The West should be cautious of Iran's reformist rhetoric - opinion

As newly-elected President Masoud Pezeshkian steps into his role, advocates of engagement with the regime in Iran are quick to label him a “reformist,” poised to redirect Iran’s path and revive nuclear negotiations in exchange for lifted sanctions. 

Yet, a critical examination reveals different realities. Firstly, Pezeshkian has never self-identified as a reformist, contradicting the narrative being promoted. Secondly, the true reins of power, especially concerning foreign and military policies – nuclear and ballistic missile policies included – remain firmly in the hands of the Supreme Leader, reducing the presidential role to largely symbolic gestures. Finally, a review of historical trends shows that Iran’s most significant progress in nuclear and missile capabilities has occurred under presidents dubbed as “reformists,” not hardliners. 

Western governments must be wary: The persistent dichotomy between reformists and hardliners is a calculated deception crafted to manipulate the international community. With Iran nearing a critical threshold in its nuclear weapons development, falling for this facade could lead to irreversible consequences.

First of all, it is important to note that Pezeshkian is a strong supporter of the regime’s hardline policies. During the presidential campaigns, he said he fully adheres to the policies of Ali Khamenei. His record also shows that he has been a strong advocate of mandatory hijab and promotes gender segregation in education and healthcare. In one of his presidential debates, Pezeshkian noted that he “enforced compulsory Islamic hijab on women in universities and hospitals even before Ayatollah Khomeini formally made hijab compulsory for all women,” and that he was responsible for “cleansing” universities of non-Islamic influences.

Pezeshkian is also a strong supporter of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its terrorist proxy groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. When he was a member of the Islamic Majlis, he signed a bill supporting armed resistance against Israel and endorsing the regime’s participation in armed conflict against Israel on behalf of the Palestinians. After his election, in an open letter to Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, Pezeshkian expressed unwavering support for Hezbollah and the Axis of Resistance against Israel. As he put it, “The Islamic Republic has always supported the resistance against Israel... and it will continue with strength.”

Secondly, Pezeshkian’s track record indicates that he will not advocate for altering the regime’s policies. Even if he would want to make changes, it would be virtually impossible because the presidency in Iran does not hold actual power over the country’s strategic direction, foreign policy, or its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. These are firmly controlled by Khamenei and the IRGC.

Khamenei holds extensive power that significantly influences the governance and strategic direction of the country. He has the ultimate say in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. While the resident and foreign minister manage day-to-day foreign relations and diplomacy, the Supreme Leader sets the overarching goals and principles. His control also extends to the regime’s strategic military programs, notably its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Furthermore, even if Pezeshkian were to be considered a reformist, this should raise greater concern rather than reassurance, given historical evidence of nuclear and missile expansion under those labeled as reformists and moderates.

When Mohammad Khatami came to power in 1997 on a platform of liberalization and reform, many observers noted that he represented “a genuine break from the regime orthodoxy” and wanted to turn the Iranian regime into a normally-behaving state. 

Building on this perception, George Tenet, then CIA director, testified to Congress that Khatami was sincerely trying to end his government’s support of terrorism. More disturbing was that the US intelligence community concluded that Khatami would terminate Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. As a result, the Clinton administration offered conciliatory gestures and “welcomed” Khatami’s dialogue, making several concessions, including a plan to release Iran’s assets that had been frozen since the embassy takeover in 1979.

However, the CIA assessment was off the mark entirely. Both nuclear and missile programs had their most significant progress during Khatami (compared to the Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad periods), with critical parts of the nuclear and missile programs being achieved during his tenure. Under Khatami (and later under president Rouhani), the network of smuggling along old and new routes also flourished. A long list of intercepted cargo indicated Iran’s continuous interest in dual-use materials and components required for non-conventional use. 

Although many observers suggested that Khatami was “out of the loop” on nuclear and ballistic missile matters, subsequent revelations peg him as a loyal supporter of the clandestine projects. In other words, while touting the dialogue among civilizations, he was firmly engaged in the deception project.

Hamid Baeedinejad, the head of arms control in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, argued that Khatami had known that the West lacked trust in the regime and used his dialogue to build up confidence. In Baeedinejad’s view, Khatami hoped that his smiling face would give Iran a chance to continue its clandestine program in a calm and secure atmosphere.

According to Baeedinejad, the entire enrichment cycle was completed during Khatami’s tenure. 

Khatami himself confirmed Baeedinejad’s claim in a subsequent interview with the Nasim-e Bidari magazine. Claiming that the critical part of the nuclear program was accomplished during his tenure, he added: “We chose the path that, were it to continue, not only would we have a better and more extensive nuclear technology, but our nuclear portfolio would not go to the UN Security Council.”

Mohsen Aminzadeh, Khatami’s deputy foreign minister, asserted that during the Khatami period, 65% of the work needed for the enrichment cycle was accomplished. Ahmadinejad added only 10% because sanctions had progressively slowed the work. 

Even if this statistic was self-serving, Aminzadeh’s general point that the Khatami government had made good progress by avoiding sanctions was credible. The auspicious international atmosphere eventually made it possible for Iran to master the enrichment cycle and experiment with military applications.

Additionally, with its deceptive tactics, the regime has successfully managed to split the American-European non-proliferation coalition. Rouhani wrote in his book that “from the beginning, the Americans repeatedly told the Europeans that the Iranians are insincere and misleading you, but the Europeans used to reply, ‘We trust them.’”

Reformist is just a name

In a similar vein, the label of “reformist” attached to Pezeshkian is yet another deceptive, manipulative tactic. It is likely that the regime anticipates the election of Donald Trump as the next US president, expecting that he will reinstate a maximum pressure campaign against the regime. Under these circumstances, a “reformist” president could provide the most effective means to create a rift in US-Europe policy towards Iran and to weaken the impact of maximum pressure. 

The West should be cautious of this deceptive tactic and avoid negotiations that merely allow the regime to continue its destructive policies, while presenting a facade of readiness for change and concessions.

Iran is now approaching a critical threshold in its nuclear weapons development. The regime has made significant progress in essential components for building a nuclear weapon. According to the latest assessment by the IAEA, the regime has accumulated enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for seven nuclear weapons, in one month. At this juncture, playing into the regime’s game could only enable Iran to breakout with an actual bomb, an outcome no Western country should desire.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Philos Project.