Israel is in desperate need of a hostage deal and strategy - opinion

Despite the great emotional difficulty, I have refrained, until now, from adding my voice to the calls for the Israeli government to strike a deal for return of the hostages in accordance with certain conditions set by Hamas.

My position resulted from a cost-benefit analysis of such a deal from a national security perspective (“Should we stop the war?” Jerusalem Post, January 26). 

Now, seven months later, I believe that there has been a significant shift in the balance of interests, and the time has finally come to complete a deal under the terms laid out in the current round of negotiations.

Three important arguments were advanced by those who supported a deal many months ago:The first, a social-moral argument, prioritized the humanitarian consideration of saving the lives of the hostages, while affirming our solidarity and sense of mutual responsibility.

The second, a security-utilitarian argument, was based on preventing unnecessary bloodshed as the army became increasingly mired in the Gaza Strip, and the need to rehabilitate the Negev and the North and return the evacuees to their homes. This argument was largely propelled by the erosion of support for Israel in Western countries, and the desire to mitigate the rising wave of antisemitism.

The third, a political-democratic argument, emphasized the need to hold elections as soon as possible, given the public’s very low confidence in the prime minister and the governing coalition.

A hostage deal would allow a lull in fighting and open a window of opportunity for conducting elections in which the people have their say. Only then will the trust between the leadership and the public be restored in a way that enables us to better address the enormous challenges facing us.

There can be no doubt that these are three compelling arguments, but until now I have not considered them to be decisive. Against them is an even more important consideration – Israel’s national security in the generations to come. As we know, our national security concept is based on three components – deterrence, early warning, and decisive defeat.

 A hostage deal before a clear resolution of the war against Hamas, the weakest of our enemies, would severely damage our deterrence. 

If the campaign against Hamas, which is not in itself an existential war, ends without a decisive defeat, we may face a future war that is existential.

This analysis is no longer valid. We are at an inflection point and a hostage deal must be pursued (of course, not “at any price”).

A low national mood in the country 

THE NATIONAL mood – as reflected in the media – is low, for obvious reasons. But it blinds us from seeing the state of war in the Gaza Strip realistically. Imagine that after the murderous Hamas attack, when the IDF’s ground operation began, you were presented with the following the scenario – and were asked to determine whether it was a picture of victory and decisiveness: Israel occupies the entire Gaza Strip and is able to operate there militarily as it wishes.

Two of the three leaders of Hamas (the head of the military wing and the head of the political wing), a large part of the senior field command, and some 15,000 terrorist fighters were eliminated.

The IDF, having dismantled 22 of the 24 Hamas battalions, had destroyed around 90% of its rockets, and succeeded in uncovering and collapsing a significant portion of the elaborate tunnel system running beneath Gaza. The only above ground and subterranean supply lines connecting the Strip to the outside along the Philadelphi Corridor, completely cut off.

Militarily, there is no other way to describe such a result other than – clearly and unambiguously – “decisive.” These achievements are the result of impressive sacrifices made by the young generation of Israelis; they did not let us down. Who among us would not have “accepted” this outcome at the beginning of the war?

In war, even the victors pay a price, and it is a heavy one: the hostages, some of whom died during the fighting and some of whom, in a state of suspended animation, are still enduring their terrible captivity; hundreds of soldiers killed, and thousands wounded; tens of thousands of evacuees whose lives have been turned upside down, and on and on. 

There is no way to proceed to the next sentence with a “but,” which would seem to diminish the significance of the price extracted from us. And yet, from an overall national perspective, a significant military objective has been fulfilled. A nation that values life must be willing to pay the price of sovereignty.

Admittedly, the account with Hezbollah is not yet settled. The continuous fire on the North cannot end with a return to the prewar status quo. 

On this front, an ironclad arrangement or decisive military force is required to reestablish deterrence. But there is nothing to prevent us from reaching a settlement or military resolution on the northern front after a hostage deal is struck.

Of course, despite the importance of military resolve, it alone is not enough: deterrence is built by shaping the enemy’s awareness of the futility of attacking us in the future. 

It seems that this goal has been achieved. Large swaths of the Gaza Strip lie in ruins. The extensive destruction that resulted from the military campaign – although this was not an end in itself, but rather a consequence of the nature of combat in residential areas and Hamas’s operational method of embedding itself among the civilian population – is indelibly seared in the consciousness of the entire region.

If the destruction of the Dahieh district of Beirut in 2006 deterred Hezbollah for many years, the mounds of rubble in Gaza, the leveled towns and villages, are doubly visceral and resounding. It should be recalled that Nasrallah publicly regretted his hasty and belligerent actions that led to the Second Lebanon War, when the IDF defied his calculations and attacked Beirut. 

It would seem that the future leadership of Gaza will feel this way, in view of the colossal losses that scar the Gaza Strip.

What Israel lacks at this point

ISRAEL HAS demonstrated its determination, decisiveness, and capability.

We did not hesitate after an initial defeat, and fought back fiercely. We surprised the surrounding region – and perhaps ourselves? – with the willingness of both regular and reserve soldiers to sacrifice themselves and to do whatever necessary, no matter the price. 

The hand wringing – accusations that hedonism and individualism are diminishing our national strength – have proved to be unjustified. If Israeli society is like a spider’s web, to borrow Nasrallah’s simile, the past year has made it clear that woe betide those who get entangled in it. At the edge of the web lurks a spider, once lethargic but now ferocious.

The recent daring and surprising moves throughout the region – in Yemen, Lebanon, and Tehran (without claiming responsibility) – have made it clear that Israel is willing to take risks. The success of these operations – though only on the tactical level – has important implications for shaping perceptions in the region: Israel has a long reach, unique capabilities, and is prepared to take bold action. This is how deterrence is restored.

Social resilience is another critical element of deterrence. There is no doubt that last year’s ignoble and shameful attempt to change the democratic nature of the state, which rightly ignited a tough civil struggle, damaged social cohesion and resilience, and by extension, deterrence. 

Our enemies interpreted the near civil war as the beginning of the collapse of the Zionist vision and sought to hasten its demise with military adventurism. Against this background, current measures that seem to be aimed at reviving the judicial reform – Minister Levin dares to speak of this explicitly – must be seen as reckless acts that only erode Israeli deterrence.

Those who are ready to rise above the smokescreen of the news of the moment – what happened today and what the pundits are saying about it – will recognize the following picture: all the weighty factors in favor of a hostage deal – the social and moral, the security benefit, and the democratic political arguments – have not lost their importance. Some have even accrued additional weight over time.

At the same time, the decisive argument against them – the fear of losing deterrence, the cornerstone of Israel’s security for the next generation – has lost its power. 

Deterrence has been largely restored, even if not perfectly. The strategic balance has changed for the better, and it is time for a deal.

A deal is the order of the day, to be followed by the main task: elections, so that the elected leadership can finally formulate what Israel is lacking: a national strategy. As experience shows, the current deterrence may be squandered if it does not serve a long-term strategy.

The writer is president of the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) and a professor (emeritus) of law at Bar-Ilan University.