Voices from the Arab press: Syria after Assad: Four urgent challenges

Tough questions in Damascus and the region

Al-Ahram, Egypt, December 13

The recent developments in Syria, including those of the past few weeks and as recently as yesterday, are certain not to remain confined within Syrian borders.

Indeed, it may not be an overstatement to claim that these events will be a catalyst for intensifying the ongoing struggle for dominance on the world stage.

The Syrian conflict has taken on international dimensions since Russia’s intervention to bolster the Bashar al-Assad regime. This move paved the way for a new international-regional security dynamic at the expense of the Syrian state, its sovereignty, Arab national security, and, eventually, regional stability. The Assad regime, using this new equation, managed to endure and maintain the state’s integrity, but with significant concessions to the influence of international and regional players.

The real danger lies in these actors primarily operating through their proxies – militias and armed groups within Syria – that scrupulously follow the directives of their external sponsors. These proxies reflect the intricate relationships among their external backers, which fluctuate between collaboration and conflict at different phases.

Ultimately, their primary aim is to manipulate the Syrian landscape to create international and regional equilibriums aligned with their interests, often at the cost of Syrian statehood, regional security, and the well-being of the Syrian people. The Syrian regime has allied with these actors, yet it remains an arrangement that cannot endure indefinitely.

In my view, this is a precise characterization of the Syrian crisis. Syria currently stands at a precarious and complex juncture, one laden with implications demanding meticulous and unbiased analysis devoid of narrow agendas.

In this context, two critical observations must guide our approach to the Syrian issue. The first pertains to the nature of the ongoing conflict. Some persist in labeling it a power struggle between the regime and the opposition, proposing that the fall of Assad’s regime is the threshold to political change and the establishment of a “democratic system.”

This perspective, however, no longer aligns with the current reality. While this description might have held some validity during the early phases of the Syrian crisis, it has now evolved into a struggle to control the Syrian state itself, orchestrated through calculated arrangements and agreements.

Interpreting the positive reactions of ordinary Syrians to the regime’s downfall and the apparent embrace of local proxies as signals of a new political era is a misunderstanding.

THESE REACTIONS must be evaluated within the context of the fleeting rhetoric employed by the groups currently in power, who seek to ingratiate themselves with the populace in the short term but may pivot toward their own agendas and those of external forces.

The second observation underscores a recurrent lesson: the peril of undermining the nation-state and its established national armies. The experiences in the region since 2011, if not earlier, affirm this lesson – suggesting that moving away from a stable nation-state and regular armed forces only increases the prospects of instability and heightens chaos.

This inverse relationship becomes even more apparent when coupled with two additional factors: internal diversity and ethnic and religious divisions within society, and sectarian and demographic entanglements with neighboring countries. The deeper these divides, the more likely the repercussions of the collapse of the state and its military will transcend immediate borders.

This conclusion emphasizes the urgent need for a swift regional consensus on preserving the Syrian state. This requires redefining the crisis and the ongoing conflict’s nature. While there are undeniable political and security concerns among several regional actors, there are also significant Arab interests tied to Syria and the broader region, which cannot be ignored or dismissed by any external party.

Therefore, when regional and international actors engage with the Syrian issue, they must address their security concerns without compromising the future of the Syrian state or society – these matters are for the Syrian people alone to decide. It is crucial to recognize the necessity of maintaining the Syrian army as a cornerstone of the state’s preservation.

We should draw lessons from other experiences in the region and maintain a clear distinction between the Syrian army and the regime. This distinction is vital given the severe consequences that could ensue from the collapse of the Syrian state and military, particularly considering the regional context and previously mentioned conditions.

It also underscores the need for a political process to manage a transition informed by regional challenges. A political process that is feasible and sustainable should serve the interests of consolidating the Syrian state and fostering a stable, inclusive political system. The process must originate within Syria, owned and led by Syrians and Syrian political entities from inception to execution.

Furthermore, it should resist complete dependence on external balances to prevent foreign parties from stalling or vetoing it. The region’s movement away from the stability of nation-states and regular national armies exacerbates instability and deepens chaos.

The more these entities weaken, the more volatile and chaotic the situation becomes.  – Mohammed Fayez Farhat

Syria after Assad: Four urgent challenges

Al-Ittihad, UAE, December 14

The downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria could be considered the most monumental strategic development in the Middle East since the Iranian revolution of 1979.

However, revolutions seldom culminate in a seamless transition to stable governance. While Assad’s rapid removal has thus far resulted in minimal bloodshed, history paints a mixed picture of potential outcomes.

For instance, the Iranian revolution was succeeded by intense internal strife, and within a year, the nascent Islamic Republic was embroiled in a full-scale war with Iraq. Similarly, Ukraine’s 2014 revolution, which resulted in the ousting of its pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, quickly provoked Russia to annex Crimea and assert its presence in eastern Ukraine.

The first hurdle facing the new leadership in Damascus is to reassure key global powers that the extensive arsenals, including chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, left by Assad’s forces are secure and will not fall into the hands of extremist factions such as the Islamic State or other groups with divergent agendas. Both Israel and the US have already initiated military actions to dismantle many of Assad’s weapons caches.

The second equally vital task is to assure significant minorities that supported Assad, such as the Alawite and Christian communities, that they will be protected. The new leaders in Damascus would be wise to heed the lessons from Iraq following the US-led toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

The American occupiers made the grave error of disbanding the Iraqi army and banning the Ba’ath Party, effectively eliminating numerous essential civil servants. A functioning bureaucracy is the backbone of any society. The post-World War II Allied occupation of Germany and Japan demonstrated the importance of maintaining essential services by retaining local personnel to ensure the continuity of complex societal functions.

The third challenge, particularly in light of the Taliban’s egregious treatment of women after their resurgence in 2021, is to prevent radicals from imposing oppressive gender policies. Should Syria’s new regime adopt a similar approach, it would quash prospects for international cooperation, recognition, and the myriad benefits arising from the equitable treatment of women and minorities.

The fourth challenge requires outside powers to reach a consensus on their expectations for the new order. Central to this is an understanding among Turkey, the Gulf states, the US, and Israel on handling Iran and Russia. Both nations have seen their sway in Syria diminish and are wary of external pressures pushing them to relinquish regional strategic goals.

In the wake of losing Syria and strategic access to Hezbollah, Iran faces a decision: to accelerate its nuclear ambitions or to seize the opportunity to engage diplomatically with the incoming Trump administration to alleviate sanctions. This would demand Iran freezing its nuclear activities and permitting the revival of rigorous UN inspections.

The Russian quandary may prove to be the most formidable. Deprived of Syrian access, Russia’s objectives in Africa could falter, and its crucial access to warm-water ports and airbases on Syria’s Mediterranean coast might vanish. Such a scenario would likely provoke Moscow to intensify its efforts in Ukraine. However, it could encounter a more unified Europe and possibly a new Trump administration less sympathetic to Russia than some have speculated. – Geoffrey Kemp

Why did the Assad regime collapse so quickly?

Al Qabas, Kuwait, December 14

At 9 p.m. on Saturday, December 7, I reached out to Dr. Radwan Ziadeh, the founder and director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies and a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Carr Center for Human Rights.

My purpose was to gain insights into the military and political landscape in Syria. To my surprise, Dr. Ziadeh expressed astonishment at the rapid disintegration of regime forces. He assured me that the opposition had a firm grip on Aleppo, handling it even more effectively than American forces had managed Baghdad after Saddam’s fall.

When I inquired about the safety of minorities in Aleppo, he offered reassuring anecdotes, saying that on Sunday, November 30, fighters from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham attended a church service and assisted in setting up a Christmas tree. Although he predicted that these forces would soon enter Damascus, I chose not to contest his optimism, ending our conversation on that note.

On the morning of Sunday, December 8, I awoke expecting to hear reports of heavy combat near Homs. Instead, the news was that HTS had indeed breached Damascus. This revelation caught not only me but also American intelligence off guard.

As reported by The New York Times on December 9, US intelligence services, until the evening of December 6, had assessed a 50% likelihood that Bashar al-Assad could fend off opposition forces and suspected he might resort to using chemical weapons. The unexpected collapse of Syrian forces prompted a flurry of articles and research efforts aimed at explaining it.

Seeking answers, I ventured to contact friends in Damascus – something I previously avoided due to the political sensitivity. On December 9, I reached Yasser, a renowned architect from Damascus University specializing in restoring historic homes near the Umayyad Mosque.

Yasser recounted his decision to flee to Beirut with his family on Saturday, December 7, to avoid potential violence in Damascus. Ironically, he learned of his city’s “liberation” only after arriving in Beirut. He remarked that he had anticipated his children might grow up under the presidency of Hafez Bashar al-Assad, the eldest son of the deposed ruler.

Many observers, including myself, misjudged the Assad regime’s resilience, but analyzing the factors behind its swift collapse is somewhat straightforward and can be attributed to several key elements: the collapse of the Syrian economy, the events of October 7, the plight of the Alawite sect, Turkish support for the opposition, Russian disillusionment with Assad, and Iranian disappointment.

The Syrian economy plummeted by 84% between 2010 and 2023. While precise statistics are elusive, given Syria’s international isolation, the World Bank estimated the economic decline using satellite imagery of nighttime lighting in Syrian urban areas. Even the lucrative Captagon factories, operated by Maher al-Assad and his associates, do not count toward the official economy.

THE EVENTS of October 7, which saw the deaths of approximately 50,000 Palestinians from Gaza and the displacement of two million others, inadvertently contributed to the liberation of the Syrian people from Assad’s grip. Israeli strikes incapacitated Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, limiting their ability to assist Assad. While Israel may not have targeted Assad intentionally, seeing him as a stabilizing force on the Golan front, the unpredictable consequences of war played out.

The regime relied heavily on Alawites for key military and intelligence roles, yet only a select few benefited materially, primarily the Assad and Makhlouf families, alongside Asma al-Assad, the president’s wife. Despite the Alawite community losing around 100,000 members defending Assad between 2011 and 2016, their economic conditions did not improve.

In a poignant letter reported by Zaman Alwasl, a notable Syrian news outlet, on December 4, 2024, an Alawite citizen criticized Assad’s policies, accusing them of posing an existential threat to Alawites despite Assad’s own Alawite heritage. The letter underscores the disparity between ordinary Alawites and the elite families.

Despite Alawites representing about 10% of Turkey’s population, relations with Syria soured under the Assads and worsened with the ascension of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party.

The 2011–2016 Syrian revolution and the influx of millions of Syrian refugees into Turkey emphasized the interdependence of Syrian and Turkish stability. With roughly 4 million displaced Syrians in Turkey, most without substantial resources, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan unsuccessfully invited Assad for discussions, leading Turkey to support the opposition through logistical and intelligence means.

Rooted in the late-1950s arms trade and maturing over decades, Russian-Syrian relations deepened through military, cultural, and social exchanges. Russia, aware of the Syrian army’s poor state and low morale, implored Assad to negotiate seriously with the opposition. Yet Assad remained defiant, ignoring repeated Russian urgings.

Despite Russia’s military interventions during 2013-2016, the diminished intensity signaled Moscow’s recognition of Assad’s doomed prospects. Ultimately, Russia extricated him by relocating him and his family to Moscow.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei involved Iran and Hezbollah heavily in Syria, a decision seen as strategically flawed given their “revolutionary” stance juxtaposed against backing a dictator. Early in the conflict, as revolutionaries neared Damascus, even Iranian leaders like President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad acknowledged Assad’s end was likely. Financial and military burdens on Iran and its allies could not be sustained, as declared by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Hossein Salami.

These six points largely illuminate the factors behind the Assad regime’s unexpected downfall. 

Although Syria faces a challenging road to stability and development, the collapse of the regime signifies the end of a pervasive climate of fear. The fear that isolated people from each other and from the world has begun to erode, fostering a new sense of hope. – Dr. Hamed Al-Hamoud

Saudi Arabia and the World Cup bid

Asharq Al-Awsat, London, December 12

In a highly anticipated development, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been granted the prestigious opportunity to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup, becoming the sole host nation for the first expanded version of the tournament approved by the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA).

On Wednesday, FIFA confirmed that Saudi Arabia would host the Men’s World Cup in 2034, while the 2030 event would be a joint effort by Morocco, Spain, and Portugal. Saudi Arabia’s successful bid marks a historic moment as it becomes the first country to host all 48 teams simultaneously, following the 2026 tournament scheduled to occur in the US, Mexico, and Canada and the 2030 event in Spain, Morocco, and Portugal.

In the evaluation process, Saudi Arabia’s proposal received an unprecedented rating of 4.18 out of 5, the highest in the history of World Cup host bids since the tournament’s inception in 1930.

FIFA categorized the associated risks as moderate, in contrast to the “high risk” assessments of the 2026 and 2030 World Cup bids. With this development, Saudi Arabia is already laying the groundwork for the 2034 event, making the nation a focal point for global scrutiny and interest.

As is widely understood, soccer is not merely a sport; it is an expansive global industry with intricate layers, interests, and networks. The World Cup is a seminal global event primarily centered on the competition itself, but it also intersects with political, sporting, social, economic, marketing, and cultural dimensions. The World Cup is unrivaled as the largest global event, captivating audiences worldwide, either directly or indirectly.

With its commitment to hosting an exceptional tournament, Saudi Arabia pledges to welcome diverse cultures and civilizations, signifying a pivotal step toward further openness – a core tenet of the Saudi vision, which aims to foster a civilization interconnected with the global community.

Since the initiation of its Vision 2030 under King Salman’s leadership and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s guidance, Saudi Arabia has pursued a path starkly opposed to the extremist, insular, and futile projects that have marred the region. This trajectory reflects a forward-looking approach focused on global engagement, symbolized by opening windows to new ideas and perspectives.

It stands in direct contrast to the fundamentalist ideologies of movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaida, Khomeinism, and the Houthi movement, not to mention the empty rhetorics of extremist factions.

This is Saudi Arabia’s deliberate choice, a vision starkly different from the chaos and superstitions propagated by disruptive elements to the north in the Levant, south in Yemen, and to the East and West. Comparing these paths clarifies the emergence of the dawn of a new day for the kingdom and our region.  – Mishari Al-Dhaidi

Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.