How Turkey and Israel salvaged their relationship - opinion

After the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power in Turkey in 2002, Ankara’s approach to Israel began to change for the worse. There were major fears at the time that the defense ties that characterized bilateral relations would vanish and create an irreparable rupture.

Within six years, ties indeed went from friendly to hostile.

And yet, the recent Israeli humanitarian delegation sent to assist Turkey in February’s earthquake disaster is the latest reminder of the fact that these days, Jerusalem’s relations with Ankara are marked by a high degree of stability. That’s not something that should be taken for granted; it took years for the two countries to reach this stage after dealing with several major crises.

It took years to get here

The 2010 Mavi Marmara crisis (when Israeli Navy commandos and Turkish Islamist activists trying to reach Gaza were involved in a deadly clash) marked a low point. Yet since then, the two regional powers have found a way to restore relations and maintain them – to a degree.

This was achieved primarily through civilian cooperation, as returning to the military cooperation that existed before Erdogan’s rise to power would be very hard. Israel would have to find alternative security partners in the Mediterranean – which it did in the form of Greece.

Once in power, Erdogan wanted to be the leader of the Islamic world and navigate according to a neo-Ottoman playbook. Unlike Ataturk, who turned Turkey from an empire to a state, Erdogan wants to return his country to empire mode.

On the one hand, Erdogan tried to employ a zero-conflict policy with Turkey’s neighbors, while seeking to increase its influence in the region through soft power, based on leveraging economic and cultural ties, rather than military means.

However, Turkey’s military involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya, and severe tensions that developed with Greece and Israel put a dent in the zero-conflict approach.

In addition, Turkey’s political influence on Arab Muslim states remained extremely limited. Theoretical predictions look nice on paper, but Erdogan quickly found out that reality doesn’t always align. No one in the Arab Sunni world was willing to accept him as a regional leader – Egypt and Saudi Arabia hold that position in the Sunni bloc.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to give up its role as the leader of the Islamic world. As a result, Turkey took up the banner of assisting the Palestinians, as part of its regional leadership bid. Yet Erdogan quickly understood that if he wants to be influential in the Arab world, he must have good ties with Israel, or he risks losing relevance.

All the Arab powers have ties with Israel, some formally like Jordan and Egypt, and, since the 2020 Abraham Accords also the UAE and Bahrain, while others, such as Saudi Arabia, maintain informal ties. As the Arab states moved forward, Erdogan was left behind.

Erdogan understood that if he remained excluded, the Abraham Accords would further decrease Turkey’s influence on the region and the Arab world – and this realization also helped convince him of the need to change his attitude to Israel. Meanwhile, Erdogan was a big disappointment to the United States, as it moved closer to Russia and created a crisis in NATO.

Israel as a means to repair damage

Israel, in Erdogan’s view, is therefore an important means for him to repair some of that damage by enabling him to forge new connections with the US and open doors in Europe via improved ties with Jerusalem. Hence, Turkey has focused on promoting civilian ties with the Jewish state.

In addition, economic trade has remained consistently high. Since Erdogan took office as prime minister in 2002, trade between Israel and Turkey has increased fivefold. Furthermore, Erdogan believes that strengthening ties with Israel will benefit his country’s economy and increase its global influence.

As a result, he has made efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Jerusalem – but without giving up his ongoing effort to stress the Palestinian issue.

This is why some Hamas members are still allowed to be active on Turkish soil, though these days, this activity mostly involves Hamas’ political wing. Hamas’ Deputy Political Bureau Chief Salah Al-Arouri – who in reality oversees West Bank terrorism efforts – is today based in Lebanon after relocating from Turkey. The AKP Party views Hamas’ political wing as a sister movement.

Erdogan’s growing problems mean that he is keener than ever to improve ties with Europe, the US, Sunni states and Israel.

Kurdish autonomous zones in northern Syria have an immediate impact on southern Turkey that Ankara finds disturbing. Millions of Syrian refugees remain in Turkey, creating a serious economic problem. Iran worries Erdogan due to its ongoing attempts to change the balance of power in Syria to the determinant of Turkish-backed Sunni forces in the north of the country.

Iranians are present on the Syrian Mediterranean coastline, and this Iranian entrenchment is not viewed positively by Erdogan. Sunni Turkey sees Shi’ite Islamist regional influence as a destructive force. Despite four hundred years of quiet on the Turkish – Iranian border, these are far from being brotherly states.

Erdogan also has huge economic problems and needs to attract new investments by improving ties with Europe and the US. He is also interested in becoming a distributor of Israeli gas to Europe.

These factors have led to a substantial change in Erdogan’s tone. When he criticizes Israel, he uses a vastly different tone from the one he used in the early years of his government rule.

That Israeli and Turkish security organizations were reportedly able to cooperate closely to thwart Iranian terror cells on Turkish soil sent to target Israelis in June 2022 is a further reflection of this change.

Erdogan has not given up his vision of establishing himself as an important Muslim leader who promotes the Palestinian cause but he has learned that he cannot achieve this by continually bashing Israel. Turkey also has direct potential gains it can make from its improved ties with Israel.

Israeli companies are already involved in helping Istanbul better manage its water system, with Israeli-made sensors helping to prevent water leakages from its pipes. There is interest on both sides in further cooperation. This will continue to be limited to the civilian sector because Erdogan has not shed all his neo-Ottoman influences.

Greece, for its part, has no reason to feel threatened by the Israeli-Turkish thaw, precisely because it is limited to civilian issues. The good judgment of both Israeli and Turkish decision-makers has enabled ties to become stable once more, as they should be.

The writer is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He is a former senior deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry. He served as Israel’s ambassador to Chile, Colombia and Turkey.