At his end, Nasrallah was a victim of his own rhetoric – opinion

Israel’s apprehension of Hezbollah has arisen not only from the arsenal of rockets and missiles it has stockpiled but also from its hostile rhetoric and the image of Nasrallah as someone who understands Israel and its society better than any other adversary. This rhetoric played a significant role in Nasrallah’s decision to enter the war on October 8, and ultimately contributed to his downfall.

On May 26, 2000, during Hezbollah’s victory celebrations following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Nasrallah delivered a speech in which he famously declared that while Israel possesses nuclear weapons, it is “weaker than a spider’s web,” a phrase derived from the Quran.

Although the Second Lebanon War in 2006 led him to conclude that it would have been better for Hezbollah not to have initiated the military operation that sparked the war, it also resulted in the organization enhancing its military capabilities, thanks to substantial aid from Iran.  Additionally, the judicial upheavals in Israel further reinforced his perception – and that of many in the Arab world – that Israeli society is “weaker than a spider’s web.”

Hezbollah’s legitimacy in Lebanon has stemmed from its leadership in the struggle for the return of Lebanese territory still occupied by Israel and its central role in the “axis of resistance” aimed at undermining Israel, or at least reducing its power. This rhetoric may have compelled Hezbollah – possibly against its will – to enter the current war, albeit in a measured and calculated manner. 

In other words, the rhetoric itself functioned as a powerful historical force that the organization no longer fully controlled. This situation is reminiscent of how Nasser was drawn into the 1967 conflict, despite his reluctance to engage in an all-out war with Israel.

Reinforcing self-image

Rhetoric is not only a powerful tool in the struggle against an enemy; it is also a tool for reinforcing self-image. During the current war, there have been instances in which Hezbollah’s media outlets have given false representations of its actions.

Thus, for example, after the assassination in July 2024 of the organization’s military commander in Beirut, Fuad Shukr, Nasrallah claimed that 340 rockets had been fired at Israel and that drones had hit two of Israel’s military bases, including Glilot. In actual fact, the bases were not attacked, and the large majority of the rockets were shot down. These boasts were intended to present a false impression of accomplishment for the Shi’ite audience in Lebanon and beyond, with the aim of restoring Hezbollah’s honor and averting humiliation.

This was surprising because, for years, Nasrallah has portrayed himself as a leader who operates in a measured manner and is capable of speaking the truth, even when it is not in his favor. This image was crucial for him in relation to both his external audience (Israel) and his internal audience (the Lebanese, particularly the Shi’ite population).

His willingness to lie in such a blatant manner was a clear indication of the pressure he was under. Furthermore, after the recent attacks, he promised that “Israel’s crime will lead to a severe response and appropriate punishment, from expected and unexpected quarters.” However, no such response materialized while he was still alive.

It is possible that Nasrallah interpreted the Israeli cabinet’s decision to include the return of residents in northern Israel to their homes as rhetoric aimed at internal purposes, akin to his own use of such rhetoric, rather than as a genuine expression of Israel’s determination to act against Hezbollah. It is particularly surprising that he failed to recognize this shift following the recent operation, which appeared to signal a significant change in Israel’s behavior.

In other words, Nasrallah did not take Israel’s declarations and actions seriously.

Similar expressions of bravado have emerged from Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. The Houthi spokesperson regularly boasts about fictitious achievements following missile launches at Israel. Another aspect of this behavior includes issuing exaggerated and empty threats, such as asserting that the Houthis are collaborating with Hezbollah and militias in Iraq to “close the Mediterranean,” or that maritime conflicts could escalate into unforeseen events that would cause Israel to “beg for peace.”

These declarations prompt many in Israel, as well as in the Arab world, to question whether the Houthis genuinely believe their own rhetoric. What is significant, however, is that this is the image they wish to project to their own public, most of whom may not have the means or inclination to verify the truth of such claims.

Iranian rhetoric shows similar patterns

Similar rhetoric can also be heard from Tehran, despite the significant setbacks faced by the axis of resistance. For instance, in response to Nasrallah’s assassination, Supreme Leader Khamenei declared, “The fate of the region will be decided by the forces of resistance,” and asserted that “the Zionists are too weak to inflict a meaningful blow on the strong structure of Hezbollah. Lebanon will make the enemy regret its actions.” Bragging statements came after Iran’s second missile attack against Israel, which caused some damage but only one fatality and a couple of light injuries.

Older readers may recognize a striking similarity to the broadcasts of Radio “Voice of Thunder” from Cairo before and during the 1967 war. The station’s propaganda transmissions in Hebrew aimed to instill fear in Israeli society, while its broadcasts in Arabic sought to bolster morale among Egyptians and Arabs through exaggerated claims of victories over Israel.

Since 1967, the media landscape has undergone a radical transformation, with the internet and social media enabling the public to verify statements made by leaders and regimes. It is not surprising that media outlets in Lebanon and across the Arab world frequently critique and ridicule the distorted narratives presented by Hezbollah – often portraying Nasrallah as an attacker of chicken coops rather than military bases, as he had claimed.

The bluster emanating from Beirut, Tehran, and Sanaa reflects a broader issue: the inability of regimes and organizations to face failure, dishonor, and humiliation. Ultimately, this rhetoric can take on a life of its own, as the speakers begin to believe their own fabrications. In Nasrallah’s case, this delusion cost his life.

Prof. Elie Podeh teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. 

Eitan Yishai is a doctoral student at the Hebrew University who specializes in Lebanon.