truth is that no one knows the answer to these questions and the longer the standoff over the judicial overhaul and the reservists continues, the harder these questions will be to answer positively.