Israel must use ceasefire in North to prioritize return of hostages - opinion

There are two ways to look at the ceasefire deal that Israel reached this week with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The first is to celebrate the success Israel has achieved over the last 14 months in its war against the Iranian-backed group. The strategic blows dealt to Hezbollah have been substantial: its long-range weaponry destroyed, its leadership decimated, and its infrastructure in southern Lebanon thoroughly dismantled. Hezbollah has been unequivocally set back by about 20 years.

Unlike in Gaza, where Israel declared from the outset that its goal was the elimination of Hamas and its removal as the ruling authority, no such objectives were announced for Lebanon. Instead, the aims were simpler: degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities, removing the immediate threat to the northern border so Israeli evacuees could return home, and pushing the remaining Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.

These were different wars with different goals.

Yet there is another perspective, one that centers on a single urgent question: What about the hostages? It was Hamas’s invasion of Israel on October 7, along with the abduction of 251 hostages, that ignited this conflict.

While wrapping up the northern front to concentrate on the southern one offers strategic advantages, it seems that Israel is no closer to securing the release of those still held captive by Hamas. What we do know, however, is that the number of the 101 hostages still in Gaza believed to be alive is rapidly diminishing, creating an unbearable sense of urgency.

The contrast in how Israel has approached Gaza and Lebanon can be attributed to several key factors.

The first is operational feasibility. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pointed out this week, Israel’s capacity to sustain an extended and larger war in Lebanon is constrained by resource limitations, including weapons stockpiles.

A broader operation, such as attempting to eliminate Hezbollah entirely, would require a massive ground invasion of all of Lebanon including Beirut and its surroundings – akin to what has been done in Rafah, Jabalya, and Gaza City. Such a campaign would lead to a protracted and potentially unwinnable conflict, with no guarantee of enhanced security for Israel.

The second factor is the international context. Unlike Gaza, Lebanon is a country of great global importance, where the United States, France, and Iran all have deep strategic interests. This reality is what led Israel to adopt a different approach in Lebanon, carefully distinguishing between Hezbollah as an organization and Lebanon as a nation-state.

By contrast, in Gaza, Hamas and the territory itself have been treated as inseparable entities, with no such distinction made when it came to the IDF’s selection of its targets.

Third is the emotional resonance of the October 7 attacks. The atrocities committed by Hamas on October 7 and the continued captivity of the hostages have created a visceral, deeply emotional drive within Israel to see the group destroyed. With Hezbollah, that simply was not the case. As a result, the imperative to eradicate the Lebanese group never reached the same level of intensity as the desire to dismantle Hamas.

Lastly, there are the political dimensions of the conflict. In Lebanon, there is no one of serious stature in Israel talking about long-term territorial control or the establishment of Israeli settlements. While some voices have called for reestablishing the security zone Israel maintained in southern Lebanon until 2000, these ideas lack political backing.

Gaza, on the other hand, represents an entirely different ideological battlefield. Members of Netanyahu’s coalition have openly discussed resettling Gaza and reversing the 2005 Disengagement Plan, which saw the evacuation of 8,000 Israelis and the demolition of 21 settlements.

THESE IDEOLOGICAL ambitions, combined with the government’s broader goal of preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state, have made it significantly harder to reach a deal in Gaza, despite the urgency of the hostage situation.

If Israel had pursued a deal earlier in the conflict, it might have worked more aggressively to create an alternative governing entity to replace Hamas. Yet, more than a year into the war, no such framework has been established. This is partly due to the complexity of the issue, but also because of the government’s reluctance to engage with the Palestinian Authority, even in a reformed or revitalized capacity.

At the moment, even Israel’s friends in the US and the Gulf fail to understand the country’s plan for post-war Gaza. While the prime minister has brought on to his staff some veteran venture capitalists with a variety of ideas, none of them create confidence around the world.

Solutions involving American defense and engineering contractors, local Palestinian clans, and IDF oversight lack clarity, raising fears of another Somalia-like chaotic reality. All of this is why Israel’s allies mostly are refusing to endorse a plan they believe is destined to fail.

Of course, the inability to reach a deal is not solely Israel’s responsibility. Hamas’s refusal to engage in meaningful negotiations for a hostage deal renders progress impossible. As much as Israel wishes to bring the hostages home, it cannot negotiate with itself.

Ultimate responsibility for return of hostages lies with Netanyahu

Nevertheless, the ultimate responsibility for resolving the hostage crisis rests with Netanyahu. As the architect of the policies that led to the October 7 attacks and the leader shaping Israel’s current strategy in Gaza, he bears the burden for bringing back our people.

If the ceasefire with Hezbollah holds, Israel must use the quiet in the North to refocus its efforts on the South and prioritize the return of the hostages. This is not only a moral imperative but also a matter of national urgency.

Based on what has been happening in the Knesset over the last week, it seems that the hostages are nowhere at the top of this coalition’s priorities. Instead, the Likud party seems more focused on strengthening its control over public broadcasting and restarting the disastrous judicial reform. It is time for that to change now.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post.