Syrian civil war flare-up: Implication for Israel’s security, Iran’s regional influence - analysis

Amid the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and the Iran-Contra controversy that had the US providing some arms to Iran through Israel, then-prime minister Yitzhak Shamir remarked that both sides in the war were “crazy,” and “we have no reason to wish either of the parties success.”

Over time, this quote morphed into Shamir's saying when asked about the war: “We wish both sides success.”

That nearly 40-year-old remark resonates today as Jerusalem assesses the weekend’s developments in Syria, where the rebels – led by Islamists backed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan – launched a new offensive in the long-dormant Syrian civil war and captured much of the key Syrian town of Aleppo.

The major developments

The timing of the offensive reflects three major developments:

First, Israel has weakened Iran, Assad’s key backer, by hitting the country directly and taking out significant military capabilities, and by seriously degrading two of its main proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. Israel has also shown the world that Iran’s threats often outweigh its actual capabilities.

Second, Hezbollah, which played a critical role in bolstering Assad earlier in the war, is not currently in any position to send reinforcements to assist Syria. An estimated 3,500 Hezbollah fighters have been killed, double that number wounded and taken out of action, and its leadership cadre decimated.

Third, Russia, whose intervention in the war in 2015 essentially turned the tide in Assad’s favor, is now deeply mired in its own war in Ukraine and does not have the same ability to come to Assad’s defense as it did a decade ago.

These factors have weakened Assad’s coalition, paving the way for the offensive led by the Central Military Operations Command (Al-Fatah al-Mubin), an alliance of radical Islamists and some more moderate forces.

What is less clear is whether this development is good or bad for Israel. The situation is highly complex, involving competing agendas and ideologies, with both potential risks and benefits for Israel.

First, the risks:

Were the Central Military Operations Command made up of Free Syrian Army rebels and Kurds who wanted to pry Syria away from the autocratic Assad and who had a pro-Western bent, then that would be one thing. But that is not the case. The rebel groups now controlling Aleppo include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a jihadist alliance with links to al-Qaeda, which in recent years has tried to moderate its image.

If Syrian President Bashar Assad were replaced by such forces, Israel could face a new Sunni jihadist threat on its northern border, with support from Erdogan – a scenario reminiscent of the situation Israel faced in Gaza: a Sunni jihadist threat, with support from Erdogan.

Additionally, a resurgence of violence in Syria could trigger another refugee crisis, increasing pressure on Jordan, which is not in Israel’s strategic interest.

 There is also the risk that Assad’s military assets, including potential chemical weapons, could fall into the hands of jihadist groups.

A further concern is that recent trends of Assad showing an interest in limiting Iran’s entrenchment and Hezbollah’s activities in Syria – especially in the south to avoid provoking an Israeli retaliation that could bring down his regime – could be reversed.

Over the past year, Israel has reportedly carried out some 70 strikes in Syria to prevent Iran from bolstering Hezbollah in Lebanon. Assad, wary of Israeli reprisals, has largely avoided direct confrontation and has stayed out of the current war, even reportedly reaching out to Moscow to encourage Iran not to heavily entrench itself inside Syria as before so as not to give Israel a pretense to attack.

The recent overtures Assad has made to moderate Sunni countries, such as the UAE, have been interpreted as an attempt to put some distance between Syria and Iran.

The rebel offensive, however, may force Assad to strengthen his reliance on Iran to repel these advances, reversing any progress made in distancing himself from the “axis of resistance.” Such a shift could bring more Iranian forces into Syria, heightening the threat to Israel.

But the situation also presents Israel with some possible benefits and opportunities.

The most glaring opportunity is that the rebel advances against Assad will weaken the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis.

Iran, itself in a weakened position, will now have to expend resources to save Assad’s regime, and not be in a position to resupply and attempt to rebuild Hezbollah. Israel has a prime interest in preventing Iran from smuggling arms through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and a renewal of the civil war in Syria will make the smuggling of those arms more difficult.

Furthermore, Iran’s resources and capabilities are not infinite, and it is going to be forced to prioritize. The militias it controls in Syria and Iraq will now have to be used to prop up Assad, and no longer be able to focus solely on Israel.

In Iran’s strategy of proxy war against Israel, it is clear that anything that sets back one of the Islamic Republic’s proxies weakens Iran.

Israel has tremendously weakened Hamas and Hezbollah over the last 14 months, and now the rebels are bruising Assad. Although Syria is not a fully owned Iranian subsidiary like Hezbollah, it was a force multiplier for Iran in the region. It was crucial for Iran’s strategic interests, first and foremost as a way to support and transfer weapons to Hezbollah, and also as a way for Iran to project its power and influence throughout the region.

A weakened Assad would be a severe blow to Iran’s hegemonic designs in the region, already reeling as a result of the losses Israel inflicted on Hamas and Hezbollah. Any time one of Iran’s proxies or allies in the region is weakened, Iran is weakened – which is why Jerusalem shed no tears over the rebel gains in Aleppo.

But while the weakening of Assad’s regime may have some benefits, Israel must prepare for the possible emergence of a Sunni jihadist threat now on its northeastern border. If that transpires, Israel will have to decide when, if, and how to intervene.

In the meantime, government officials are repeating the mantra that Jerusalem is carefully monitoring the situation, silently hoping – as Shamir did 40 years ago – that the two sides successfully weaken one another to reduce the threat and danger either can pose to Israel in the future.