Voices from the Arab press: Iran's options for revenge

Iran's options for revenge: is war among them?

An-Nahar, Lebanon, August 1

Israel has unmistakably crossed red lines in its confrontation with the Resistance Front by assassinating Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the political bureau of the Hamas movement. Haniyeh was in Tehran to participate in the inauguration ceremony of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. While previous operations, like the assassination of Fuad Shukr, a leader of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, in Beirut had not yet tested Iran’s boundaries, Israel’s latest actions mark a more severe provocation.

Hezbollah issued a statement just two hours after the deadly attack. This communiqué included a request from Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, to Sheikh Naim Qassem and Hassan Fadlallah, of the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, urging the resistance to maintain its “wise path,” especially since the onset of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Had Israel only assassinated Shukr in Lebanon, it could have been interpreted as an act of retribution for the victims of the missile strike on Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights – a retaliation Israel could manage.

However, the subsequent assassination of Haniyeh at his Tehran residence during the inauguration ceremony, following the provocative death of president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter incident near the Azerbaijani border, shifts the context from revenge to outright provocation. This remains true even if Haniyeh and other Hamas leaders were already on Israel’s target list for their role in the Oct. 7 attack. Globally, the narrative now inescapably ties Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran to Israel’s implicit desire for a broader conflict. Observers from the Far East to the Western world see this act as a clarion call for war.

The backdrop to this situation includes an array of internal, regional, and international factors: Israelis are currently more focused on internal discord than external threats and might need a return to a “circle of fear.” The resistance front shows signs of weakening.

For instance, negotiations over a prisoner exchange have highlighted Hamas’s exhaustion despite its ongoing resistance. Hezbollah has lost qualitative advantages, such as effective drone confrontation. Its accuracy in missile strikes has diminished alongside the loss of skilled fighters.

The Houthi reaction to the attack on Hodeidah’s port remains mired in rhetoric. Khamenei’s decision to approve the ascendancy of a figure like Pezeshkian, who faces rejection from Iran’s hard-line current, signals internal and external strife in Iran. Additionally, pro-Iranian groups in Iraq have abstained from targeting American bases for months, indicating that considerable threats can restrain them.

The US, entrenched in a tumultuous presidential election cycle involving candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, has afforded Israel a strategic upper hand. This was evident both in the enthusiastic reception for the Israeli prime minister in the US Congress and in the bipartisan support to “finish the job” through coordinated plans drawn up by American and Israeli military, security, and political figures.

How might Iran react to these developments? Since the beginning of Al-Aqsa Flood, Iran has demonstrated a reluctance to engage in a war involving the US. Following the Oct. 7 attack, the US enhanced its military presence in the region, causing Iran to backtrack on promises made to Hamas to vigorously open all resistance fronts against Israel.

Iran swiftly imposed restrained responses on Hezbollah following Israeli strikes, such as the January 2 attack in Beirut’s southern suburbs that killed Hamas commander Saleh al-Arouri near Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah’s supposed residence.

When Israel targeted the Quds Force headquarters in the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Tehran’s calculated yet ineffective response contrasted sharply with Israel’s high-value target hit in Tehran through a single missile, resulting in Haniyeh’s assassination. In contrast, Iran’s April 13 offensive involving 300 drones and various missiles failed to hit any significant Israeli targets.

The assassination of Haniyeh is a significant blow to Iran, potentially necessitating a change in strategy. On paper, Iran has the firepower and the capacity to mobilize the entire Resistance Front, including Hezbollah. However, real-world constraints loom large, such as the US pledge to aid Israel, and the Israeli military’s demonstrated operational prowess, exemplified by their detailed knowledge of Haniyeh’s sleeping arrangements and the precise location of Hezbollah’s military leader, Shukr.

Given these complexities, Iran is likely to carefully weigh its options before escalating the conflict with Israel. Repeating a calculated, minimal response akin to the aftermath of the Damascus consulate bombing might emerge as the only viable strategy. – Fares Khachan

Israel: A thug state

Al-Ahram, Egypt, August 1

The recent Israeli assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, in Tehran was hardly unexpected. This action is in line with a well-documented and consistent Israeli policy that dates back through its history.

Israel has orchestrated the assassinations of dozens of Palestinian leaders and figures – numbering well over a hundred. Prominent names such as Ghassan Kanafani, Kamal Adwan, Kamal Nasser, Ali Hassan Salameh, Zuheir Mohsen, Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Salah Khalaf, Fathi Shaqaqi, Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, and many others remain etched in the memories of our generation. Many of these slain leaders were affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization or its various factions.

The assassination of Haniyeh recalls an impactful book that I encountered but regrettably could not obtain. Published in 2018, it bears a Talmudic-inspired title: Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Assassinations. This book, authored by the esteemed researcher Ronen Bergman, is the result of more than a thousand interviews with political figures and intelligence officers across various countries, coupled with an examination of thousands of classified documents.

Bergman’s exhaustive research led him to conclude that since the end of World War II in 1945, Israel has conducted more assassinations than any other Western nation. The targets have ranged from leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization to Iranian nuclear scientists and figures within Hamas and Hezbollah.

One notable case that remains vivid is the assassination of Egyptian nuclear scientist Yahya El Mashad, who was working on the Iraqi nuclear program. He was killed in his Paris hotel room in June 1980, an act that I firmly believe was orchestrated by Mossad.

This pattern of state-sponsored assassinations prompts a grave reflection. In my estimation, when it comes to Israel, we are confronting a particularly unique type of state – what I term the “thug state.” – Osama Al-Ghazali Harb

Israel and the limits of regional use of force

Al-Ittihad, United Arab Emirates, August 3

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu frequently touts Israel’s ability to wage wars on multiple fronts. Yet, this assertion stands in stark contrast to a strategic and security reality that suggests Israel can effectively engage only on two fronts. Recent incidents, such as those in Majdal Shams, and the heightened focus on the Gaza and northern fronts, have highlighted Israel’s difficulties in managing sudden threats elsewhere.

The absence of a large, conventional army compared to Israel’s adversaries, including those on the Egyptian front, masks the deeper strategic vulnerabilities Israel faces. The core issue for Israel is how to tackle both immediate and long-term threats across extensive areas. This necessitates reaching the sources of these threats and dealing with them, much like Hezbollah does periodically.

Israel’s ability to move and enforce its capabilities away from conventional engagement rules is crucial, especially in the context of missile and drone warfare. This situation calls for distinct capabilities and renewed defenses. Israel does possess multiple defense systems, which theoretically equip it to repel attacks and manage current theaters of operations.

However, despite these technological advancements, a significant portion of the Israeli public remains skeptical about Israel’s ability to guarantee security and stability. The failure to recover its hostages and the reality of citizens frequently taking shelter underscores these doubts. This situation persists despite Israel’s considerable investment in super-conventional capabilities, which, in theory, should protect its skies.

The diversion of resources from education and health to security underscores the strain on the nation’s infrastructure. Ultimately, Israel still confronts real dangers necessitating a comprehensive review of its security landscape. Significant challenges have emerged, underscoring the limitations of Israel’s conventional military prowess in its broader regional environment.

This has led to an essential question: what is the value of nuclear weapons if Israel cannot secure safety for its citizens across multiple fronts? Neighboring countries, now less reliant on traditional armies, engage through armed factions with advanced missile and drone capabilities, often supplied by Iran. This technology has penetrated deep within Israel, affecting its vital interests.

The closure of the port of Eilat and the potential closures of Ashkelon and Ashdod ports could render Israel effectively landlocked. Targeting Tel Aviv would serve as a provocative message, exacerbating the exposure of Israel’s skies to both proximate and distant threats.

In response, senior military figures in the General Staff have begun a serious dialogue about overhauling the current national security doctrine. This includes formulating a new strategy that accounts for the evolving threats and necessitates a realistic political and strategic assessment.

Innovations in defensive systems, joint development programs with the US, and the pursuit of advanced laser and satellite technologies indicate a potential pivot in Israeli strategy to meet these burgeoning challenges. Therefore, the solution lies in adopting innovative approaches to national defense. Military scientists are actively testing new defensive systems and exploring joint development with the US, aiming for superior laser and satellite technologies.

This shift suggests Israel will likely adopt a comprehensive new strategy, moving away from traditional methodologies in light of expanding risks. A review of its security policy is imperative, shifting from reactive measures to a proactive and confrontational strategy, aligned with the real-time challenges it faces.

Conclusively, despite ongoing advancements in armaments and support from American strategic partnerships, Israeli forces are struggling to confront the surrounding challenges. Regional adversaries are effectively exhausting Israeli capabilities, threatening its very foundation. This reality necessitates not only a reevaluation of Israel’s current strategies but also an all-encompassing political and strategic overhaul.

Israel must confront urgent security challenges with new strategies that extend beyond mere adjustments to current tactics and strategies, thereby ensuring a comprehensive approach to both national and regional security concerns. – Tarek Fahmy

Following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh

Al Arabiya, Saudi Arabia, August 3

A state of uncertainty grips the region following the assassination of Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, while he was a guest in the heart of Iran’s capital. The anticipated Iranian responses against Israel, presumed to be behind the assassination, add to the turmoil. Israel, however, has not officially claimed responsibility for the assassination, seemingly to nullify any justifications for an Iranian retaliation, which could then be framed as an unprovoked attack by Iran.

This incident has also sent shock waves through Iranian militias, not least because it occurred in Tehran – an epicenter of decision-making, now exposed as vulnerable. This breach in Tehran’s security raises alarming concerns about spying at the highest echelons, affecting the broader security framework of Iran’s militias.

Given this precarious balance, the Iranian response may serve more to distract the militias with the notion of retaliation rather than addressing the fundamental security lapses troubling Tehran’s political hierarchy. Thus, any action by these militias may aim more at obscuring the details of the assassination than addressing it head-on.

However, regardless of Iran’s possible response, it will not alter the Palestinian dynamics, which are set to enter a complex phase that could diminish Iran’s influence in Palestinian affairs moving forward. In the aftermath of Haniyeh’s assassination, the political landscape in Gaza is the first to feel the tremors. Discussions about an upcoming truce and the future of Gaza post-conflict have shifted dramatically.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, unburdened by concerns over hostages, now holds additional strategic advantages following a series of high-profile strikes against Hamas and Hezbollah, reinforcing his standing in Israeli domestic politics. Netanyahu’s December 2023 ultimatum – that Hamas must surrender or face destruction – remains pivotal, especially after reinforcing it through multiple assassinations, including that of a senior Hezbollah military figure.

For Hamas, the war’s continuation with the loss of key military leaders and the risk to political leaders abroad places heavy pressure on the Qassam Brigades in Gaza, now shouldering the burden of decision-making alone. This scenario likely forces Hamas to contemplate a future in Gaza stripped of military control, a significant blow that would reduce it to a political entity devoid of substantial military power. This is a difficult crossroads for the Qassam Brigades, which face mounting internal and external pressures, making the concept of post-war Gaza highly relevant in forthcoming negotiations.

Abroad, Hamas faces challenges not only in security but also in its political role, particularly in Lebanon. If an official war between Hezbollah and Israel breaks out, leading to a political settlement, Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon would likely be diminished. Hamas, similarly, may find itself relegated to a purely political role in Lebanon, maintaining military strength primarily in the West Bank, shifting toward covert operations. The potential loss of Gaza presents an uncertain future for Hamas, raising questions about its political relevance and capacity for restructuring.

On the Palestinian Authority’s front, the possibility that Hamas might lose Gaza without securing a political agreement poses a substantial challenge. The Israeli stance opposing the full return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza complicates the prospect of unifying Gaza and the West Bank, straining relations between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Hamas would need the Palestinian Authority to maintain political relevance, which might require significant concessions, compelling Hamas to reconsider its ideology and approach profoundly.

The assassination of Haniyeh, following closely on the heels of other key Gaza military leaders, marks a critical juncture as it occurred amid vital negotiations between Hamas and Israel, and an attempt to recalibrate the Palestinian political landscape. This assassination underscores the movement’s need to identify a secure locale and formulate an acceptable political agenda.

Notably, the Oslo Accords emerged not immediately after the PLO’s exodus from Beirut but were catalyzed by the Intifada, which paved the way for the Palestinian Authority’s establishment. In contrast, Hamas now faces the challenge of defining its future trajectory and political strategy in a fractured environment.

The looming Iranian response and the prospect of Hezbollah’s military engagement further contribute to an evolving equation, likely resulting in a diminished Iranian and Hezbollah role in the Palestinian issue moving forward. – Ayman Khaled

Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb.