MBS seeks US and Israeli assurances in Saudi deal amid fears of backlash - opinion

On August 14, the US digital news medium, Politico, published an exclusive report. It was based on accounts from three separate sources, who had been privy to talks between of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), and members of the US Congress.

These talks were the latest in a series of detailed discussions that have been taking place for years between the United States and Saudi Arabia. They began during the presidency of Donald Trump, and preceded the Abraham Accords. 

Over time, the shape of a complex agreement of major significance has emerged, clearly aimed at boosting MBS’s ambitious program for securing Saudi’s future development. His Saudi Vision 2030, launched in 2016, aimed at breaking the nation’s total dependence on oil and promoting additional means of developing the nation’s potential.

In exchange for commitments by the US to Saudi Arabia covering, among other issues, security, technical assistance with developing a civilian nuclear program, and investment in areas such as hi-tech, Saudi Arabia would limit its dealings with China and normalize its relations with Israel. 

MBS had one provison before agreeing to breathe life into the draft deal. In line with long-standing Saudi policy, he required firm approval from Israel for the establishment of a Palestinian state. This stark condition has been somewhat modified during the negotiating process. MBS now requires the inclusion in the agreement of “a credible path toward a Palestinian state.”

Despite widespread global support, including that of the US, for the two-state solution, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has so far refused to countenance fostering the development of a sovereign Palestine. It could, he has pointed out, bring Iran-sponsored terrorism into the heart of Israel, and place Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion airport under permanent threat of attack.  

History of a 'Palestinian State'

The territories earmarked to form the putative Palestinian state – the West Bank, east Jerusalem, and Gaza – were overrun by Jordan and Egypt during the 1948 Israel-Arab conflict, and administered by them for 20 years. When originally seized, Mandate Palestine had been dissolved and the land belonged to no sovereign state.

During the subsequent two decades, neither Jordan nor Egypt, which occupied those territories, made the slightest effort to form a Palestinian state. 

The areas were won back by Israel in the Six Day War in 1967. However, in the following years, through astute Palestinian propaganda, they morphed in the public consciousness into “occupied Palestinian land.” A political reality had been created. 

Since then, Israel has been increasingly pressured to support establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank [Judea and Samaria], east Jerusalem [including the Old City], and Gaza. 

Politico’s revelations about the latest round of talks include two apparently contradictory elements. On the one hand, the reports indicate that MBS seems intent on striking this mega-deal with the US and Israel; and on the other, that he appears worried by the possibility of assassination for doing so. 

He is reported to have cited the fate of the Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat following his 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Sources say that he questioned whether the US had offered Sadat effective protection and appeared to be requesting personal security if, or when, the deal is ratified.

MBS could have indicated that the same considerations might apply to Netanyahu, who might have in mind the tragic end of his predecessor, Yitzhak Rabin. Having signed the first Oslo Accord in 1993 and finalized a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, Rabin died at the hands of an Israeli extremist in November 1995. In truth, though, Netanyahu is more likely to be considering the implications for his precarious government coalition if he gave way on the two-state solution – which would, incidentally, be as unacceptable to Hamas and its followers as to his right-wing ministers.  

THE REASON for Saudi Arabia’s insistence on “a credible path toward a Palestinian state” is entirely understandable. The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was conceived and proposed by King Salman’s predecessor on the throne, his half-brother, then-crown prince Abdullah. The plan, endorsed on a number of occasions by the Arab League, advocates a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine dispute. Given that and a just resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue, the plan promises full normalization of relations between the Muslim world and Israel.

 In September 2021, when King Salman addressed the UN General Assembly, he reiterated Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the 2002 plan, ignoring the fact that it was drafted well before Hamas gained control of Gaza in 2007. Members of the Arab League must now take into consideration that Hamas, with the support of much of the Arab world, is dedicated to eliminating Israel from the Middle East, and would certainly never endorse the idea of Israel continuing to exist alongside a Palestinian state that occupied only a portion of what was once British Mandatory Palestine.

In short, in signing up for the US-Saudi-Israel deal, MBS would be facing not only the fear of assassination, but also, whether or not a Palestinian state was part of the deal, endless conflict with Hamas or whatever jihadist organizations succeed it – for it is morally certain there is no foreseeable end to the rejectionist struggle to overthrow Israel and acquire the land “from the river to the sea.”

World opinion, such as Saudi Arabia’s, in favor of the two-state solution needs to face up to this awkward truth: It will never work until the majority of the Palestinian leadership acknowledges that the State of Israel is here to stay and endorses its legitimacy. Since Saudi Arabia and the Arab world are promoting the two-state solution, the ball is in their court. Only they can convert, circumvent, or disempower rejectionist organizations like Hamas. 

IF THAT is too great an ask, then Saudi Arabia – despite its unique position as leader of the Sunni Muslim world – will need to consider aligning its position with that of other Abraham Accord signatories. All maintain their support for Palestinian aspirations, but not at the expense of their own interests. They have decided to put establishing a Palestinian state on the back-burner, and prioritize the substantial benefits to their countries and the region of normalizing relations with Israel.

In practical terms, therefore: Is the price that Saudi Arabia is asking for a normalization deal with Israel unrealistic? Or will MBS’s compromise formula be enough to kick the issue into the long grass and finalize the normalization deal? Or will current US policy and the weight of public opinion in favor of the two-state solution finally prevail? Time will tell.

The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020.  Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com