Egyptian expert says UAE sees itself as ‘USA of the Arab world,’ backs Emirates peacekeeping force

Emirati diplomat Lana Nusseibeh recently shared her vision for a postwar peacekeeping force in Gaza with the London-based Financial Times. She detailed the conditions for participation, including US leadership, a reformed Palestinian Authority, and a clear path to a two-state solution. This move aligns with a US-led effort to reestablish PA control in Gaza and prevent Hamas from regaining power. However, the UAE’s involvement depends on broader Arab support, Israel’s cooperation, and other factors.

Yaara Segal, a former senior adviser to Israel’s ambassador in the UAE and a specialist on the Abraham Accords and the MENA region, explained to The Media Line the relevance and potential consequences of Nusseibeh's view.

“This is a very positive development because this is the first time since the beginning of the war that an Arab country has indicated its willingness to be a part of the peacekeeping force,” Segal said. “Until now, most of the Arab countries have stated that they will not deploy security forces in the Gaza Strip, especially as long as the war is ongoing. The UAE’s position could pave the way for other Arab countries to join the bandwagon. Israel, of course, has from day one made it clear that it would like to see moderate and pragmatic Arab countries play a key role in a postwar administration.“

The former Israeli diplomat explained further: "The United Arab Emirates can serve as the role model for such an important step. They have been providing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip throughout the war in coordination with Israel. We should remember that Israel’s position is to welcome anyone who wants to provide medical and humanitarian aid. If the UAE and other Arab countries come up with a plan to replace Hamas, I’m sure Israel will not only welcome it but will also cooperate provided that the plan does not compromise Israel’s security.”

Other experts on the subject are also cautiously optimistic about the statements of the Emirati diplomat. Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, the former head of the IDF’s Research Division, former director-general of the Strategic Affairs Ministry, and a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, spoke to The Media Line about his perspective. “I hope this information is correct because it wasn’t a declaration made by the UAE government. While such exciting news is rare and worth noting, we must first acknowledge that it is not an official statement,” he said.

Nevertheless, Kuperwasser believes that “the UAE is serious and committed to ending the conflict without empowering radicals, as is evident particularly from its stance against groups like Hamas. The UAE itself is a case of successful normalization of relations with Israel, and it could be a blueprint for a deradicalized Gaza Strip. Hopefully, it could inspire countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and possibly Jordan and Egypt to consider involvement.”

Khaled Hassan, an Egyptian British counterterrorism researcher specializing in antisemitism in the Arab world, explained to The Media Line that the UAE sees itself as the region's superpower and aims to be the "USA of the Arab world." He stated that the UAE is “the Arab world’s most successful country; it’s the builder and leader of the moderate Sunni alliance and its leading financier.” Its involvement in Gaza’s postwar peacekeeping ensures its investments are protected from Iranian control via Hamas, which is a concern for both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, especially given the rising Houthi threats.

Many obstacles remain in a postwar plan for Gaza

Despite what appears to be an increasing alignment of interests between Israel and the UAE in what a postwar Gaza will look like, many obstacles remain. Brig. Gen. Kuperwasser expects difficult issues to arise around Israel’s recognizing Palestinian statehood or even acknowledging that statehood is possible in the future. “This poses an obstacle to this cooperation, as many countries will require a commitment to Palestinian statehood. However, with creative diplomacy, this can be addressed.”

Hassan described how “creative diplomacy” might impact Palestinian statehood. “I don’t believe that an Israeli commitment to Palestinian statehood is a fundamental issue to the UAE/Saudi Arabia, despite their press statements after, and long before, October 7. In Arab foreign policy and politics, it is not uncommon for politicians to make statements for domestic political consumption.” This suspicion was reinforced, he said, by US President Joe Biden’s interview stating that Saudi normalization with Israel was offered in exchange for American civilian nuclear energy and security guarantees.

“It’s highly advisable to take a ‘back to basics’ approach when examining a matter of such complexity,” Hassan concluded, “so I think that the Saudis are highly likely to abandon Palestinian statehood if the US responds positively to their demands for nuclear energy capabilities and security guarantees.”

With her experience in Israel’s Foreign Ministry, Segal observed that setting preconditions at this stage is not helpful. “The Israeli public has lost confidence in any peace process with the Palestinians, and it will take a long time to restore that confidence or even a basis for it. The onus is on the Palestinians. They are the ones who have to prove to the Israeli public that they are willing to renounce violence, distance themselves from Hamas and extremism, stop delegitimizing Israel and demonizing Jews, and embark on substantial reforms and good governance. Until this happens, the Israeli public will remain skeptical,” she explained.

According to Kuperwasser, “The Palestinians need to go beyond Israel's recognition and change their narrative to facilitate cooperation. A joint statement on necessary reforms could help overcome obstacles. The UAE can have a huge impact on changing narratives, as it did successfully by itself, and it can be a blueprint for a more tolerant culture in Gaza.”

Segal also sees the potential for the UAE to participate in Gaza’s deradicalization process. “Israel hopes that the UAE will primarily play a role in the deradicalization of Palestinian society. This should be the number one priority.”

“But also,” Segal observed, “Israel has every interest in the success of any peacekeeping force.” She noted that Israel provided protection for the Americans when they built their temporary port and will likely cooperate with any peacekeeping force in Gaza. Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups oppose such a presence, threatening to treat it as an occupation force. If an Arab peacekeeping force succeeds, it will benefit all parties: Israel, the Arabs, and the Palestinians.

Another core subject in potential Israel-UAE cooperation in postwar Gaza is the role of international organizations in peacekeeping. Segal said, “As for UNRWA, it’s clear by now that the organization can no longer function in the existing structure. The involvement of UNRWA employees in terrorism has been very problematic for Israel.” She added that while Israel has worked with UN agencies in the past, the current UN leadership has shown evident hostility toward Israel, disqualifying itself from a neutral role.

Kuperwasser acknowledged obstacles related to authority over a potential Gaza peacekeeping force. “It’s unlikely that Israel would agree to a peacekeeping force in the Gaza Strip under a mandate from the UN. More likely, it will be led by a coalition of interested countries, including the US, and countries in the region who are normalizing relations with Israel and working with the Gazans.” However, Israel would likely retain the majority of the security responsibility.

Eventually, this cooperation process can lead to the emergence of a new local alliance resembling a Middle Eastern military alliance similar to NATO, according to Kuperwasser. “Ideally, this hypothesized organization would hold the mandate for peacekeeping in Gaza. At some point, even a deradicalized Palestinian entity could be a part of this organization.”

The American role in a postwar Gaza will remain a central pillar, especially during the reconstruction and deradicalization of Gaza. Hassan believes “the USA’s position and leadership are crucial for the UAE and Saudi Arabia.” He suspects decision-makers in both countries and across the Gulf Cooperation Council are “jovially waiting for a potential Abraham Accords 2.0. Then, we will see much closer coordination between the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.” However, he says, the UAE and Saudi Arabia will expect increased influence on Israeli decisions regarding aid access, military targeting of terrorists, and postwar plans in Gaza.