How the IAF dismantled Hezbollah's command structure with precision strikes - analysis

Imagine Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, at the height of a war, ordering his forces to execute coordinated attacks—thousands of rocket salvos combined with UAVs and missiles. Yet there is no response: commanders eliminated, command centers destroyed, and bunker-busting bombs collapsing underground infrastructure.

During the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah demonstrated advanced command and control (C2) capabilities. Orders, coordination, and oversight flowed seamlessly from commanders in Beirut and southern Lebanon to operational forces, enabling effective resistance against the IDF, especially during ground operations. These capabilities not only facilitated intelligence gathering on IDF positions in Lebanon but also allowed for surprise attacks and reinforcements of units in distress.

Following the war, Hezbollah recognized the value of its C2 systems and prioritized investment in this area. Starting in 2008, Hezbollah—assisted by Iranian experts—transformed into an organized terror army. A disciplined hierarchy emerged, equipped with military assets, advanced communication tools, intelligence technologies, operational plans, and emergency protocols. Some facilities were above ground, while others were hidden underground to evade Israeli intelligence and withstand airstrikes.

Major-General (res.) Yossi Baidatz, then head of the IDF’s Research Division, identified Hezbollah’s C2 systems as both a strength and a potential vulnerability in future conflicts. He convinced then-Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi to prioritize intelligence collection aimed at dismantling Hezbollah’s infrastructure. This intelligence effort, spanning years, culminated in a comprehensive dossier guarded closely to ensure Nasrallah remained unaware of Israel’s surveillance.

“It was a long war of minds between the IDF and Hezbollah, where determination won out,” a senior reserve officer involved in the effort explained. “But let no one be mistaken. This is ant work—countless small actions and inter-departmental cooperation.”

Major A. (29), head of the C2 section at the IDF Air Force’s operational headquarters, provided rare insights into the IDF’s efforts to disrupt Hezbollah. These operations thwarted massive rocket barrages aimed at Israeli civilians and disrupted coordinated attacks on IDF ground troops.

“An organization like Hezbollah is comparable to a human body,” Major A., a combat navigator, explained. “It has a brain—senior commanders—and nerves for communication. Our mission in the C2 division is to disrupt this network. We targeted everything from Nasrallah to mid-level commanders.”

The Air Force’s C2 division is responsible for intelligence collection, planning, and precision strikes on Hezbollah’s leadership and operational units. Ahead of IDF ground operations in southern Lebanon, the division reached unprecedented readiness levels.

Hitting Hezbollah's nervous system

One operation, “Blind Spot,” targeted Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters in late September, disrupting its ability to manage activities. Subsequent strikes, such as “Moonlight,” targeted underground command centers thought invulnerable, severely impacting Hezbollah’s operational continuity.

“We achieved significant breakthroughs by targeting underground assets and leadership structures,” Major A. said. “This severely diminished Hezbollah’s ability to coordinate against our operations.”

The strikes also undermined Hezbollah's morale. “They couldn’t execute large-scale operations, and their leaders were being eliminated,” Officer G., a C2 planning officer, explained. “Our operations left a lasting impact on their capabilities and morale.”

Efforts extended to cyber operations as well. In July, the IDF targeted five Hezbollah cyber operatives involved in intelligence and cyberattacks. “Thanks to excellent intelligence, we executed a precise strike,” Major A. revealed.

As IDF ground forces advanced, Hezbollah struggled to regroup or organize large-scale attacks due to the loss of command centers and leaders. “We impaired Hezbollah’s ability to function as a military force,” the C2 commander said. “Local units were left to fend for themselves.”

Reflecting on the operations, Officer G. noted: “After the first wave of strikes, Hezbollah operatives avoided communication devices for fear of being tracked. This chaos rendered them unable to coordinate, further fracturing their organization.”