The crisis in Sudan is getting worse with no hope in sight - opinion

In the Sudanese crisis, the situation appears bleak, with no sign of hope in sight. In fact, the situation might actually be worsening, as certain signs suggest a prolonged escalation. Sudanese’s Defense Ministry has urged reserve soldiers and retired personnel to promptly go to their closest military bases and officially enroll their names.

In the field management of the Sudanese scene, there exists a sense of ambiguity. At first, the army leadership issued a call for all retirees and able-bodied individuals to be ready to protect themselves. However, they subsequently clarified that the invitation is specifically for former soldiers, urging them to register at the nearest military bases. It remains unclear whether this call is mandatory or voluntary.

Despite this ambiguity, the essence of this significant statement revolves around two potential scenarios, or perhaps even a combination of both.

The readiness of the Sudanese army leadership to participate in a protracted conflict could be indicated, with the potential for preparing to expand the extent of combat and the intensity of the conflict beyond the ceasefire. Alternatively, it could imply that the army leadership has started to recognize that the current manpower within the army is inadequate for geographical deployment and achieving a decisive military resolution.

Reinforcing the human force, including reserve forces and even retirees, and potentially involving anyone capable of bearing arms, would be necessary. If this is true, it would signify a crucial indication of the conflict’s future trajectory. On a positive note, there exists a relative adherence to the ceasefire, which was mediated by Saudi Arabia and the United States.

TO FACILITATE the provision of humanitarian aid to those impacted by the conflict that broke out more than a month ago, the fighting has ceased. This conflict has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, leading to extensive displacement and refuge. Over one and a half million individuals have been forced to leave their homes, either as internally displaced persons or as refugees in neighboring nations. Meanwhile, international reports indicate that around 25 million Sudanese citizens require humanitarian assistance.

The dilemma in the Sudanese crisis lies in the reciprocal rejection by both generals to initiate political negotiations. The sole progress made through the endeavors of Saudi Arabia and the United States is the humanitarian ceasefire agreement, valid for one week. Consequently, there is no definitive accord for a ceasefire, let alone the commencement of peace talks.

The rub, as observed by numerous analysts, stems from the reluctance of Army Chief General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan to engage in negotiations with Hemeti. According to the official portrayal of the army, Hemeti is now deemed a rebel and has been ousted from his position as deputy to Al Burhan. Consequently, attaining agreements to bring an end to this conflict needs considerable time and extensive diplomatic endeavors. Resolving this crisis through a zero-sum equation proves challenging.

The return of Hemeti as a governance partner is unacceptable to both Al Burhan and Hemeti himself. Similarly, Hemeti refuses to be ousted from power in such a manner. Both men are fully aware that if one of them gains control, it would result in the arrest of the other and the implementation of severe punitive actions.

As a result, it becomes apparent that, at least for the time being, the parties involved in the Sudanese crisis are relying on the military situation on the ground to achieve favorable outcomes.

In the Sudanese crisis, the army aims to conclusively resolve the conflict in its favor, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) rely on their dominance over strategic locations and checkpoints to wear down the army’s capabilities and prolong the fighting indefinitely.

One of the predicaments in this crisis is that the envisioned resolutions by both parties, as well as most external actors, revolve around one faction securing control of the government.

Given the existing field reality, it proves arduous to accomplish this objective. Both sides take advantage of the ceasefire to restructure their positions, reconsider their stances, and garner support from within and outside.

Upon closer examination of evidence, it becomes apparent that the Sudanese army’s capacity to sustain unity in an extended internal conflict may be comparatively weaker in contrast to the RSF.

The latter, operating under different rules and philosophies than regular military institutions, are accustomed to working in demanding circumstances. Consequently, they have the capability to persevere in an internal conflict over an extended duration. Their position could be bolstered if tribal militias or other armed groups align themselves with them.

In general, the Sudanese army appears to be running out of time. They must swiftly resolve the conflict to prevent the depletion of forces, a decline in morale and challenges in sustaining combat capabilities in urban warfare conditions.

Additionally, there is a possibility of limited supplies of weapons and equipment, as well as potential issues with soldiers’ salaries. In contrast, the RSF possess access to both weapons and funds, rendering them well-prepared for such field conflicts. Moreover, they hold the capacity to rally allies and acquire external backing in terms of weaponry and financial resources by leveraging the borders with the neighboring countries of Sudan.

Difficult to predict the direction that the Sudanese crisis will head

As things stand, it proves challenging to formulate plausible scenarios concerning the direction of the Sudanese crisis. Nevertheless, it is evident that the intensification of the conflict in the capital, Khartoum, constitutes a calamity in its own right. It swiftly propels the situation towards the potential collapse of the state, accompanied by the destruction of crucial institutional landmarks, like the Central Bank, various government entities and hospitals, and the deterioration of public infrastructure, among other consequences.

What is even more concerning is that the international community has unmistakably begun to disregard the Sudanese crisis. Following the evacuation of foreign nationals from the nation, the crisis joined the ranks of the numerous forgotten troubles on the international agenda.

At the onset of the crisis, we issued a warning about this very matter: if the Saudi and American endeavors to seek resolutions to this unyielding crisis come to an end, the situation may deteriorate further. This is particularly true considering that African efforts have completely halted following the unsuccessful mediation attempts made at the incipient conflict.

The writer is a UAE political analyst and a former Federal National Council candidate.