Where does Iran nuke threat stand post-IAEA rebuke, Israel attack, Trump win? - analysis

After the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors condemned Iran for its nuclear violations for the second time this year, Israel’s disabling of most of Tehran’s vital anti-aircraft systems protecting its atomic facilities, US President-elect Donald Trump’s victory, and as three key European countries (the E-3) were set to meet with Iran about renewing nuclear negotiations, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program is again in the spotlight.

Iran’s response to these developments was a series of mixed signals.

Does all of this mean that Israel, the West, and Iran are closer to a climactic showdown over the nuclear program, or is such a showdown still far off?

Some sources have said explicitly – and others have indicated to The Jerusalem Post – that the West is getting more ready for confrontation but that the path of diplomacy is still open.

First, why might Israel, the US, and the E-3 (England, France, and Germany) be more ready to confront the ayatollahs now than in the past?

There are several reasons.

Only escalated since ending JCPOA

Not only have Iran’s nuclear violations continued and escalated since 2019, and in a very dangerous way since 2021, but around October 2025, the ability for the West to use the UN global snapback sanctions weapon against Iran will finally expire.

This weapon was a part of the 2015 nuclear deal, which still has a provision that allows the US or the E-3 to snap back full global sanctions on Tehran with no chance for a veto by Russia or China.

At the same time, invoking the snapback sanctions weapon could lead Iran to take more aggressive moves with its nuclear program in retaliation.

In fact, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said explicitly last week that his country could decide to cross the 90% weaponized uranium threshold or even cross the entire nuclear weapons threshold if the West tried to use the snapback against it.

This might be no idle threat.

When the IAEA condemned Iran in June, the Islamic Republic increased its uranium enrichment program, and it promised to do so again following the November 22 condemnation.

In fact, since Trump pulled the US out of the nuclear deal and reimposed American sanctions in 2018, Tehran has continually matched any penalty or condemnation with moving its nuclear program forward.

It is exactly for this reason that the E-3 and the Biden administration have been reluctant to initiate a showdown with Iran any sooner than the October 2025 expiration date might require.

However, this dynamic may have changed recently.

ISRAEL’S ATTACK on 20 Iranian sites on October 26, following Iran’s attack on October 1, both disabled the country’s defenses of its nuclear facilities and destroyed one of its secret weapons group activities for potential nuclear detonation at Parchin.

Trump’s win means that the ayatollahs face an impending economic and diplomatic maximum-pressure campaign and have less maneuvering room than they have had under Biden.

Some were even worried that Iran would try to break out to a nuclear weapon before the election, but the Post has no indications from top Israeli defense officials that this is realistically in the works.

This would seem to make it in Iran’s interest to reach a deal with the E-3 and the Biden administration before Trump takes office.

It would not bind Trump – he already exited the 2015 nuclear deal – but it would, to some degree, limit the effectiveness of any new pressure campaign he might try.

Further, Iran trying to stare down the Trump administration in a showdown over the global snapback sanctions sometime between January and October 2025 could look much scarier for Tehran than it did with a less aggressive US administration.

As all of this is happening, Iran is also in the process of a broader rethinking of its regional strategy, having lost Hezbollah and Hamas as two major proxies who could once deter Israel from striking its nuclear program.

The regime is considering a variety of options, including more diplomacy with the West to relieve pressure, more nuclear brinkmanship betting that Trump will only use sanctions but not attack militarily, or keeping its proxy strategy but trying to rebuild them quietly and more gradually so as to avoid Israeli attacks.

One sign that the Islamic Republic may try to cut a deal before Trump takes office is that Araghchi explicitly said Iran is still open to talks even after he felt that IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi and the E-3 betrayed a small initial deal he thought had been made.

Days before the IAEA Board condemned Iran, Grossi revealed that he had offered Tehran to avoid a condemnation if it agreed to freeze its 60% uranium enrichment and started the process of bringing back some of the nuclear inspectors that it expelled in early 2023.

Tehran agreed and thought it had dodged a condemnation and that it would have already cornered Trump a bit with a positive diplomatic process.

It turned out that Grossi could not “deliver the goods,” and the E-3 stuck to the condemnation, saying the Islamic Republic would need to do more to return to positive standing with them.

After all of these zigzags, the Post understands that the E-3 is still open to a deal with Iran, which could help them with Trump, and that Israel’s successful attack on Iran and Trump’s election have not brought them to be steadfastly opposed to talks or to feeling overconfident.

Rather, sources have indicated that the E-3 is still concerned that Israel or Trump may only push Iran over the nuclear weapons line.

All of this makes the next six weeks until the January 20 US Inauguration Day a wide open and wild playing field where getting closer to a mini nuclear deal or to an escalating nuclear conflict are both possibilities.