Editor's Notes: IDF equipment failures endangered soldiers

During the first chaotic days of the war, I began receiving calls from several friends serving in the IDF. These weren’t casual conversations; they were pleas for help. Whether stationed in Gaza or on the border with Lebanon fighting Hezbollah terrorists, they all faced a troubling reality: they were woefully underequipped. They asked me if I could help raise money, either from Jews in the Diaspora or Israelis, so they could buy life-saving equipment like ceramic vests, food, and basic necessities. Ceramic vests, in particular, can mean the difference between life and death in combat.

While these grassroots efforts successfully provided soldiers with some of what they needed, it became clear that this shouldn’t have been necessary in the first place. The IDF had consistently assured the public that their soldiers had everything required for battle. But Eliav Breuer’s investigative reporting in The Jerusalem Post has now revealed the grim truth: the IDF’s claims were far from accurate, and the reality on the ground was one of severe shortages.

Breuer’s report, based on a classified document presented to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, lays bare the scope of the equipment crisis. This document, which covers the weeks following the October 7 massacre, details nearly 350 urgent requests for military supplies. The requests came from various units, including some of the most elite forces in the Israeli military, such as Shayetet 13, Egoz, and Duvdevan. These are the soldiers who are at the very forefront of Israel’s defense, and yet they found themselves desperately in need of basic protective gear, food, and medical supplies.

Seeking bullet proof protective vests

The most shocking revelation from Breuer’s article is the sheer number of bulletproof vests and helmets requested.

According to the classified document, approximately 4,000 bulletproof vests and 2,500 helmets were needed, and yet, at the same time, the IDF spokesperson, on October 9, was telling the public that “no equipment was lacking.” This disconnect between the military’s official narrative and the reality on the ground is deeply troubling. Soldiers were begging for ceramic vests – equipment that could save their lives – while the IDF insisted that everything was under control.

This wasn’t just about helmets and vests, either. The classified document also detailed the need for 600 special military knee pads, 200 medical kits, and even 20 rifles. Other requests included tactical gloves, warm clothing, and food supplies – basic necessities that the military should have been able to provide but didn’t. Soldiers and their families were left scrambling, relying on donations and makeshift solutions to equip themselves for battle.

One of the most distressing aspects of Breuer’s report is the fact that many of these requests came not from reserve units but from regular army divisions and elite forces. These are not soldiers who were unprepared or ill-equipped to handle the realities of war; these are highly trained, specialized units that found themselves without the gear they needed to carry out their missions effectively. Even a municipality was forced to submit a request for supplies, highlighting just how widespread these shortages were.

It’s not just the fact that these shortages existed – it’s the military’s refusal to acknowledge them that is most frustrating. Throughout the early days of the war, the military consistently downplayed the severity of the situation. On October 9, IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari claimed that “no equipment was lacking,” adding that “patience was required” and that “even if it takes more time, everything will arrive.” The truth, as Breuer’s investigation makes clear, is that patience wasn’t enough. Soldiers needed equipment immediately, and the IDF’s insistence that everything was fine put lives at risk.

The refusal to accept donations of equipment is another point that Breuer’s report sheds light on. While the IDF cited concerns about the quality and safety of donated gear, it’s difficult to shake the feeling that pride and bureaucracy played a significant role in their decision. The military didn’t want to admit that it was unprepared, and as a result, it turned away help that could have saved lives.

According to Knesset member Yulia Malinovsky, who was involved in addressing these equipment shortages, the military’s attitude was one of aloofness and inflexibility – traits that contributed to the intelligence and operational failures of October 7. Malinovsky’s assessment aligns with what many soldiers on the ground have been saying for weeks: the military leadership was more concerned with maintaining its image than addressing the real and pressing needs of its soldiers.

This situation, as Breuer’s article shows, wasn’t just limited to the chaos following the October 7 massacre. The document suggests that the demand for equipment was likely much larger than what was officially recorded, as many requests were directed to private donors outside of the formal channels. This raises serious questions about the IDF’s ability to logistically support its troops in a time of crisis. If elite units like Shayetet 13 and Egoz were struggling to get basic supplies, what does that say about the readiness of other, less specialized divisions?

These revelations from Breuer’s investigation are deeply concerning, especially considering how much the IDF prides itself on being one of the most advanced and capable militaries in the world. For months, we’ve been hearing stories from soldiers and their families about shortages in equipment and supplies. The military has dismissed many of these stories as isolated incidents or minor logistical hiccups. But as Breuer’s reporting makes clear, these weren’t isolated incidents – they were part of a much larger problem.

The refusal to acknowledge its equipment shortages, even as soldiers were scrambling to secure life-saving gear from donors, speaks to a deeper issue within the military’s leadership. There seems to be an unwillingness to admit mistakes or vulnerabilities, even when doing so could save lives. Instead of embracing the help that was offered, the IDF doubled down on its narrative that everything was fine, leaving soldiers to fend for themselves.

These issues are not new. Soldiers have been struggling with a lack of basic supplies for months. Soldiers in Gaza and on the northern front have been forced to wear torn uniforms, operate malfunctioning vehicles, and make do with whatever equipment they could scrounge together. These problems were brushed aside by the military as localized incidents, but the pattern is clear: our soldiers are not being properly equipped, and the military’s leadership has been in denial about it.

Breuer’s article should be a wake-up call to everyone who cares about the safety and effectiveness of the IDF. The equipment shortages detailed in his report were not just logistical oversights; they were failures that put the lives of our soldiers at risk. The IDF must acknowledge these shortcomings, accept the help that is being offered, and ensure that our soldiers are properly equipped to defend this country. If the military leadership cannot confront its own failures, we risk repeating these mistakes in future conflicts.