Israel-Hamas War: Making peace based on past experience - opinion

Israel and the Palestinians long ago resolved most of the issues confounding their effort at peacemaking. Over the last 30 years, genuine political initiatives by each of the antagonists have generated discussion, consultation, and serious negotiations.

Early on, both the Israelis and the Palestinians understood that their conflict was not a zero-sum game in which only one side can win. This revelation became obvious in 1993 with the Oslo Agreement.

But well before the unofficial negotiations began in Oslo, the Palestinians had taken the initiative which enabled a positive Israeli response. This was when, in 1988, the PLO announced its acceptance of UN Resolution 181 which called for the creation of “a Jewish state and an Arab state in Palestine.” The Palestinians declared the Arab state with its capital in east Jerusalem in their name. In doing so, they also announced their acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 242 which affirmed the rights of all states in the region to “live in peace within recognized and secure borders.” And in a follow-up UN meeting in Geneva, Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader, emphatically proclaimed his renunciation of terror and his uncompromising emphasis of “Israel’s right to exist.”

It was, however, not until 1992, when the Israel Labor Party won the legislative elections under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin, that a change in Israel’s policy became possible. Rabin declared his commitment to the peace process, advocating Palestinian autonomy and his readiness to make land concessions.

Rabin was accepting of the negotiation process which had begun in the aftermath of the 1991 Madrid Conference. The conference was convened following the Persian Gulf War, by president George H.W. Bush and co-chaired by Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. Afterwards, bilateral talks were initiated in Washington between Israeli, Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian representatives. And while there was little progress to report, prime minister Rabin chose to support continuing Israeli participation, in the expectation that in time the process would prove to be successful.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations of the 1990s

In contrast, the Oslo negotiations were a track-two secret process initiated by deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin in cooperation with Terje Larsen, head of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science Research. Initiated in December 1992, on the Israeli side were two academics – Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak. Representing the Palestinians was Ahmad Qurei, a PLO leader and member of the Central Committee of Fatah. He was accompanied by two other Palestinian representatives.

Sitting in the same room in a Norwegian home enabled the Israeli and Palestinian teams to face one another with mutual respect and consideration. Their challenge was initially to develop a program for the implementation of a Palestinian autonomy plan following the withdrawal of Israeli presence in Gaza, economic cooperation between the two sides, and a Declaration of Principles defining Israeli-Palestinian relations for a period going forward.

Rabin was informed of the progress in the secret negotiations in February of 1993. In May, following the request by Qurei that the Israeli representation be upgraded with the participation of an Israeli government representative, Rabin gave foreign minister Shimon Peres authorization to appoint the director general of the Foreign Ministry, Uri Savir, to represent the government.

In June, the ministry invited Washington lawyer Joel Singer, a retired IDF officer and former head of the Military Advocate General’s Office, to join the Israeli team in Oslo. Following Singer’s review and careful rewriting of the Declaration of Principles, he reported to Rabin that the Palestinian delegation was serious and that the negotiating process was going forward. Thereafter, the Israeli participants presented a weekly report to Rabin about progress in the talks. Nonetheless, the prime minister was hesitant about making an agreement with the PLO.

To ensure that he was on the correct track, Rabin authorized two of his closest Labor allies to confirm the verity of the information he was receiving. One was health minister Haim Ramon who, with Arab MK Ahmad Tibi, checked with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to confirm the information reported to Rabin.

The second Israeli confidant was brigadier general (Ret.) Ephraim Sneh. His initiative included writing a text for the Declaration of Principles with his PLO counterpart Nabil Shaath, a senior Palestinian official and policy adviser.

However, when informed of the Shaath-Sneh initiative, Arafat asserted his firm preference for the Oslo track.

Having achieved the objectives set forth for the Oslo meetings, on August 19, 1993, Peres secretly flew to Oslo to meet Qurei and to witness the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles by Savir and Qurei.

When the American administration was informed of the Oslo achievement, it stressed the importance of there being documents of mutual recognition signed by Arafat and Rabin. This was effectuated by an exchange of letters on September 9, 1993. Arafat’s letter affirmed the PLO’s commitment to the peace process, peaceful coexistence with Israel, and renunciation of terrorism and acts of violence. It further declared “that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status issues would be resolved through negotiations.”

Rabin responded with a letter saying that “in light of the PLO commitments...the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO.”

On September 13, 1993, on the grounds of the White House, the Oslo Accords were signed. Following the ceremony, in an opinion poll of the Israeli public, 65% expressed support of the agreement. This was complemented by a 75% support expressed in a poll of Palestinians living in the territories.

One month later, in October, negotiations began in Taba, Egypt, between the PLO and Israel about the process for implementing the principles outlined in the accord. The negotiations were prolonged due to disagreements over many of the issues. Thus, in order to effectuate a disciplined and intimate negotiating process, the sites and participants were alternated. Teams of specialists in different areas met in Taba, Cairo, Oslo, Versailles, and Davos over a period of seven months. The meetings concluded with a detailed document known as the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.

The writing and signing of the accords, known as Oslo I, marked the conclusion of the first part of the process. The elements agreed upon included the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho on the West Bank.

In reflecting on the negotiating process, a number of prominent factors explain why it was successful. Above all was the secret unofficial character of the meetings in a place where the participants were protected from public exposure and influence. The intimacy of the meetings enabled the participants to develop a constructive, even friendly, relationship. This is not to say that they were disconnected from their distinctly different political leaders and mandates. All along, the Israeli participants reviewed and amended their positions as instructed by Beilin, Peres, and Rabin. In the case of the Palestinians, Arafat was giving direction to his representatives. This likewise explains why the follow-up meetings about the way in which the principles agreed upon in the accords were to be implemented were conducted over a seven-month period by teams of experts appointed by each side meeting in different, secure locations.

The spirit created by the Oslo achievement led to a series of secret meetings into 1994 between Israeli and Jordanian leaders. Both Peres and Rabin met with King Hussein in a series of negotiating sessions. The process culminated with the signing of a declaration on the lawn of the White House on July 25, 1994, marking the end of enmity and the beginning of peace negotiations. A peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed near the border of the Arava, just north of Eilat on October 26, 1994, in the presence of Rabin, Peres, president Ezer Weizman, US president Bill Clinton, secretary of state Warren Christopher, King Hussein, and Crown Prince Hassan.

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the dramatic political achievements in 1993 and 1994, extremist Israelis and fanatic Islamic terrorist groups were emboldened in opposition.

Perhaps the most egregious expression of Israeli opposition was the February 25, 1994, massacre of 29 and the wounding of more than 125 Muslim worshipers at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. The assassin was Baruch Goldstein, a follower of the anti-Arab racist Meir Kahane.

On the Arab side, the militant resistance to the PLO was led by Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement and the Islamic Jihad. It is Hamas that has conducted the longest and most violent terrorist struggle against Israel both within the state borders and in the territories.

As confirmed by the US Department of State, following the signing of the Oslo Accords, Hamas “increased its violent operations in an attempt to disrupt implementation of the Declaration of Principles.”

In 1994, Hamas was responsible for 54 Israeli deaths and 150 wounded. In 1995, Hamas continued its campaign “against the Israeli occupation of all of Palestine and in retaliation for the Hebron massacre.” Among other terror acts were suicide bombings on Israeli buses, in restaurants, and in public markets. The casualties numbered in the hundreds.

In contrast to Hamas, from the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, for a period of at least seven years, there were virtually no acts of terrorism conducted by member groups of the PLO.

Arafat appeared to honor his commitment to refrain from violence. He did, however, fail in his commitment to restrain and repress Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Arafat acted in this regard only sporadically, especially when he was pressed by Israel and the US peace process mediators.

The Oslo II Accords were completed in August of 1995 with detailed guidance in matters of security, electoral, public administration, and economic arrangements during the interim period of five years from the signing of Oslo I and leading to a permanent settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Oslo II agreement was initially signed in Taba on September 24, 1995, and four days later on September 28 in Washington, D.C. The Oslo II Accords were signed by Rabin and Arafat in the presence of Clinton, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, and King Hussein of Jordan.

The Oslo II Accords consisted of over 300 pages, including five chapters with 31 articles, and an additional seven  annexes and nine maps. The central issues agreed upon included a description of the process of gradualism by which Israel would withdraw from additional territories in favor of control by the Palestinian Authority, as well as mutual security arrangements.

Also included was the role and powers of the Palestinian Council.

The issue of the division of territories during the interim period was also elaborated. The map was divided into three zones – Areas A, B, and C.

Area A includes the major populated Palestinian towns and cities in the West Bank which would be under the full control of the PA. Area A constitutes 8% of the land in the West Bank.

Area B includes areas with a large number of Palestinian communities but with no Israeli civilian presence. This zone was designated to be under PA civil control but with Israeli responsibility for matters of security. Area B constitutes 22% of West Bank territory.

Area C includes all of the Israeli settlements and adjacent territories and Palestinian civilians located there. Area C was designated to be under the full control of Israel, constituting 70% of the land mass. It was subsequently reduced to 61% in recognition of select Israeli settlement blocs which would remain sovereign according to the agreement between prime minister Ariel Sharon and president George Bush.

The Oslo ll Agreement was defined as an interim agreement during which time the PA would establish a Self-Government Authority, the Palestinian Council, to function for a transitional period of five years.

Negotiations leading to a permanent status agreement were expected to begin “no later than May 4, 1996, and to end no later than May 4, 1999,” resulting in the assumption of control by the Palestinian Authority in all of the territories, with the exception of those areas to be determined by resolution of the final status negotiations. The issues to be negotiated included matters of border locations, security arrangements, the status of Jerusalem, and the rights of Palestinian refugees.

George Bush’s 2007 Road Map to Peace was consistent with the general principles of the Oslo Agreements. In substance, the detailed process described can still serve readily as a functional time line and map for the renewal of negotiations between a revived and strengthened Palestinian Authority and Israel.

Sharon and his successor Ehud Olmert in turn, diligently sought to revive the peace process. Olmert was a lifelong Likud activist until the time he joined Sharon to create a new party with a pragmatic plan for resolution of the conflict. Ironically, it was Olmert who came closest to resolving all of the outstanding issues standing in the way of an agreement with Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority.

Historical processes have a way of acting in contrarian ways to the best-laid hopes of man and woman. In the case of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, three Israeli leaders came closest to achieving a peace agreement based on positions of compromise and accommodation. The tragedy is that Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated; Ariel Sharon died prematurely; and Ehud Olmert was compelled to resign from his office before completing negotiations with president Abbas at the Prime Minister’s Residence in Jerusalem, where in his honor he flew the Palestinian flag.

No doubt, as Israel and the Palestinians once again are on a collision course which begs for resolution, the rich experiences and detailed plans of predecessors can guide both the Israeli and the Palestinian people to a workable plan for the peaceful resolution of our conflict.

The writer served as the director of the Israel Labor Party American Desk and chairman of Labor’s educational organ reaching out to the Russian-speaking community in Israel. He also worked in support of the policies and programs of former prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak. ■