Martin S. Indyk's diplomatic legacy: Lessons from Kissinger's Middle East strategy - opinion
It’s been a month since Indyk passed away. He will be sorely missed by his many colleagues and students in the United States and Israel. May his memory be a blessing.
During a talk a few years ago at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Martin S. Indyk distilled the central lesson he learned from a long career as a diplomat and scholar of the Middle East. It is particularly relevant today, as Israel faces great challenges on several fronts and seeks to balance short term needs with longer term strategic goals.
After serving twice as the US ambassador to Israel and later special envoy for the Obama administration, Indyk stepped back to analyze an earlier and more productive phase of American diplomacy in the region. From his perch at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he held the position of Lowy distinguished fellow in US Middle East diplomacy, he examined the voluminous records of Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy following the Yom Kippur War.
As a naturalized American citizen and a Jew, Indyk’s career in Middle East diplomacy echoes that of Kissinger’s. The resulting book, Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy, included stories from Indyk’s personal diplomatic journey alongside a captivating account of Kissinger’s sometimes flawed but ultimately successful campaign to end hostilities between Egypt and Israel while keeping the two countries firmly within the American orbit.
During the INSS talk, Indyk described the book’s central insight. Kissinger, when asked by Indyk in their final interview why he had not pursued a comprehensive peace treaty but instead pursued more modest interim agreements, explained the source of his reticence. “I always feared that if I pushed it too far, I’d break it.”
For Indyk, this was the central lesson of Kissinger’s Middle East diplomacy: to seek modest gains that improved security and confidence rather than grand conflict-ending gambits. Prime minister Yitzhak Rabin employed this step-by-step, incremental approach in the design of the Oslo Accords. In contrast, United States presidents aimed higher and, perhaps as a consequence, presided over ambitious failures that arguably set back the cause of peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
Indyk was a lifelong Zionist and believed that Israelis and Palestinians would eventually need to arrive at a two-state solution. In one of his final interviews, he criticized the view that “sheer force could deter Hamas and that Israel did not need to address the long-term problems” of its relationship to the Palestinians.
Indyk on Israel's future
Indyk never gave up hope that smart diplomacy and rigorous scholarship could make a difference. He also believed in the historic role of courageous leadership. “I believe that moment will come again, although perhaps not in… my lifetime, when leaders in the mold of Sadat, Hussein, Meir, Rabin, and Begin will again pursue the vision of peace that, with American support, will enable them to build a new, more stable, and peaceful Middle Eastern reality.”
Indyk was a founder of INSS and served on its board of directors. It’s been a month since Indyk passed away. He will be sorely missed by his many colleagues and students in the United States and Israel. May his memory be a blessing.
The writer is a Ruderman Family Foundation scholar-in-residence in the Israel-United States research program at the INSS.
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