Did Iran oppose or approve of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire? - opinion

Did Iran oppose or approve of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, which was agreed on November 26 and implemented the following day? Opinion is divided, views differing according to the holder’s perception of Iran’s complex geopolitical interests in the region.

Some in the media speculate that Iran saw the proposed ceasefire as conflicting with its strategic interests by undermining its leverage against Israel, and opposed it. Some argue that an enfeebled and disheartened Hezbollah, desperate for a respite from Israel’s onslaught, proceeded to negotiate the deal without a green light from Tehran. 

Most opinions take a contrary view. The defense editor of the UK’s Daily Telegraph believes Iran has been so weakened through the defeats inflicted on its proxies that it was forced into the ceasefire and that it represents a major setback for the ayatollahs.

Given the destruction that the Israel Defense Forces have wreaked on the infrastructures of both Hezbollah and Hamas, he writes: “The Iranian regime, which finds itself increasingly under pressure from a disaffected populace, had little option but to bring hostilities to an end. All the indications are that Iran, not Hezbollah, was the driving force behind diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Lebanon, as it feared that its standing in the region would be further eroded the longer the conflict carried on.”

Some commentators have perceived a split developing between Iran and its two main proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah. They believe that a much weakened Hezbollah and the rump of Hamas are both more than willing to prolong the conflict with Israel, believing that the longer it lasts, the more pressure Israel will come under from world leaders to make concessions. This, they think, is what is behind the Hamas leadership’s constant refusal to accept ceasefire terms brokered by the Biden administration. 

There are reports that dissatisfaction with Iran’s agreement to a ceasefire is morphing into talk of betrayal. It has certainly resulted in numerous breaches of the ceasefire terms by Hezbollah, requiring an appropriate military response by the IDF. If Hezbollah is indeed determined to resume hostilities against Israel, the chance of extending the 60-day truce will eventually turn into a struggle of wills with Iran. 

October 7

Hamas’s savage assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, was probably intended to mark the start of a new era of Iranian strength. If so, subsequent events seem to demonstrate that it was the exact opposite – namely, that October 7 signaled the high-water mark of Iran’s power, and it was all downhill from then. 

From the moment that Israel chased Hamas back into Gaza, Iran’s power base began to decline. Over the past year, the ayatollahs have had to watch their Hamas allies suffer huge losses of manpower and facilities, culminating in the elimination of its leader, Yahya Sinwar.

In a long, hard struggle Hamas as a military entity has been all but destroyed. It has also been ousted from the governance of Gaza, which Iran’s ayatollahs can no longer regard as a launching pad for the invasion and destruction of Israel.

Israel’s determined and effective self-defensive action in response to October 7 has clearly reduced Iran’s strength and influence. The regime has also proved powerless to prevent the decimation of Hezbollah’s senior command structure, including the assassination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

Some commentators are linking the military successes in Syria by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), referred to by the media as the “Syrian rebels,” to Iran’s evidently weakened state and Russia’s preoccupation with its struggles in Ukraine. 

Neither could offer Syrian President Bashar Assad much support as HTS forces advanced into the streets of Damascus, greeted by jubilant crowds. Assad’s dictatorial regime seems to have collapsed, while Iran’s “ring of fire” has blown back on itself. 

Syria, Lebanon, Hamas and Hezbollah now represent not an unassailable Iranian regional powerhouse but a diminished and flagging regime.

IRAN APPEARS to have made a serious, perhaps fatal, strategic miscalculation in April 2024, when it decided to escalate its conflict with the West by launching its first-ever aerial onslaught on Israel. That first attack was a humiliating failure since some 99% of the missiles and drones were destroyed in flight and failed to reach Israel.

The ayatollahs compounded their failure by essaying a second bombardment on October 1. Although more powerful missiles were deployed, the results were only minimally more effective. 

The ultimate humiliation, perhaps, was that Iran’s direct assaults on Israel triggered retaliatory airstrikes, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated struck Iran’s nuclear program.

While the regime has managed to win some victories in the propaganda war – successfully persuading many young, left-wing people in the West that Israel is the aggressor in this conflict – it has been discomfited on the battlefield and diminished geopolitically. The strategic goals it has worked toward for years have become pipe dreams in a matter of months. Iran’s aim of regional domination seems less attainable than ever. 

The disintegration of Iran’s carefully constructed terrorist network in the Middle East could even have profound implications for the survival prospects of the regime itself and its ruling ayatollahs. 

Openly calling for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic are Iranian opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi, the son and heir of the last shah of Iran, who heads a body called the National Council of Iran for Free Elections, and his rival, Maryam Rajavi, the head of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Both claim to be acting as a government-in-exile. In November, Pahlavi called on Iranians to take the country back, adding that he was ready to lead any interim rule.

Having expended billions of dollars supporting terrorist proxies throughout the region, the ayatollahs are likely to find themselves under increasing pressure from disaffected voters. Inflation is currently at 35%, and more than 20% of young people are unemployed. 

Apart from the failing economy, the regime is holding the lid on a seething cauldron of discontent about the restrictions imposed on women by the religious police. Every so often, the people’s frustration explodes in the form of public protests that are invariably put down ruthlessly by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

With the Trump administration, which is likely to take a hard line on Iran, soon to assume power in Washington, the ceasefire deal in Lebanon could be the first indication that the ayatollahs’ days are numbered.

The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.