Divorce refusal will only be solved if everyone does their part - opinion

The meeting room of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee crackled as politicians, Mavoi Satum, and other women’s rights organizations, representatives of the rabbinical courts, and lawyers hashed out the details of the updated Rabbinical Courts Bill (Enforcement of Divorce Rulings). Among the topics of debate was a clause containing an extremely limited definition of divorce refusal. 

Ultimately, Mavoi Satum and other women’s rights organizations succeeded in eliminating the contentious clause. Only after the committee’s upcoming meeting today, when the Rabbinical Courts Bill will likely be put to a vote, will we know if this definition has been taken off the table for good.

However, what is equally concerning is that the introduction of this definition of divorce refusal and its subsequent withdrawal went entirely under the public’s radar. No public protests, discourse, or pressure on politicians. The damage caused by this definition being voted into law could have been significant – yet seemingly slipped by unnoticed. 

The definition appears in a sub-clause of the bill defining the scope of a certain punitive action. Almost as an afterthought, the bill dictates “divorce refusal” as the situation in which a court has issued a ruling requiring the husband to give a divorce that the husband subsequently ignores. 

Unfortunately, should this definition be taken as a general definition for the concept of divorce refusal, it falls short. This definition inaccurately implies that the existence of a court order to divorce is what generates a halachic or moral obligation to divorce, and “divorce refusal” is the act of ignoring this obligation. But in reality, divorce refusal is much simpler and more common – anytime a person refuses to give their spouse a divorce, they are committing divorce refusal. 

A woman we’ll call “Rotem” helps illustrate these limitations. She filed for divorce in 2018. Her husband was physically violent toward her, and she received a restraining order that evicted him from their place of residence. The husband demanded that Rotem give up their previously shared residence before giving her a get, and the court focused their attention on his arguments about housing instead of ruling about the need to grant a divorce. It was four and a half years before the court issued any ruling about divorce at all, and six years before Rotem finally received one. 

The basis for the court’s eventual ruling was that the halacha requires a couple to divorce in certain circumstances, and Rotem’s case had enough relevant features to be considered among those circumstances. Here we see the first flaw with the bill’s definition of divorce refusal: It doesn’t recognize that the features of Rotem’s case that obligate a divorce were present long before, and independent of, the court’s order. 

The fundamental issues with the definition 

More importantly, this proposed definition of divorce refusal is inappropriate on a fundamental level. Divorce refusal doesn’t rely on the presence of circumstances with halachic significance or the issuing of a legal ruling – divorce refusal occurs any time one party refuses to give or accept a divorce. Full stop. As soon as Rotem requested a divorce and her husband didn’t grant her one, this was a case of divorce refusal.  

Beyond being clearly inadequate, the definition of divorce refusal proposed by the Rabbinical Courts Bill could have been harmful. Had this definition been codified into law, it could have been applied as a general legal definition for divorce refusal, and many women who are experiencing divorce refusal would not have been classified as such. These women wouldn’t have received official recognition of their hardship, and likely the essential legal and psychological support they deserve.

Given the high stakes involved, it is alarming how little attention this proposed definition – and the bill overall – received from the public. While it isn’t easy for the public to follow the legislative process, it’s critically important for the public to give their representatives feedback and hold them accountable.  

Divorce refusal will only be solved if everyone does their part – if the public demands that politicians act in the best interest of the people, politicians enact legislation that meets legitimate public needs, and the judges on the Rabbinical Court rule expansively and sensitively. It’s time for everyone to step up.

The writer is a volunteer at Mavoi Satum, a nonprofit organization that supports women’s rights in the rabbinical courts.