Fear's defeat: Militant Islam and the challenges of deterrence - opinion

Deterrence was conceptualized during the Cold War as a strategic practice to regulate relations between nations. It is predicated on the idea that regimes undertake a deliberate analysis of costs and benefits, prioritizing their survival by avoiding actions that could lead to their annihilation. 

This strategy has been crucial for global stability, evident in the Cold War’s nuclear standoff where mutually assured destruction (MAD) prevented direct US-Soviet conflict. The balance between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan has similarly prevented full-scale wars despite tensions.

But history is also replete with instances of states and other groups who chose violence despite immense – sometimes total – loss. One can think of the Jews at Masada, for example, who chose mass suicide, rather than submit to the Romans. Or the Japanese who, despite being at a steep strategic and military disadvantage, chose to attack Pearl Harbor, and then suffered the wrath of a nuclear-armed United States.

Today, deterrence fails particularly miserably in the Middle East. As conceptualized in the context of interstate relations, it is ill-equipped for mitigating threats posed by militant Islamists who feature a potent ideological component.

ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, other Iranian proxies and Islamist groups – and to some extent the Iranian regime itself – all exhibit, to varying degrees, a high tolerance for risk and a culture glorifying martyrdom and sacrifice. These factors render the main currency of deterrence – the desire to avoid death and material loss – much less valuable.

As of now, even according to Hamas, between 6,000 and 8,000 of its combatants have been killed (out of 30,000,) which means that at least that many have been injured. Half its fighting force is off the battlefield at minimum (IDF estimates are much higher – 14,000 killed.) These losses don’t even consider the destruction of military equipment and facilities. Hamas’s strategy of embedding its operations among civilians results in significant civilian casualties; Hamas officials openly acknowledge this as part of their approach. The potential danger to civilians does not deter them.

WHEN ABU Bakr al-Baghdadi ascended the pulpit of the Great Mosque of Mosul in 2014 and declared the ISIS Caliphate, deterrence was not on his mind. A few months later, he said ISIS would never cease fighting “even if only one soldier remains.” It proceeded to conquer vast territories and commit atrocities while recruiting jihadists worldwide and launching a global terror campaign.

In a 2017 report, the US Defense Department recommended emphasizing deterrence against ISIS based on Israel’s model against its enemies. It cited the perception that Israel had established “rules of the game” for a “tolerable level of violence.” But both ISIS and Hamas proceeded to wage war and commit atrocities, far beyond anything “tolerable,” undeterred by punitive threats.

Terrorist organizations are on a mission

These organizations are impervious to punitive threats – the stick – and largely ignore the carrot of deterrence, which involves political and economic concessions. They are driven by ideological convictions that render conventional incentives irrelevant. They are unlikely to accept any political compromise that doesn’t align with their absolute causes.

Yet despite the diminished efficacy of deterrence, Israeli and Western leaders often speak of deterrence with great confidence when confronting these militant Islamist groups. Even as early as 2009, researchers and officials expressed confidence in Israel’s deterrence of Hamas. For example, political science researcher Yair Evron said, “Hamas, as the de facto government of the semi-state of Gaza, is sensitive to Israeli punitive actions and Israel now enjoys a robust state of deterrence.”

Going forward, with several failures of deterrence in between, in November 2020, former IDF chief of staff Lt.-Gen. Aviv Kohavi argued that Israel’s enemies were deterred. Though he acknowledged the fleeting nature of deterrence, he was confident, saying that “none of [our enemies] want to initiate anything against us.”

In June 2021, after the Israel-Hamas conflict, Kohavi said, “Guardian of the Walls wasn’t meant to provide a decisive victory in Gaza, but to create deterrence.” One year later, in May 2022, senior IDF officers confidently stated that “our deterrence is stronger than previously thought.” Even just days before the October 7 attack, Israel’s National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi said in an interview, “Hamas is very, very restrained and understands the implications of further defiance.”

Examples like these are ubiquitous – how many times have we heard the phrase “restoring deterrence?” Senior Israeli officials consistently assert their adversaries are deterred, despite evidence to the contrary. After October 7th, the idea that deterrence can be established against militant Islamists remains pervasive in Israeli security discourse.

In a Foreign Policy article, Sajjad Safaei points out that even after the Hamas massacre and the start of Hezbollah’s missile barrages, Israeli leaders reflexively spoke of the “existential urgency... on reestablishing deterrence.” But was it ever there in the first place?

Proclaiming effective deterrence despite contrary evidence fosters hazardous complacency among policymakers and the public. Western and Israeli policymakers must shed the illusion that these organizations can be deterred in conventional terms.

Yaakov Lappin, an expert on strategic affairs and jihadist organizations said, “One of the key policy lessons going forward needs to be the shift away from the doomed attempt to decipher the intentions of terror armies, and towards placing the focus on continually degrading their capabilities.”

In Israel, it entails stopping the formation of organized military forces that can launch major threats at the home front, including rockets, drones, and cross-border assaults. This strategy involves disrupting finances, dismantling bases, targeting leaders, hindering recruitment, and using covert and overt tactics to relentlessly erode their war capabilities and terrorist activities.

Lappin added, “Since jihadist armies will unleash their capabilities at a timing that is opportunistically convenient for advancing their totalitarian goals, the concept of deterrence should be discredited in dealing with these actors.”

The writer is a professional technical writer in the hi-tech industry and an independent journalist focusing on extremism, disinformation, and Mideast history and politics.