Old ways to detect new technology, finding a temporary solution to drone attacks - opinion

Israel is facing a multitude of attacks from many vectors, one of them being drones. Seth J. Frantzman assessed that "one-way attack drones that strike their targets by flying into them are relatively cheap to make, hard to detect, and can fly thousands of miles." 

They are cheap to manufacture, making conventional methods of interception prohibitively expensive, both in terms of cost and availability of interceptor missiles. The Tamir missile of the Iron Dome costs around $50,000, and the air-launched Python 5 is likely more since they are designed to engage fast-moving targets.

This article will evaluate old and current vehicles that can engage drones as cheaply as possible by using old Hovets and Machbets from storage or potentially through field modifications of the Namer IFV and the 30mm Rafael remote-controlled turret systems.

As the majority of drones used by Hezbollah and Iran fly low and slow, with a similar flight profile as a helicopter, systems designed to engage helicopters would do the job effectively. Recently, an Apache used its 30mm M230 chain gun to shoot one down over Binyamina.

Former IDF air defense chief Brig.-Gen. (res.) Ran Kochav told the Jerusalem Post that the two keys to beating the drone defense problem are better identification and a wide range of tailored shootdown solutions.  

“We can use acoustic detection, lower the threshold for radar detection [to declare a threat], improved intelligence, and try to bring in more different kinds of ways to shoot them down, from shells to Vulcan anti-aircraft guns, to more Iron Dome batteries, to more dedicated anti-drone aircraft,” he said.

How can you shoot down a drone without a missile?

The most cost-effective way is to use lasers or energy-directed systems, such as the Iron Beam. New "hunter drones" are being developed, using reusable drones to destroy incoming ones. However, as the Iron Beam is rolling into service, older systems could be used as stopgap measures to increase coverage.

Air defense is a multi-layered complex, with different systems and sensors that complement each other. In US service, radar-guided cannons are used as the closest layer to the protected site. The IDF brought back a 20mm M61 Vulcan rotary gun for trials and is currently deployed on the northern border. 

The IDF once used Vulcans for air defense, placing them on troop transports ("Nagmash" or APCs), creating the Hovet and Machbet. Hovet, based on the 1968 American M163, had its onboard targeting system and self-destructing rounds (so misses don't land in populated areas). The Machbet is a 1990s upgrade that modernized the targeting sensors and added Stinger missiles for backup. These vehicles were phased out in 2006, but their simple design allows for a quick re-entry into service as the basic Nagmash is in service.

They are highly capable systems, with the original Hovet even downing a MiG-21 Fishbed jet fighter in 1982. Furthermore, their rate of fire can be adjusted to conserve ammunition when engaging slow-moving targets. They were phased out as the IDF moved towards more technologically advanced solutions, with the Machbet and Stinger crews retrained into the Iron Dome.

What are the downsides of the Machbet? Is there any better alternative?

The Machbet's old M113 chassis is vulnerable to RPGs, drones, and missiles. A better-protected option would be the Namer IFV. Equipped with a 30mm gun, it has an advantage compared to the 20mm Vulcan: more than double the effective range. Thanks to superior ballistics, 30mm guns can cover more than four times as much ground. The lower fire rate compared to the Vulcan is advantageous as it helps conserve ammunition.

The Namer would make an ideal vehicle as it has plenty of interior space for electronics, an external turret can hold more ammunition easily, and the four anti-tank Spike missiles could be replaced by Stingers or 1 Python 5, providing a last-resort trump card. With a datalink, it could hypothetically even fire the Iron Dome’s Tamir, as the Machbet received targeting data from other ground radars in the 1980s.

Which current systems can be used?

Another system currently in use is the remote-controlled weapon turrets (Katlanit) used by several IDF combat vehicles. Their sophisticated fire control system can engage low-flying helicopters despite their intended use being to support ground troops. They could be deployed along the border while being protected by the vehicle's armor.

Currently, some of these systems are in the Gaza border posts, so their standalone ground application is feasible and well-known. Rafael's Typhoon, a 30mm ship-based version, is potentially being developed to engage drones, according to the Ministry of Defence. 

How can they be detected in new or old ways?

For detection, radars and acoustic systems are used. As Kochav stated, "When an explosion happens nearby, it can be harder for the radar and those watching the radar to maintain contact with other drones that might not have been hit." Perhaps the solution is another "old-school" system to complement current radars. 

In the 1980s and up to 2000, the IDF used acoustic detection for incoming artillery fire. The Meofef artillery radar and later Nurit systems could detect targets up to 20km. While new radars are much more efficient, they could add an additional layer and be tailored specifically for drones.

Overall, the IDF should continue pursuing cutting-edge technology without losing the adaptability and improvisation that once was the cornerstone of the Israeli defense establishment. This “high-low” combination of systems defeated numerically superior enemies with the limited resources of the Jewish nation.

The writer is a National Security and Holocaust Studies MA thesis researcher/student at the University of Haifa. He specialized in modern warfare, with an emphasis on air power and logistics.