The toppling of Assad's regime in Syria may be bad news for Israel - analysis

The sudden rekindling of the Syrian civil war has many Israelis looking to the northeast and asking the following question: “The enemy of my enemy is fighting my enemy, so whom am I for?”

Or, in other words, who would Israel least like to see parked on its border with Syria: Iranian-backed Shia jihadist extremists or Turkish-backed Sunni jihadists?

Since the answer is neither, Israel’s approach to the developments in Syria will be to stay out of the melee as long as its security interests are not directly or immediately threatened. As Yitzhak Shamir was once quoted as having said during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s – when two of the Jewish state’s fiercest enemies were weakening each other – Israel can “wish both sides success.”

The Syrian civil war flared anew on November 27 with an offensive by an alliance of hardcore Sunni jihadists, once allied with al-Qaeda (called Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan-backed Islamists (the Syrian National Army [SNA]) against the northern Syrian city of Aleppo. This alliance has since taken most of Aleppo and moved on to its next target: Hama.

Few saw this coming, though it should not have been that much of a surprise. It was always clear that the Mideast war Hamas began on October 7 with its barbaric attack on Israel would have wider regional implications. What was not clear, but is now coming into focus, is what those implications and ramifications would be.

The October 7 attack led to Hezbollah opening a front against Israel and driving 60,000 Israelis from their homes. This led, after 11 long months, to Operation Northern Arrows with the aim of bringing those residents back home. This operation resulted in exploding Hezbollah beepers, the decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership, the severe degradation of Hezbollah’s capabilities, and the demonstration – via an airstrike on Iran – of the Islamic Republic’s vulnerability and penetrability.

And this sequence of events led to the decision by the Syrian rebels to try to retake Aleppo and reignite the civil war at a time when three of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s biggest allies are severely weakened or preoccupied: Moscow tied up in Ukraine, and Hezbollah and Iran at their weakest point in years due to the Israeli onslaught, which likely would not have happened were it not for October 7.

With Assad’s three allies far from what they once were, the rebels saw an opportunity – one that they had clearly been planning for – and pounced. Not coincidentally, they struck on November 27 – the same day the Hezbollah-Israeli ceasefire was announced.

Hamas’s attack is already reshaping the Mideast well beyond the borders of Gaza in ways few anticipated. It was clear after October 7 there would be strong aftershocks that would be widely felt. Just how strong and how widely felt is quickly becoming apparent.

The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, pitted a hard-to-keep-straight jumble of different actors with a myriad of different ideological interests one against the other. The renewed fighting is no different. Here’s a look at the prime interests of four key players in that drama: Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Russia.

Israel

Israel is an actor in this drama in that its actions in Lebanon and Syria significantly weakened two of Assad’s primary backers – Hezbollah and Iran – prompting the rebels to strike. But Israel is only an indirect actor, not actively involved in the fighting taking place in the north of Syria.

Nevertheless, Israel has definite interests in Syria, primarily to weaken the Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis and prevent Iran from using Syria, as it has in the past, to rearm and build up Hezbollah.

A weakened Syrian regime under Assad, therefore, is in Israel’s interest. But here’s the rub: Israel would like to see Assad weakened, but not overmuch, and not toppled.

That’s the paradox.

Why weakened? So that Syria will be unable for generations to pose a credible threat to Israel. The long-running civil war has taken Syria out of the circle of countries that can pose a conventional threat. Notice that in the current war, Assad has not opened up an additional front against the Jewish state, not wanting to give it any pretext to blast away at the Syrian army.

The IDF has struck some 70 targets in Syria over the past year, but those have primarily been Iranian and Hezbollah assets, not assets belonging to the Syrian army.

And why does Israel not want to see Assad overly weakened?

Because Israel would like to see Damascus move away from Iran and toward the moderate Sunni countries like the United Arab Emirates. In recent months there has been positive movement in that direction, movement that will likely now come to a halt, as Assad will need more – not less – help from Iran.

If, in the past, the bargain offered to Assad was economic aid from the Gulf countries in exchange for moving out of Iran’s circle of influence, now Syria is in desperate need of boots on the ground – which only Iran, or its proxies, can provide.

As to why Israel would not like to see Assad toppled, this is because that may lead to chaos, something rarely good for Israel.

Jerusalem, in general, likes predictability – and Assad in Syria provides that. While Assad is no friend, Israel at least knows what to expect from him – what he can and cannot do, what he will and will not do. A new ruler in Damascus of the Sunni jihadist variety would be unpredictable.

If, under the guise of the reignited civil war, Israel sees Iran trying to transfer weapons to Hezbollah, it can be expected to act. But, short of that, it can be expected to let its enemies just slog it out – all the while repeating the mantra: “Jerusalem is monitoring the situation.”

Turkey

For the rebels to launch the type of offensive that they did, they needed the go-ahead from Turkey, which Erdogan gave even though his backing of the rebels puts him at odds with Iran, Russia, and – inasmuch as one of his interests is to squash the Kurds – also the US.

Why risk this? Because Erdogan is keen on resettling in northern Syria the estimated 3.5 million Syrian refugees who poured into his country since the start of the civil war, and because he wants to further undermine Kurdish efforts in the region.

Regarding resettlement of the refugees, Turkey and Syria have been in reconciliation talks for months (Erdogan quickly backed the rebels when the civil war began). But these talks have gone nowhere, with Assad demanding that Turkey remove its troops from a security zone that Turkey, together with the SNA, have carved out in northern Syria.

This rebel offensive now gives Erdogan added leverage against Assad to reach an agreement.

The Syrian refugee crisis has increasingly become a domestic issue in Turkey, where – amid an economic crisis – there has been a backlash against the refugees, something that hurt Erdogan’s party in local and parliamentary elections. He wants them to return precisely to the buffer zone in the north.

In addition, Erdogan is hoping that the fighting will help contain and potentially remove the threat he perceives from the Kurdish groups in northeastern Syria, which – at least until President-elect Donald Trump comes into power on January 20 – have US support.

The success of the rebels gives Erdogan increased leverage and strengthens his position in shaping Syria’s future.

Iran

Along with Assad, Iran is the biggest loser as the rebels gain ground.

Tehran has invested billions in Syria since the beginning of the civil war there, seeing the country as central to its efforts to encircle Israel with a “ring of fire” of proxies willing to do its bidding.

Iran’s interest is clear: to preserve Syria as a conduit of arms to Hezbollah and as a platform from which it can produce arms for the Lebanese terrorist group and rebuild its prime proxy. If Assad falls, that conduit is lost.

Like Hezbollah, however, Iran’s resources are not limitless, and – because of the drubbing Hezbollah took in Lebanon – the resources Iran can now allocate to save Assad are not the same as they were in the past.

Iran has militias comprised of Iraqis, Pakistanis, and Afghanis it may deploy, but these militias do not match Hezbollah in their battle readiness and training. Hezbollah, decimated by Israel, is in no position to send forces now to prop up Assad.

Syria is key to Iran’s regional influence, and if Assad falls, it loses that asset.

Russia

Russia intervened actively in 2015 in the Syrian civil war, and by so doing tipped the scales in Assad’s favor. Moscow’s intervention stemmed from several interests that are as important for the Kremlin today as they were then.

The first is that through Syria, Russia is able to project power throughout the Middle East and combat US influence in the region.

Assad gave Russia a much-coveted warmwater port on the Mediterranean in Tartus, as well as an air base near Latakia. Agreements with Assad will allow Russia to operate the port and air base for the next half century, if not longer. This has strategic significance for Moscow, which explains why, in the midst of its war with Ukraine, over the last week it has undertaken bombing runs against the rebels in northern Syria, trying to halt their advance.

In addition, Moscow has an interest in showing other allies that it will come to their aid and keep them from obliteration – one reason the rapid defeat last week of Assad forces around Aleppo was such an embarrassment for the Kremlin. Assad’s poor showing undermines Russia’s position in the region and trashes the perception Russia wants to project that – unlike the US – it is a superpower on which its allies can rely to ensure they do not fall.