Unraveling the Gordian Knots: Gaza Conflict, Israeli Instability, and US Relations - opinion

These days our general situation seems to be immersed in at least three interwoven Gordian knots. One concerns the lingering fighting in the Gaza Strip and the prospect of the current border confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah turning into a full-scale war. The second concerns the ongoing political instability and growing social tensions inside Israel. The third, which I shall touch upon very briefly, concerns a needed overhaul of Israel-US relations.

It is generally believed that the only way a full-scale war in Lebanon can be averted, and a settlement of the border confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah can be resolved (at least for the time being) is by means of an agreement between Israel and Hamas. Since such an agreement seems unlikely, because Israel refuses to accept some of the conditions laid down by Hamas, which refuses to become more flexible in its basic demands, the outbreak of a limited or full-scale war in the North seems to be unavoidable.

The IDF is believed to be preparing itself for this apparently inevitable escalation in the North, and for this purpose advocates the de-escalation of its activities in the Gaza Strip as soon as it will end its current operation in Rafah, limiting them to occasional interventions when the need arises. The military is also concerned with the fact that under the circumstances it must significantly increase the annual enlistment of 18-year-olds, which turns it into an active participant in the battle about the enlistment of haredim (the ultra-Orthodox) to full military service.

It is unclear whether what IDF spokesperson R.- Adm. Daniel Hagari said last Wednesday in an interview to Channel 13, to the effect that talking about the complete destruction of Hamas is “throwing dust into the public’s eyes,” expresses the official view of the IDF on the subject, is correct. The same applies to his statement, on the same occasion, that if an alternative will not be found to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the latter will remain in power there.

The position of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be the exact opposite on all these issues. Netanyahu does not support the IDF’s departure from the Gaza Strip, even if it will be forced to carry out a full-scale war in Lebanon. He objects to the enlistment of most of the haredim to full military service or civilian alternatives, in order to remain on good terms with his haredi coalition partners, who reject such enlistment. He also continuously calls for the complete and unconditional obliteration of Hamas, and by means of his lackey, Yaakov Bardugo, accused IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi of seeking to leave Hamas in power in the Gaza Strip.

IT IS no secret that Netanyahu is inclined to blame the security forces, and even Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, for the fiasco of October 7 and all of Israel’s security problems since then, while refusing to take any responsibility for what happened upon himself.

Despite the fact that his and his colleagues’ attacks on the heads of the security forces keep escalating, the government and the security forces still somehow manage to keep up a necessary modicum of cooperation – but the current situation cannot continue. Some believe that Netanyahu and the government must gain the upper hand, and insist that the complete leadership of the defense establishment be replaced. Others argue that the current political leadership must go home and be replaced, while a third group believe that both must be replaced, though the politicians must be replaced first.

The second tangle concerns the internal political situation. Of course, it would be best if as long as the fighting/war continues, the deep social and ideological rifts that have widened to dangerous dimensions in the last five years be set aside. I believe that in October 2023 there was much greater willingness to try, and Benny Gantz’s National Unity Party actually joined Netanyahu’s “all Right government” despite qualms.

For close to eight months, it did its best to moderate and even block some highly disturbing initiatives coming from the other coalition members. However, three weeks ago Gantz and his party left the government, after they felt they no longer had any leverage on the government’s policy – especially with regards to the continuation of the fighting and the hostage issue.

For over four months after October 7, the anti-government demonstrations – which had developed soon after Justice Minister Yariv Levin launched his judicial reform (called by the opposition an “anti-democratic constitutional revolution”) – were stopped due to the enduring war. However, in mid-February the demonstrations were renewed, together with others calling for the immediate return of the hostages, by any means.

TODAY, one of the demonstrators’ most central demands is for early elections to be held in order to bring down the government, which they accuse of failing to hold talks about and to initiate some alternative to Hamas control of the Gaza Strip; of failing to place the immediate return of the hostages before they will all be brought back in coffins as a top priority; and of continuing to attack Israel’s liberal democracy.

The government responds that elections should not be held before the end of the war, which Netanyahu seems in no hurry to end, and that there is no reason to hold the elections to the 26th Knesset before they are due in October 2026. Since the demands for early elections began, opinion polls have successively shown the general public favoring them and the government parties losing their majority of 64 MKs.

However, the situation is not straightforward. For example, for the first time since the government was formed at the end of 2022, coalition MKs have dared speak and even threaten to vote against government-initiated legislation. These include the military service enlistment law (or rather the evasion from enlistment law) for haredim, and the so-called Rabbis Law, which is designed to enable the Religious Services Ministry and the Chief Rabbinate to appoint hundreds of cronies to allegedly superfluous rabbinical jobs.

At the moment it is very difficult to predict whether following the next elections, whenever they will take place, it will be possible to form an authentic, broad national unity government as a priority rather than as a default. As long as Netanyahu continues to lead the Likud, to achieve this goal a strong, liberal right-wing alternative to it will have to be established.

What will Israel's fate entail?

Today efforts are being made by former prime minister Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Liberman and Gideon Sa’ar to create such a party, possibly with the participation of former Mossad head Yossi Cohen, and even former minister Moshe Kahlon. This party will have to win over a large bloc of right-wing voters from the Likud, and then join together with Yesh Atid, the National Unity Party, and at least one of the religious parties (Shas?). If this basic core will gain a majority of the MKs, Israel can finally mount a new course, with or without additional parties.

As to Israel’s relations with the US, no matter who will be elected as president in November, and who will be the prime minister of Israel’s 38th government, a lot of work will be needed to overhaul the damage caused to the foundations of these relations since last October.

The writer worked in the Knesset for many years as a researcher, and has published extensively both journalistic and academic articles on current affairs and Israeli politics. Her most recent book, Israel’s Knesset Members – A Comparative Study of an Undefined Job, was published by Routledge.