Iran's calculated inaction: Why Tehran stands by as Hezbollah falters - opinion

In a series of “targeted strikes” against Hezbollah, the Israeli military has eliminated Hassan Nasrallah, the long-time leader of the group, along with almost all top Hezbollah commanders and operatives. The IDF also severely damaged Hezbollah’s command-and-control systems, destroyed its communications infrastructure, and significantly reduced the group’s stockpile of short- and medium-range rockets. 

As Iran’s premier proxy in the region, Hezbollah serves as a crucial second-strike force in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. So, why does Iran look paralyzed with indecision as the IDF continues to cripple Hezbollah? Has the regime abandoned its key ally, or are there deeper strategic calculations behind its inaction?

Since the October 7 terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel, Hezbollah has launched 8,000 rockets in an attempt to deter the Jewish state from eliminating the Palestinian terrorist group in Gaza. This has led to the displacement of over 70,000 Israelis, primarily from border communities, and the deaths of many civilians, including children. In one tragic incident on July 28, twelve children and teens were killed in a Hezbollah rocket attack on a soccer field in the northern Druze town of Majdal Shams.

In the meantime, the United States has attempted to persuade Hezbollah to halt its aggressive campaign against Israel through diplomatic channels. Amos Hochstein, the diplomat leading negotiations with Lebanon, has made numerous trips to Lebanon in an effort to pressure Hezbollah, but these efforts have so far been unsuccessful.

The situation has become untenable, leaving Israel with no choice but to retaliate against Hezbollah to “change the balance of security” and push the group deeper into Lebanon (to the far side of the Litani River) as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which set the terms for the end of the Second Lebanon War.

Pager aftermath

On september 17 and 18, Israel allegedly carried out a significant operation in which thousands of pagers and hand-held devices used by Hezbollah operatives were detonated, resulting in the deaths of 30 Hezbollah members and injuries to over 3,450 others. Following this, the IDF launched a campaign targeting approximately 2,000 Hezbollah sites, eliminating senior commanders and severely damaging the group’s stockpile of rockets, cruise missiles, and drones, many of which were hidden in civilian homes across southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley.

Under extreme pressure and prior to his death, Nasrallah reportedly urged Iran to launch a direct attack on Israel. However, Iranian officials responded that “the timing isn’t right,” citing the Iranian president’s presence in New York for the UN General Assembly, a justification that many see as a mere pretext.

Anyone familiar with Iran’s political system will understand that the president’s role is largely symbolic, especially when it comes to foreign, security, and military decisions. These matters are firmly controlled by Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, and the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), who run the regime’s proxy wars against Israel. The president has virtually no influence in this area. Therefore, the Islamic Republic’s reluctance to directly engage in a war with Israel in support of Hezbollah likely stems from other strategic factors.

Hezbollah is strategically crucial to Iran’s regional influence and security interests, making it unlikely that the regime would abandon the group. So, if Hezbollah is so important, why hasn’t Iran rushed to its rescue? Several factors may explain this hesitation.

Issues at home

First, the regime is facing several crises at home, with the most pressing being a severe economic crisis that has persisted since the United States withdrew from the nuclear agreement in 2018. The US sanctions have dealt heavy blows to Iran’s economy. The economy has contracted significantly, with national debt reaching 30% of GDP, and the currency losing 80% of its value in less than two years.

Inflation currently stands at 49.5% and unemployment is nearing 10%. In an effort to manage its budget deficit and finance operations, the government has borrowed billions of dollars in local currency from the central bank, which according to experts, can lead to hyperinflation similar to what was seen in Venezuela.

The government has already spent $140 billion of its $150 billion National Development Fund and faces the need to allocate an additional $100-150 billion annually over the next few years to prevent the total collapse of the system. On top of this, the regime is grappling with dwindling energy and water resources, alongside serious economic imbalances, which will continue to exert mounting pressure on the government. These challenges will require increasingly larger annual operating budgets.

Sustaining a war effort against Israel would require a strong economy, and given the depth of Iran’s current economic crisis, the regime would struggle to afford such a conflict. The ongoing crisis has ignited widespread riots across the country, with the most recent unrest in 2022-2023 resulting in the deaths of over 630 Iranians at the hands of the regime’s security forces.

Iranians’ outrage over economic collapse and mismanagement, frustration with strict social restrictions, and growing anger toward Khamenei and the clerical establishment, who have shown little regard for the people’s needs, have all converged into a full-blown legitimacy crisis for the Islamic Republic.

THE REGIME’S legitimacy is at its lowest point since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In the March election, for instance, only 41% of eligible voters participated (unofficial reports suggest turnout was actually below 15%). The results of parliamentary elections in May 2024 saw voter turnout between 7% and 8%, marking the lowest participation in the history of the Islamic Republic.

A regime facing such a deep legitimacy crisis at home would struggle to engage in a direct conflict with Israel, as sustaining public support during a war would be highly challenging. If the regime were to proceed, it would face significant risks, including further destabilization and increased domestic unrest. Moreover, many Iranians believe that their hardships are directly linked to the regime’s irrational proxy wars against Israel and the diversion of national resources to terrorist groups like Hezbollah. A new adventure by the regime against Israel would likely face widespread domestic backlash.

Additionally, fear of Israel’s capabilities likely plays a key role in shaping Iran’s calculations. Israel has demonstrated clear military superiority, thus far, while Iran’s outdated air force would stand little chance against Israel’s advanced one. Tehran’s missiles and drones have failed to penetrate Israeli airspace, while Iran’s air space is open to Israeli war planes.

We suddenly want peace

This is likely why President Pezeshkian, speaking to journalists at the UN in New York, said, “We don’t want war [with Israel]… We want to live in peace.” It’s also why the regime rejected Hezbollah’s call to attack Israel, saying that “the timing wasn’t right.” Abbas Araghchi, the regime’s foreign minister, also said “Hezbollah is fully capable of defending itself independently.”

GIVEN THE depth of Iran’s economic and legitimacy crises, along with the risk of severe retaliation from Israel, it is difficult to imagine the regime taking the risk of engaging in a direct war. In fact, during past incidents, such as the alleged Israeli attack on Iran’s major gas pipelines in March 2024, which severely disrupted vital services, regime leaders were deeply concerned that additional Israeli strikes could further destabilize the country and cripple the already fragile economy. So much so that the head of the IRGC Quds Force, Ismael Ghani, reportedly instructed Hassan Nasrallah to publicly declare that Hezbollah “will not drag Iran into a war” should Israel attack.

The regime also understands that engaging in a direct war against Israel would likely drag the United States into the conflict – a war in which Iran would ultimately be the loser. In fact, some Iranian leaders believe that Israel’s escalation is “a trap designed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to provoke Iran into a direct conflict with the US” and they should be cautious to avoid falling into this trap.

After all, as the Clausewitz noted in his renowned work On War, that a rational leader would not start a war they are certain to lose. Additionally, a full-scale war could potentially hurt Kamala Harris’s chances in the upcoming US presidential elections, something the Iranian regime would not want.

Given these challenges, it is unrealistic to expect the Iranian regime to engage in a direct conflict with Israel (and the United States) in response to the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah. The Hezbollah leader’s death will not compel the regime to change course either. The regime will continue its indirect fight against Israel and try to resurrect Hezbollah from the ashes. As one of the regime’s officials noted, “Whoever is martyred, someone will replace them.” Only by increasing the cost of confrontation will the regime cease its aggressive actions against Israel.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Philos Project.