Faulty systems or surprise: Why hasn't IAF intercepted missiles aimed at central Israel? - analysis

After two Iranian ballistic missile attacks were intercepted in April and October, Israel’s defense establishment expressed confidence in the multi-billion-dollar air defense system, claiming it had successfully established a protective barrier against Iran.

Despite hundreds of missiles launched toward Israel, the resulting damage was minimal. The sole fatality was a Bedouin resident in an unprotected area.

However, the recent missile strike in Ramat Efal on Thursday and the Saturday morning hit in Jaffa have raised significant concerns. Iran appears to have been refining its strategies, leveraging both direct launches and the steady supply of missiles to Yemen's Houthis to test Israel’s systems.

Israel’s air defense comprises four operational layers. At the top is the Arrow-3 interceptor, targeting threats in space. Below it is the Arrow-2, designed for ballistic missiles in the upper atmosphere. The David’s Sling system, with highly agile interceptors, targets short-range ballistic and cruise missiles.

At the base is the Iron Dome, which intercepts rockets, drones, and some cruise missiles. A fifth layer, the Iron Beam laser system, focusing on drones and rockets, is expected to join the lineup next year, though it cannot neutralize heavier missiles.

Preliminary investigations into last night’s failure revealed that multiple interceptors were activated but failed to neutralize the missile launched from Yemen. A probe, led by the Air Force in coordination with the Defense Ministry’s HOMA Directorate, Israel Aerospace Industries, and Rafael, aims to determine whether this was a one-time malfunction or the result of a more advanced weapon supplied by Iran to the Houthis.

The simultaneous failure of several interceptors diminishes the likelihood of a technical defect. All interceptors rely on a national radar system integrating data from Green Pine and Great Pine radars, supplemented by the American X-band radar and the US satellite system. These systems are designed to provide overlapping coverage to ensure interception.

Iran still has some tricks up its sleeve

Until now, the Houthis have used modified Toufan missiles based on Iran’s older Shahab-3 design. However, Iran also possesses more advanced ballistic missiles, such as the Emad and Khaibar Shakan, which can reportedly evade interceptors through post-reentry maneuvering.

Israel issues targeted Red Alert warnings after launches from Yemen or Iran based on a missile's trajectory. However, maneuverable missiles disrupt this calculation, making interception at hypersonic speeds more challenging. Such missiles require advanced designs, including visible fins on their warheads, as seen on newer Iranian models.

Reports suggest that Iran may have begun deploying these advanced missiles from Yemen. Iran previously claimed that such missiles were used during October’s second attack on Israel, a claim Israel initially dismissed, asserting successful interceptions with minimal “leakage.” These claims now warrant re-examination: Were the investigations thorough? Have the missiles been refined for real combat conditions?

The recent incident in Ramat Efal, where the missile’s warhead caused significant damage to a school, and this morning’s strike in Jaffa, demand clear answers. Israel’s newly appointed Defense Minister, Israel Katz, who recently visited Mount Hermon, must address these failures and reassure the public.