It's past time for Israel to administer a new civilian entity in Gaza - opinion

Despite the significant damage Hamas has suffered, it is expected to recruit more terrorists to replenish its ranks. Israeli leadership is debating a crucial decision that will determine the war’s outcome.

Critical questions include the advantages and disadvantages of an Israeli military administration in Gaza and its implications for the IDF, and the significance of the Gulf states’ proposal for the “day after” the war.

In recent weeks, the “day after” discussion has resurfaced, pressing for an urgent decision. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s speech last month emphasized the necessity of this decision to prevent Hamas from regaining power, implying that Israel would suffer strategic defeat if we continue to avoid this discussion. 

Gallant’s words were met with many negative responses with the more substantive ones arguing that any discussion of alternatives to Hamas is premature, as the movement would have to be destroyed in Gaza, for any other ruling power, particularly the Palestinian Authority, to have any chance of succeeding. This view, while understandable, is incorrect. A decision must be made now, and it must involve a (significantly renewed) PA.

As Gallant suggested, delaying the decision any further will ensure a strategic Israeli defeat, failure to achieve the war’s aims, and will allow Hamas to continue its rule. An alternative civilian government must be promoted alongside military activity for four reasons. 

First, because it is what Hamas and its Qatari sponsors fear. Loss of control over Gaza’s residents would spell political defeat for Israel’s adversaries. Second, without a civilian counterpart for humanitarian aid distribution, Hamas will maintain this role, strengthening its status and creating a narrative of an “absolute victory” over Israel. Third, an alternative civilian entity is necessary to relieve Israel of the burden of supporting the day-to-day lives of Gaza’s two million residents.

Finally, dismantling Hamas militarily is only the first step toward defeating it. The movement must also be ideologically weakened by an alternative civilian entity that proposes a path forward that does not rely on the idea of armed resistance.

This final point is especially crucial if Israel is to defeat Hamas over time. Hamas’s power is sustained by both its military wing, with approximately 30,000 terrorists, and the civilian population in Gaza, which serves as a human shield and a recruitment base. Recent public opinion polls show wide support for Hamas and its violent struggle against Israel. 

Gaza’s predominantly young population, with significant percentages under the age of 14 and between 15-29, ensures a steady supply of volunteers whether for ideological or economic reasons. Thus, as long as young Palestinians are motivated to resist Israel, there will always be a supply of recruits to replace fallen terrorists.

A need for a political alternative 

My own experience confirms the need for a political alternative to avert this outcome. During the Second Intifada, I commanded a regional brigade in Judea and Samaria. The IDF eliminated and arrested a massive number of terrorists, but our efforts were Sisyphean – the “well” of terrorists continued to refill faster than we could empty it. That is until Yasser Arafat’s death and Mahmoud Abbas’s rise on a platform of “nonviolent resistance” and “nation-building.”

This ideological shift allowed young Palestinians to express national pride and their struggle against Israel through nonviolent means, such as joining the PA security forces, thereby reducing terrorist recruitment. Over a two-year process, this shift reversed the trend: the IDF’s erosion rate of terrorists surpassed the rate at which armed resistance organizations could recruit new fighters. 

THIS IS precisely what is lacking in Gaza today and will lack. The IDF can repeatedly conduct operations in Gaza, killing terrorists, but without an ideological alternative to “armed resistance,” Hamas will continue to replenish its ranks.

An alternative civilian entity, like the PA reformed under the sponsorship of moderate Arab countries, could pose a rival to Hamas’s ideology. 

Israel is not doing enough

Unfortunately, the Israeli government fails to act. While the IDF erodes Hamas’s military layer, Hamas continually replenishes its ranks from the civilian population. The PA suffers from corruption and opposes Israel, and what is worse, it is too weak to defeat Hamas militarily. Nevertheless, it remains the only Palestinian alternative to Hamas’s rule in Gaza, provided we have the courage to take the first step in a lengthy process that will take years. 

To achieve this, we should lean into the Gulf states’ and American plan for post-war Gaza as part of broader regional normalization and international counterweight to Iran, Russia, and China. Under this plan, The PA will undergo reforms supported by an Arab coalition of the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain.

The suggested reforms range include everything from school curricula to new leadership. Any financial aid for rebuilding will be conditioned on reform implementation. Immediate steps will include humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza by the PA allowing it to demonstrate its authority with the help Arab coalition financial and security support. 

Consequently, Hamas will lose control over parts of Gaza, diminishing its sovereignty. Gazans will find alternative employment opportunities through reconstruction efforts. And most crucially, for the foreseeable future, the IDF will continue operations against senior Hamas members, partially coordinated with the reformed PA – as it does regularly in Judea and Samaria.

Reticence over handing responsibility to the PA has led some in Israel to support the establishment of full-scale military administration of Gaza. This is at best a temporary solution. A military administration is preferable to indecision; it would improve action against Hamas’s military wing and provide an alternative for civilian governance. 

However, it fails to provide an ideological alternative, and, based on past experience, inevitably leads to military clashes, as happened in the First Intifada, or necessitates a political process to transfer authority to the PA, as happened by agreement at the end of the Second Intifada. 

This solution would require significant time and resources, limiting the IDF’s ability to address other urgent security challenges, worsen Israel’s international isolation, and impose internal costs on Israeli society and economy. 

To conclude, we have wasted enough time. The Israeli government should have decided on its day after plans six months ago. Without addressing both the ideological and military foundations of Hamas simultaneously, Hamas will not be defeated, even if fighting continues for several years. 

Israel must act swiftly, embracing the Gulf states’ willingness to assist with the post-war Gaza order, even if it means accepting a role for a reformed PA. In turn this requires a large-scale deal for hostage release. 

Concurrently, Israel will transition from waging war to fighting terror through ongoing, intelligence-guided actions targeting the arrest or elimination of terrorists within the Palestinian territory.

The writer is the executive director of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).