How to conduct hostage negotiations - opinion

Since 1995, I have studied dozens of cases of hostage negotiations in the world. I have explained how to act against terrorism both online and offline in many articles and books, including The Scope of Tolerance and Confronting the Internet’s Dark Side. 

Let me outline the keys to successful negotiations that may bring the hostages home to their loving families.The prime responsibility of any government is to protect its borders and its citizens.

A country that is unable to protect to its citizens, where citizens are worried about their self-protection, ceases to be attractive. Therefore, the government should not leave a single stone unturned in striving for the release of hostages. Tremendous efforts must be invested.

The delicate balance required when negotiating 

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 37a) says: “Whoever saves a single life is considered by scripture to have saved the whole world.” Striving to save lives is a must. At the same time, like most things in life, reasonable boundaries about the price should be introduced. 

Negotiating the release of hostages is a craft. It demands knowledge and skill, as the stakes are high: human life. A team of experts must conduct the negotiations. They must be committed and highly experienced people who did their homework and understand with whom they are dealing – the hostage takers’ backgrounds, culture, aims, abilities, strengths, vulnerabilities, and the best ways to communicate with them.

They also need to be fully aware of their government’s priorities, wishes, and red lines. These experts, and only they, should be involved in the negotiations unless there is a need for a third party to be involved. The government should publicly say as little as possible in order not to harm the work of its assigned experts.

It's better to be direct 

Direct negotiations are preferable to indirect ones. However, sometimes direct communication is impossible due to a lack of trust and an inability to communicate. In such cases, governments should strive to work with third-party negotiators.

There are overt and covert activities. The negotiations themselves must be covert. Putting pressure on the hostage-takers can be both covert and overt. Overt pressure can be employed by other governments, especially those that have ties to the hostage-takers; international organizations like the Red Cross; and NGOs. The media should be involved in applying such pressure. Media experts should come into play according to instructions from the negotiating team.

TIME IS a major factor. The pressure on the hostage-takers should be unrelenting, aiming to yield immediate results. The longer the hostages remain in captivity, the less their chance is to return home. Media interest will fade away and the hostages’ captivity might be normalized in the sense that the public can live with it.

The aims of the government and the hostages’ families are different. The families are interested in one thing: bringing their loved ones home. Governments have a broader picture and a large array of interests: political, strategic, and social. The families’ aims are short-term and focused. The government has short- and long-term objectives, some of which are not directly related to the hostages. For the families, any price will do to bring their loved ones home. The government cannot and should not pay just any price.

Therefore, families must act with the government as well as independently. They must apply relentless pressure on their own government to do its duty and release the hostages from captivity. They also must act overtly and covertly: employ any means they have to keep the hostages in the news; engage with anyone who might help, nationally and internationally; and keep open communication with the government. The government may ask the families to keep quiet so that they won’t damage the negotiations, but they should not be silent.

At the same time, families should also consult negotiation experts about what they say, the way they operate, the people they contact, and the organizations they involve, thus ensuring that they themselves do not undermine efforts to release their loved ones.

GOVERNMENTS DO not and should not reveal everything to the families, but they must maintain open communication with the families as much as possible. The lives of their loved ones are on the line. Sensitivity and compassion are essential.

Any information that could harm the hostages must remain secret. The less the hostage-takers know about what the negotiating team knows, the better. Released hostages should tell the experts, and no one else – not even their families, and certainly not the media – what they know about their assailants until the last remaining hostage returns home. The negotiating team can advise the released hostages regarding what information should be released to the public.

The government dictates the red lines: what it is willing to give in exchange for the hostages’ release and what is an affordable price. The government cannot pay just any price because the consequences might be very harsh. Twice Israel paid a very high price for its hostages: in the Jibril deal and in the Schalit deal.

The Jibril deal was a prisoner exchange that took place on May 21, 1985, between the Israeli government and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command; 1,150 prisoners were released from Israeli jails in return for three Israeli soldiers.

 That deal set a very bad precedent. The negotiations involved politicians who were not experts in negotiations. For the release of Gilad Shalit on October 11, 2011, Israel freed 1,027 prisoners, including hundreds of terrorists who harmed Israel badly both before and after their release.

Israel has far more Palestinian prisoners than Hamas does but it cannot afford to release bloody murderers who are very likely to return to murdering Israelis once out of prison.

Some unshakable red lines must be introduced, and these red lines should be known only to the negotiating team.

The writer is a professor of politics and founding director of the Middle East Study Centre, University of Hull in the UK; 2023 Olof Palme Visiting Professor, Lund University, Sweden; global fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington; and president of the Association for Israel Studies (AIS). X: https://twitter.com/almagor35