Khamenei’s dilemma: Syria, Assad, Takfiris, and the fight for Iran’s influence

At a time when Hezbollah and Israel have signed a shaky ceasefire and Hamas is seriously weakened in Gaza, one of Iran’s other proxy strongholds in the Middle East is causing increasing concern for the ayatollahs of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Syria.

Dozens of Syrian Army soldiers have been killed as rebels of the Islamist terror group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham swept into the major city of Aleppo, forcing the army to redeploy in the biggest challenge to President Bashar al-Assad in years.

Russia, a major Assad ally, said its air force had carried out strikes on Syrian rebels in support of the country’s army, following what was the boldest rebel assault for years in a civil war where front lines had largely been frozen since 2020.

Iranian-backed militias also entered Syria on Sunday night from Iraq to support Assad and were heading to northern Syria to reinforce the beleaguered Syrian Army forces battling insurgents, according to Syrian Army sources. Dozens of Iran-aligned Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi fighters from Iraq also crossed into Syria through a military route near Al Bukamal crossing.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, once known as the Nusra Front, is designated a terrorist group by the United States, Russia, Turkey, and other states.

To throw his opinion into the mix, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sent out a post on X on Sunday evening, addressing the current situation in Syria, stating, “Takfiri groups are good news for enemies of the world of Islam. Exactly at a time when all Islamic Ummah’s attention is focused on the issue of Palestine, takfiri [apostate] groups, [that] instead of concentrating on [the] Zionist regime’s malevolent nature, draw the attention to other places. #Syria”

Takfiri groups are good news for enemies of the world of Islam. Exactly at a time when all Islamic Ummah’s attention is focused on the issue of Palestine, Takfiri groups, instead of concentrating on Zionist regime’s malevolent nature, draw the attention to other places.#Syria

— Khamenei.ir (@khamenei_ir) December 1, 2024

Khamenei’s post criticizes takfiri groups, a term often used to describe extremist Sunni factions that declare other Muslims apostates. He accused these groups of serving the interests of Islam’s enemies, such as the US and Israel, by diverting attention away from the Palestinian cause and the “malevolent nature” of the “Zionist regime.”

This perspective aligns with Khamenei’s long-standing belief in the umma (Muslim community at large) – that unity among Muslims is essential to resist external threats, particularly from Israel. By engaging in internal conflicts – such as those in Syria – takfiri groups weaken the Islamic world and shift focus from what Khamenei views as the central issues: Palestinian liberation and opposition to Zionism.

Khamenei, while embodying the Shia theocratic model, often invokes the concept of the umma to assert Iran’s leadership in a broader Islamist struggle.

A relationship worth saving?

Iran and Syria’s alliance began in the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Syria, under former president Hafez al-Assad, was one of the first Arab nations to back Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. The shared hostility toward Israel and opposition to Western influence in the Middle East cemented their ties. Syria also provided critical logistical support to Iran, allowing the passage of arms and supplies to Hezbollah – the Iranian-backed militia in Lebanon – which Israel has spent years trying to disrupt and has amped up its pressure since the war against Hezbollah erupted after October 7.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), particularly its Quds Force, has been the primary actor managing Iran’s relationship with Syria. The Quds Force, tasked with overseeing Iran’s extraterritorial operations, established a significant presence in Syria to support both strategic goals and ideological ones, such as exporting the Islamic Revolution’s principles. Iran’s support for Syria includes arms supplies, economic aid, and the training of pro-Assad militias.

The onset of Syria’s civil war in 2011 marked a turning point in the relationship.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, like his father Hafez, positioned himself as a key ally of Iran. When anti-Assad protests escalated into a violent conflict, the IRGC intervened decisively to ensure Assad’s survival, as losing Syria would have been a strategic blow to Iran’s regional influence.

Iran has since poured billions of dollars into Syria, supplying arms, deploying IRGC officers, and recruiting militias from across the region, including Afghan, Pakistani, and Iraqi fighters. This intervention helped Assad regain control over much of the country. Iran also viewed the war as a chance to expand its “axis of resistance” against Israel, consolidating a land corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean.

The Assad family’s secular Ba’athist ideology contrasts with Iran’s theocratic Shi’a governance, but their partnership endures due to shared goals. Both regimes oppose US policies in the region, support Palestinian resistance groups, and resist Sunni-dominated powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

For Iran, Syria acts as a critical bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon and provides access to Israel’s borders, complicating Israel’s defense strategies and acting as an Iranian deterrence.

While the Iran-Syria alliance remains strong, it faces challenges, including economic pressures and differing priorities in post-war reconstruction. Syria’s dependence on Russia has introduced a new player into the dynamic, sometimes complicating Iran’s influence. However, the IRGC’s deep entrenchment in Syrian security and economic structures ensures its continued leverage.

The relationship between Iran, the IRGC, and Syria is a multifaceted alliance defined by strategic necessity, ideological convergence, and mutual survival against shared adversaries. The IRGC’s role as Iran’s external arm ensures that Syria remains central to Iran’s regional ambitions.

Missing friends

Over the course of 2024, Khamenei has lost some of his closest allies.

The elimination of figures such as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh (killed in Tehran itself), and Hamas’s Gaza chief Yahya Sinwar will have led the Iranian leadership to be desperate to keep Assad – its closest ally in the region – in power, no matter what the cost.

In Khamenei’s eyes, the umma is not just a concept but a mission, embodied in the jihadist groups that  Iran backs and the IRGC’s extensive reach. His message, accusing HTS  of drawing attention away from Israel’s wars and the Palestinian issue is merely a pretense hiding his real intention: Assad must stay in power, or Iran’s influence will be critically wounded in Israel’s periphery.