How the US invasion of Afghanistan is shaping the Gaza war - comment

Within Israel and the world Jewish community it has already become standard to refer to Hamas’s October 7 invasion of the South as “Israel’s 9/11.”

When people say this, they are making a connection to the unconscionable size of death to civilians caused by the al-Qaeda September 11, 2001, terrorists.

But there is another side to this analogy which has haunted the Biden administration since at least the August 2021 pullout from Afghanistan, and which, as US involvement in Israeli decision-making evidently increases, is now plaguing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as well.

In some circles, 9/11 has also become synonymous with US overreach and wasting decades of blood and treasure in forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Put differently, no one denies that the US needed to hit back against al-Qaeda and Islamic terrorism after the act of war that 9/11 was. No one denies that the US had a right to at least initially go into Afghanistan to dismantle al-Qaeda. But was it wise for the US to stay in Afghanistan to try to rebuild it? Did the US not waste huge numbers of US soldiers’ lives and incalculable funds (well over $2 trillion) for over 20 years, ultimately pulling out with its tail between its legs versus the Taliban – not exactly a world-class enemy.

Why should any of this matter to Israel? The US is making it matter to Israel

US President Joe Biden has backed Israel in crucial strategic ways: militarily, diplomatically, economically, and in the global public relations war – see his quick rejection of Hamas’s false narrative about the striking of a Gaza hospital.

But as soon as Netanyahu and Biden gave each other a big hug during the US president’s recent Israel visit, there were concerns of its being a “bear hug,” with benefits but also strings attached.

Israeli officials denied that there were strings attached, but it is now apparent that they were being charitable, not correct.

Not only did multiple US officials sit in on top-secret Israeli war cabinet debates about the Gaza invasion and postwar/post-Hamas future. The US also now has sent Lt.-Gen. James Glynn to “advise” the IDF on its strategic and tactical approach to the invasion.

The fact that this was leaked publicly, along with other messaging from Washington, clearly showed that America is second-guessing the IDF’s capacity to handle the invasion.

That is not a crazy idea right after the IDF completely blew catching on to Hamas’s October 7 invasion of the South. But what exactly is US military advice going to contribute?

If American guidance helps Jerusalem make its postwar/post-Hamas vision clearer about who Gaza can be handed to and when, that could be a big positive. Improving tactics to avoid urban warfare ambushes could also be helpful, and Glynn has experience fighting urban insurgencies.

However, if all of that is cover for reducing and delaying Israel’s invasion, two issues which could be linked, as well as limiting the Jewish state’s opportunity to eliminate as much of Hamas’s military apparatus as possible, it could be very problematic.

This concern is not theoretical.

The fact is that there is no magic answer to the postwar/post-Hamas question. Any answer is fraught with tremendous potential downsides. Whether Gaza is run next by the Palestinian Authority, a new group of local Gazans, the UN, some other Western or Middle East allied coalition, or a mix of the above, there will be a threat of guerrilla warfare and of Hamas or other jihadist groups making a resurgence.

Any strategy will be imperfect and will involve numerous factors beyond Israel’s control which could lead to disaster. So in some ways it is just a question of making the best imperfect decision possible that the most allies will support, while trying to get as much done militarily as Israel knows it must do.

Coming to a clear decision

IT IS not at all clear that taking more weeks to brood over this decision will lead to a better outcome. Rather, it seems the most important thing is to come to a clear decision regarding one of the above options that has a clear exit strategy, whatever that may be, so that IDF forces do not get permanently bogged down in Gaza.

If stalling that fateful and fraught decision beyond a certain point is not necessarily able to make the postwar situation better, and if it is clearly negatively affecting IDF morale (field commanders wanted to invade two weeks ago), then why is Israel continuing to stall?

Maybe the delay is not as much about a gap between the US and Netanyahu, as it is about a gap between Netanyahu, other members of his war cabinet as one axis of debate, and portions of the IDF high command and IDF field commanders as another axis of debate.

Many times in the past, Netanyahu has used “US pressure” as an excuse for a policy he is taking domestic criticism for, but which he himself supports.

For decades Netanyahu avoided pressure from many officials to do a deep invasion of Gaza. During the 2014 Gaza war especially, he resisted heavy pressure to do a much bigger cleaning house of Hamas than the very limited IDF ground invasion that took place. Since 2014 he has been even more conservative about using ground troops. So for around 15 years of being prime minister, he has been against using large ground forces.

Maybe the US really is just an excuse.

But Netanyahu does not seem to be alone.

IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi is a decorated special forces officer who is not afraid to use force, but he is part of an IDF high command that was stunned by Hamas’s surprise. He was Military Intelligence chief during the era when Hamas was viewed as deterrable, 2014-2018. He was OC Southern Command when the country decided not to do larger operations, 2018-2021.

The Jerusalem Post understands that Halevi has rallied from the early days of the war when he was not heard from physically in public, but all signs are that he could be more in a place of second-guessing than the IDF’s field commanders, who want to unleash their troops.

Once again, a small amount of second-guessing to be more thoughtful strategically and tactically and avoid ambushes, and to reduce Palestinian civilian and Jewish hostage deaths, can be a good thing.

But stalling beyond a certain point has costs, also regionally.

Maybe Hezbollah would have attacked Israel as much as it has or worse if the IDF had gone into Gaza two weeks ago. But maybe a quick IDF counter-invasion would have left Hezbollah in shock and more worried about Israel’s furious potential responses.

At this point, Hezbollah is less and less deterred and more convinced that it can push Israel further, evacuating more of the North, before it crosses a line that would lead to major Israeli retaliation.

The air force’s ability to destroy tunnels and truly take down the majority of Hamas’s forces is limited.

No matter what promises allies, critics, and the UN make to Israel today that if it delays the invasion, it will still get time later, the clock is ticking and they could change their minds.

Palestinian casualties already far exceed Israeli ones, with one night reaching around 700 alone. These numbers may be inflated, and half or even some majority may be terrorist fighters, but even if 40% are civilians, that is thousands dead, far more than in 2014.

And all this time, Hamas is maintaining its rocket fire on Israel. Few people have been killed or wounded by rockets, but not zero. Also, Hamas has shown it can lure Israel to sleep with some long hours of no rockets and suddenly fire on the West Bank Jewish communities or on Tel Aviv, and break through Israel’s missile shield somewhat.

Not to mention there were over 120,000 evacuated Israeli civilians around a week ago, and that number is only growing. Stalling is not free.

Israel and the defense establishment failed on October 7. The US is a great ally. And deliberation can avoid costly errors from rushing in too fast. But there are sizable costs to delaying as well, and the record makes it hard to blame all of the delay on Washington. The prime minister and the war cabinet make Israeli strategic policy, and the IDF chief makes military decisions – them, and no one else.