Is it time for the Turkey-Cyprus dispute to be revisited? - opinion

In connection with an incident in the UN buffer zone separating Turkish from Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, the specter of what Lyndon B. Johnson called “one of the most complex problems on earth” has once again raised its head.

The incident, which took place in August, was when UN forces tried to block Turkish Cypriot attempts to build a road from the North, through the buffer zone to the ethnically mixed village of Pyla. In the process, UN troops were manhandled.

The secretary-general condemned the assault on UN peacekeepers and Turkey, in turn, condemned the UN’s intervention. Whatever the merits of the dispute, it only serves to confirm that the division of this island, which occupies a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, is an open sore that remains unhealed after 60 years. 

Cyprus has been a bone of contention for a thousand years, and as the Arab geographer Al-Muqaddasi noted in 985, “The island of Qubrus is in the power of whichever nation is overlord in these seas.” And Turkey is determined to be the overlord. 

As the architect of Turkey’s “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy, Prof. Ahmet Davutoglu explained in his key work, Strategic Depth in 2001, “Even if there was not one single Muslim Turk over there, Turkey would have to maintain a Cyprus question. No country could possibly be indifferent to an island like this, placed in the heart of its vital space.”

Turkey’s stance on this issue has not changed. In a TV interview in August, President Tayyip Erdogan’s adviser on security and foreign policy, Mesut Hakki Caşin, warned: “The Turkish nation stands firmly with the Turkish Cypriots. The Mediterranean Sea belongs to us, and no one should even think about raising a sword against us there. They [Greece, Cyprus, and their allies] better not forget this.”

In view of the considerable gas and oil resources in the Levant Basin between Cyprus and the mainland and Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” maritime policy, Turkey’s claim to the Mediterranean as mare nostrum scuppers any prospect of regional peace.

The history of the Turkey-Cyprus dispute

At this stage, a recap is necessary. Cyprus was once a place d’armes for the Crusaders en route to the Holy Land. It was later ruled by Venice for 100 years until conquered by the Ottomans in 1571. In 1878 Cyprus was taken over by the British to protect the Suez Canal. In the Lausanne Treaty (1923), which established the borders of modern Turkey, it accepted Britain’s annexation of Cyprus and that Turkish nationals resident in Cyprus would become British citizens.

However, in 1955, when the Greek Cypriot majority demanded independence and enosis (union with Greece), the British convened an Eastern Mediterranean conference and played Greece off against Turkey by inviting them both. Turkey concocted its own plan for partition, but after Cyprus became independent in 1960 the Greek Cypriots under Archbishop Makarios III put into operation their own Akritas plan to achieve enosis.

The power-sharing constitution collapsed, fighting broke out between the two population groups, and in 1964 a UN peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) intervened and is still there. 

The finishing touch was in July 1974, when Greek Cypriot extremists staged a coup, removed Makarios and – with support from the Greek junta – intended to declare enosis. Britain as a guarantor state refused to take action, so Turkey, in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee, which prohibited the union of Cyprus with any other state, intervened and occupied the northern third of the island.

At a Geneva conference in August of that year, Turkey offered a federal solution but the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Glafcos Clerides, under pressure from Makarios, refused. In 1975 talks between the two communities began under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General, but as the present incumbent, António Guterres, despondently observed after the last round of talks collapsed in Switzerland in 2017, it is “a horizon of endless process without result.”

The unilateral declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, which only Turkey recognizes, further cemented the island’s division. Since the election of Ersin Tatar as Turkish Cypriot leader – instead of the pro-federal Mustafa Akıncı in 2020 – the Turkish Cypriot position has hardened.

Turkey now insists on a two-state solution based on sovereign equality instead of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, which has been the agreed UN parameter.

Nevertheless, at the Israel-Hellenic Forum in Nicosia in June one of the speakers, a Greek professor of international relations, Kostas Ifantis, noted that Turkey had entered a period of de-escalation. This has been driven more by economic necessity than inclination, witness Erdogan’s recent trip to the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, to drum up foreign investment.

As the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security has observed, the recent cycle of elections has confirmed the return of experienced political figures to office: Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Greece,  Nikos Christodoulides in Cyprus, Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, and Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. This may create opportunities for strengthening existing bonds of cooperation – and exploring new options for resolving or reducing old conflicts.

AT THE same time, the energy crisis facing Europe calls for new solutions, where the Eastern Mediterranean plays a central role. In a trilateral summit, the three presidents from Cyprus, Israel, and Greece have just reaffirmed their commitment to energy cooperation.

At the Israel-Hellenic Forum, Kostas Ifantis mentioned the need for a procedural opportunity to include Turkey, but the opportunity already exists. In 2019, Egypt, whose Zohr gas field is the largest in the Mediterranean, founded the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which includes Israel, Cyprus, Greece, France, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, but not Turkey. The US and the EU are observers. According to former US ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman, Erdogan believes he can threaten his way in. 

The alternative is to convene an EMGF conference, where Turkey could take part as an observer, as a prelude to the solution of outstanding issues. 

The writer is an international adviser at the Research Institute for European and American Studies in Athens.