How Israel’s war risks destroying ties with Jordan and regional allies - opinion

Relations between countries naturally ebb and flow.

While high tides are often seen as a positive sign, low tides can strain these connections. 

As we mark the 30th anniversary of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, relations between the two appear to be nearing an unprecedented low – mirroring the current state of Israel’s ties with other countries in the region.

The bonds and shared interests linking Israel and Jordan are deeper than those Israel has with any other country with which it holds diplomatic relations.

Since its early days as Transjordan, the Hashemite Kingdom has been considered Israel’s “best of enemies.”

While Jordan participated in the 1948 and 1967 wars against Israel, its leaders maintained secret ties with Israeli counterparts throughout this period.

The existence of common enemies and Jordan’s reliance on Western allies (first Britain, later the United States) made Israel a valuable partner in preserving Hashemite rule. 

King Hussein expressed gratitude to Israel for its support during Black September in 1970, when he was engaged in a struggle against the PLO. 

In return, he warned Golda Meir of the impending war during their meeting at Glilot in September 1973.

Israel, in turn, could generally rely on the Jordanian army to secure the long-shared border, preventing terrorist incursions. 

Over time, Jordan also developed additional strategic needs, such as water and gas, which Israel provides.

Before 1994, peace with Jordan had always been a possibility. However, unlike Egypt, Jordan lacked the strength to withstand opposition from the broader Arab world and the Palestinian population within its borders. 

But Israel’s signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords with the PLO provided Jordan with the legitimacy it needed to formalize its own peace treaty a year later. 

After years of attempting to represent Palestinian interests, Jordan relinquished this role to the PLO, while retaining its special role in the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, according to the peace treaty.

How to proceed? 

Since then, the failure to solve the Palestinian problem has presented the regime with a dilemma, of how to square its own interests, and those of the state, with the demands of its citizens. 

The response has been to keep diplomatic relations with Israel on a low-profile while sustaining close, clandestine military, defense, and intelligence cooperation. 

Thus, while public relations remain cool, covert ties have remained strong. A similar dynamic has unfolded with Egypt but with a significant difference: in Jordan, more than half the population is Palestinian.

Tensions on the Temple Mount and conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians have consistently strained relations between Israel and Jordan. 

The Jordanian government has typically responded by recalling its ambassador and issuing strong condemnations of Israeli actions – measured responses that have not jeopardized the peace agreement itself. 

However, as the current conflict endures, as Palestinians in Gaza face ongoing humanitarian hardships, and as Israel refrains from offering a political horizon, the voices in Jordan calling for more decisive actions against Israel are likely to grow louder and could increasingly impact Jordanian policymakers.

Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, exemplifies the duality of Jordan’s stance. 

Throughout the conflict, he has issued strong condemnations of Israel’s actions, yet he has also emphasized that Jordan, along with the broader Arab world, seeks peace rather than war, advocating for a solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative.

DEVELOPMENTS with Jordan may be more pronounced, but a similar pattern is evident in Israel’s relations with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. 

Despite a shared interest in countering Tehran, all these states condemned Israel’s recent attack on Iran.

Although these countries maintain varying levels of relationship with Israel, even the UAE – despite continuing flights to Israel and maintaining moderate statements – has made it clear that it will not participate in “the day after” in Gaza unless progress is made toward establishing a Palestinian state. 

This stance is also shared by Saudi Arabia, which has yet to normalize relations with Israel.

Taking peace with Arab states for granted 

Under the Netanyahu government, Israel appears to take its relations with peace and normalization with Arab states for granted. 

The longevity of peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt – 30 and 45 years, respectively – may create the impression that these relationships are immune to crises. However, this assumption should not be put to the test.

Rational government policies should consider the circumstances, limitations, and risks associated with their implementation. 

Israel’s limited strike on Iran was influenced, if not compelled, by American pressure to avoid complicating matters for the US administration ahead of the elections. 

Similarly, an Israeli government acting with strategic foresight must weigh not only its own interests and those of its closest ally, the United States, but also the interests of other regional countries with shared concerns.

In this context, two key issues arise. 

In the short term, priorities include ending the conflict, securing the release of hostages, securing Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the northern border, and establishing an alternative governing structure in Gaza. 

In the longer term, a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue is essential, ideally through the formation of a state-like entity. 

Resolving the first set of challenges could improve relations with the Arab states; however, only addressing the second will elevate these relationships to new heights. 

This may currently seem like a fantasy, but so did peace with Egypt and Jordan just a few decades ago.

The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.