Shin Bet, IDF: Lebanese suicide bomber, with Iran, caused 1982 Tyre Disaster
The commission radically reverses the original finding that the gas leak explosion killed 75 Israelis, which raises questions of cover-up.
“The First Tyre Disaster” in 1982 was the result of a Lebanese terrorist suicide bomber, a joint Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and IDF commission said Wednesday. The explosion killed nearly 75 Israeli members of the security forces and 15 Lebanese detainees at Israel’s headquarters in the city, it said.
The commission, which was led by IDF Maj.-Gen (res.) Amir Abulafia and Shin Bet division chief “S,” found that either Hezbollah or Amal – which now are a united movement but at the time had some separate aspects – in coordination with Iran had caused the explosion, using a minimum of 50 kilograms of explosives plus some additional gas explosives to collapse the multistory building.
The timing of the commission’s announcement could be significant because it blames Hezbollah for a mass terrorist attack that also killed many Lebanese citizens. The terrorist group is currently trying to convince the broader population that its main focus is Lebanese interests and not those of Iran.
It is also significant in that it brings into question the integrity of the defense establishment for being fully honest about its shortcomings just as the IDF probe regarding the October 7 failures is close to being released to the public later this month.
The commission’s determination reverses the decision of the 1982 Zorea Commission, which had ruled that the November 11, 1982, collapse of the building was caused by a gas-leak explosion.
Such a complete reversal, more than 40 years after the event, raises serious questions about whether the defense minister at the time, Rafael Eitan, and other top Israeli officials had staged a cover-up of the incident being caused by terrorism in an effort to save their jobs or for some other reason.
Top Israeli defense officials involved in the commission – which included dozens of investigators, intelligence, ballistics, and forensic experts – could not reject out of hand the possibility of a cover-up.
At the same time, these officials said there were many valid reasons why the current commission might have reached a different and more professional determination regarding the cause of the disaster, as opposed to the Zorea Commission, which was led by IDF Maj.-Gen. (res.) Meir Zorea.
They said the Zorea Commission only had one week to perform its probe, while the current commission had worked on the issue since mid-2023.
Furthermore, they said there were several Lebanese witnesses to the incident whose statements were taken after the commission had finished its work.
These witnesses either said they saw or heard the white car collide with and destroy the building.
Moreover, they said technological and forensic advances, especially from Israel’s experience with the impact of explosives on bodies during Hamas’s suicide-bombing waves in the 1990s, had provided new evidence of a bomb, which were beyond Israeli officials’ investigative capabilities at the time.
Also, the scenario the current commission has settled on for the terrorist attack – a car driving full speed with a suicide-style bomb attached into the Israeli headquarters from the nearby thoroughfare – was not a known tactic in 1982. Today, Israeli officials are familiar with a wide variety of suicide-bomb tactics.
Israel was not aware of Iran's involvement in 1982
Finally, they said Israel in 1982 was not as fully aware of the extensive involvement of Iran in terrorism against Israel in Lebanon.
The breakdown of those killed was: 34 Israeli Border Police officers, 33 IDF soldiers, nine Shin Bet operatives, 15 Lebanese detainees, and other victims nearby.
The nine Shin Bet victims represented one of the largest losses of the agency in its agents’ elite history, probably being one of the forces that pushed Bar to lead the way to reopening the file.
Dozens of Israelis were successfully rescued from the disaster.
Besides some of the above-mentioned indications of terrorism, the commission presented evidence relating to two vehicles in the vicinity of the incident.
A white Peugeot 504 car was coming in one direction on a road that would pass directly in front of the building by about 70 meters, but it suddenly is believed to have swerved into the building.
This was seen by witnesses nearby, as well as a red car that was coming on the same road from the opposite direction and would pass by the Israeli headquarters building.
Pieces of the white Peugeot car, including its engine, were identified inside the building.
The commission was able to trace the car and engine to having been made in France and then to having been transported to Lebanon.
The car’s specifications do not match any of the set vehicles that any of the security forces in the area would have used, but it did match vehicles used by various Lebanese terrorist groups.
In addition, pieces of a body that had never been identified were found deep inside the collapsed building.
More advanced forensics capabilities available in 2024 identified these remains as likely the leftover pieces of an additional person who did not correspond to either the Israelis or Lebanese detainees who had been in the building.
Although Israeli intelligence officials would never simply base themselves on claims made by enemy forces, which are often false and used for psychological warfare, in this case, the current commission believes Hezbollah’s claims were likely largely true.
For years, there has been a monument near Baalbek, Lebanon, dedicated to 17-year-old Ahmad Qasir, who they say was responsible for the attack.
In addition, Hezbollah celebrates this attack every year on November 11 as Hezbollah’s Martyr Day.
A Jordanian news article from December 1982 also appears to correctly reflect the terrorist narrative, which the commission has now adopted as correct.
In terms of avoiding the incident, the commission was generous to the Israeli officials at the time, again saying that despite intelligence warnings of potential terrorist attacks, there was no specific warning regarding the Tyre headquarters or the specific date.
Adding into the mix that Israeli officials at the time were familiar with the threat of static car bombs but not with moving suicide colliding car combs (something that is now well-known), the current commission believed it would be unfair to judge Israel’s security readiness at the time in hindsight.
Israel’s defense establishment announced in late 2022 that it was reopening the probe into the incident “out of respect for the fallen and in the pursuit of the truth.”
Following the initial reopening of the probe, the defense establishment announced that an internal IDF probe had recommended opening an official commission of inquiry, after new evidence “strengthened the possibility” that the building’s collapse could have been due to terrorist activities.
The commission’s members were appointed by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi in cooperation with Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Israel Police Insp.-Gen. Kobi Shabtai.
Nevertheless, Bar is known as the chief official who breathed new life into the case after years of campaigning by family members of those Israelis killed to dig deeper into the causes of the event.
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