By caving on Philadelphi, Israel will always ultimately give into the enemy's demands - opinion

It was reported this week that in a closed-door meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and Israel’s ceasefire-hostage negotiating team, Netanyahu called out the negotiators saying, “It’s impossible to take part in negotiations only to fold after two days.” According to the report, the negotiators replied that “We have been negotiating for months,” adding that “Philadelphi is not a security issue. We can return there if we need to.”

According to the report, the Israeli negotiating team trumpeted the advances they had made in discussions with the Americans, increasing the number of living hostages to be released but bemoaned Netanyahu’s unwillingness to compromise on Philadelphi. They reportedly told the prime minister that without surrendering Philadelphi there will be no deal. Netanyahu, the report states, has stood his ground. And we should all be grateful to him for it.

The argument that Israel is free to return to areas from which it has withdrawn its forces and that, therefore, there is no need to worry about security vulnerabilities brought about by the withdrawal is one we have heard before. 

And Israelis should shudder at hearing it again.

On September 1, 1994, almost exactly a year after the famous Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House lawn, The Wall Street Journal reported statements by Yossi Beilin, Israel’s deputy foreign minister regarding the implementation of the Gaza and Jericho First Declaration of Principles, the first stage of the Oslo Peace Accords. 

“Mr. Beilin said that a key part of the Gaza and Jericho first plan is the fact that it is reversible. Mr. Beilin continued, ‘As in any other agreement, there is the belief that both sides will be able to implement it and can be trusted, but if there is a clear violation, it will be more than understandable that we cannot adhere to it.”

But of course, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which became the Palestinian Authority (PA), did not fulfill its side of the agreement. It did not rein in violence against Israelis. It did not educate Palestinian children to peaceful coexistence with Israel. 

And yet, despite these and many other violations of the agreements, at no point did the Israelis ever make good on Beilin’s suggestion that Israel would step away from the agreements as well. At no point did the Israelis treat their own concessions as reversible, despite the claim that they would be. 

Israelis heard the same claim of reversibility when then-defense minister Ehud Barak withdrew Israeli forces from Lebanon and during the lead-up to the 2005 Gaza Disengagement. This brings us to the Philadelphi Corridor, the main sticking point in the current negotiations. 

When did Israel return control over the Philadelphi corridor?

On June 6, 2004, the Israeli cabinet approved the Gaza Disengagement Plan. Included in the approved text was the following:

“The State of Israel will continue to maintain a military presence along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Philadelphi Route). This presence is an essential security requirement. At certain locations, security considerations may require some widening of the area in which the military activity is conducted.”

One year later, under pressure from the Egyptians, and with assurances from the US, Israel agreed to give security control of Philadelphi to Egypt. At the time, Israel expressed its concern over weapons being smuggled into Gaza through tunnels from Egypt. But not to worry, we were told, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak gave his word that the smuggling would stop. 

According to this week’s report on the conversation between Netanyahu and the Israeli negotiators, Netanyahu asserted that the issue of Philadelphi was not primarily a security issue, but a political-strategic one. Considering the aforementioned background that led to the original withdrawal of Israeli forces from there, this statement by Netanyahu makes sense. First, there is the issue of the Egyptian complicity in the arming of Hamas for years. Clearly, the Egyptian commitment to prevent the smuggling of weapons was revealed to be unreliable. Continuing the charade of Egypt as a trustworthy partner would be a mistake. 

But there is perhaps another strategic issue that Netanyahu had in mind. 

As we’ve laid out above, the pattern of negotiations between Israel and her enemies has always been as follows: The Israeli side convinces itself and its own people that what is written in the agreement is what they will get. Later, when faced by violations by the other side, Israel proceeds as though the agreements are still in force. Then, the new reality in which Israel has de facto accepted far less than it bargained for becomes the new starting point for the next round. Perhaps this is what Netanyahu meant by stating that Philadelphi is a political-strategic issue. 

Were Israel to cave on Philadelphi at this point, the precedent would be set, or reinforced, that Israel will always ultimately give in to the demands of the enemy. If the reports are accurate, Israel’s negotiating team is clearly stuck in this dangerous paradigm.

What’s at stake with Philadelphi is much more than Philadelphi. By insisting on Israeli military presence along the corridor, Netanyahu is not only ensuring Israel’s security from smuggled weapons from Gaza, he is rolling back the decades of capitulation and wishful thinking that led to October 7 in the first place.  

The writer is director of Israel365action.com and cohost of the Shoulder to Shoulder podcast.