Takeaways for Israel from US elections: Ensuring strong ties amid change - analysis

Whatever happens on Tuesday in the US elections – whether Kamala Harris becomes the first woman American president, or Donald Trump becomes the only US president outside of Grover Cleveland 131 years ago to be reelected after being turned out of office – one thing is clear: the Israel-US relationship will endure.

How do we know? Historical precedent.

Since Israel’s founding in 1948, US presidents have varied in their stance toward Israel: some have been supportive and warm, others cold and distant, and still others have fallen somewhere in between. 

And through it all, the Israeli-US relationship has survived and flourished.

Why? Because the relationship is broader and deeper than any single US president or Israeli prime minister, or the friction that may exist between them (think Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu).

While the relationship at the top is important, there are other significant connections – defense and intelligence relationships, business partnerships, congressional ties, public opinion – which are also important. The relationship in 2024 remains deep enough and wide enough to withstand trouble at the top, if there is trouble at the top. 

The Netanyahu-Obama years (2008-2016) provide ample proof of that.

This doesn’t mean that the identity of the president does not matter; it obviously does, and a president perceived as problematic from Israel’s point of view can cause migraine headaches for Jerusalem. 

But it is also important to remember that, in viewing the US-Israel relationship, things are neither as bad or as good as they are often portrayed.

Disagreements over settlements or Iran, long gaps between leaders’ phone calls or visits, and icy meetings between senior officials do not mean an irreparable rupture in the US-Israel relationship, any more than France’s fury at the US for announcing a security pact with the UK and Australia that cost Paris a $65 billion nuclear-powered submarine deal led to an end of the US-Franco alliance in 2021. 

It means disagreements between governments, not a fracture between states.

Similarly, an agreement on moving the embassy to Jerusalem or on policy toward the Gulf states does not imply total convergence; it simply shows agreement on these particular issues.

All that being said, the upcoming elections are obviously consequential for America, Israel, and the world. Here are a few takeaways from the campaign from an Israeli perspective:

Israeli Jews are from Venus, American Jews are from Mars

One thing that often surprises non-Jewish visitors to Israel is the degree to which American and Israeli Jews are not on the same page politically. American Jews tack Left, while Israeli Jews lean Right.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in surveys asking whom they favor in the upcoming election: Trump or Harris.

There has been extensive polling over the last few months of American Jews, and while there is a variation of a few percentage points here and there – with Trump garnering more than 30% in some polls but not in others, a variation that could make a critical difference in a close election – the trend is clear: American Jews overwhelmingly favor Harris. 

A Manhattan Institute poll conducted in early October among 658 Jewish registered voters, for instance, showed a 67% to 31% split in favor of Harris.

And Israelis? Whom do they prefer?

A Channel 12 poll on Monday indicated that if Israelis could vote, the country would be a red state, in fact, a deep red state – think Mississippi or Wyoming red. According to this poll, 66% of Israelis would favor Trump, 17% would favor Harris, and 17% said they don’t know.

How can this be, an outside visitor might wonder? Israeli Jews and American Jews share the same religion, the same history, and, to a large degree, the same values. How could one group be so pro-Harris while the other leans so pro-Trump?

Easy: priorities.

When Israeli Jews are asked this question, they are focused solely on one factor: Who do they think will be better for Israel?

They are not looking at the character of the candidates, their stances on abortion, or their views on immigration and the national debt. 

They are looking at only one thing: Who will support Israel more, pressure it less, and under whose tenure will Israel have an easier time pursuing its goals. Based on these priorities, the Israeli public’s answer, according to the Channel 12 poll (and others conducted over the past few months), is resoundingly clear: Trump.

American Jews, on the other hand, consider a much broader range of issues when they vote. Israel is one factor but neither the only one nor the most important one.

According to the Manhattan Institute poll, for American Jews, the top issue is abortion, followed by the economy, then by democracy/election integrity, and only then security/Israel/antisemitism.

Notably, ranking Israel fourth out of 12 issues represents a significant rise in priority compared to previous elections – a result of October 7 and its aftermath, events that various surveys have shown have brought some American Jews closer both to Israel and their Jewish identity.

Interestingly, denominational affiliation is a good indicator of the degree to which Israel will be a high priority for American Jewish voters – a factor that policy-makers, both in Israel and the American Jewish community, should bear in mind.

According to the Manhattan Institute poll, among the Orthodox, Israel is among the top two issues for 45% of the respondents; for those who identify as Conservative Jews, it’s 27%; 23% for Reform; and only 5% of those Jews who do not identify with any particular denomination.

This suggests that the more closely American Jews are affiliated with a synagogue and denomination, the more likely they are to identify with Israel to the degree that it affects their voting choices. The less they are affiliated with a synagogue or denomination, the less important Israel is for them.

More than Israel meddled in the US elections, the US elections affected Israeli policy

Remember the 2012 Barack Obama-Mitt Romney election?

During that campaign, Netanyahu and his ambassador to the US at the time, Ron Dermer, were widely accused by Democrats of interfering in the election by unabashedly supporting Romney.

Whether or not that is true is subject to debate. What is undebatable, however, is that it works both ways, and that for decades the US has sought to tip the political scales inside Israel as well (cue Sen. Chuck Schumer).

This time around, however, there have been few allegations that Netanyahu is interfering on behalf of Harris, though the widely held presumption is that, like 66% of Israelis – according to that Channel 12 poll – he would favor a second Trump term over a first Harris one.

Nevertheless, Netanyahu’s critics would be hard-pressed to present hard evidence of his having picked sides publicly in the current election campaign.

Rather than Israel meddling in US elections, always a dangerous proposition considering that the side you pick may lose – what has been evident is the degree to which the US elections have weighed heavily on Israeli policy decisions.

For example, the recent Israeli attack on Iran.

According to a Washington Post report, Netanyahu promised the Biden administration that Israel’s response to the Night of Iranian Ballistic Missiles (October 1) would be calibrated to avoid the perception of “political interference in the US elections.”

As such, Israel hit Iranian military sites. It did not, however, hit the Islamic Republic’s oil fields, which would have led to an oil price spike that would be bad for Harris, nor Iran’s nuclear facilities, which could have triggered a major Iranian response necessitating US involvement, something similarly not good for Harris.

These are examples of how the November 5 election put the brakes on possible Israeli action. 

But, in another area, it might have given Israel a freer hand to act, knowing that the administration would be reticent to place heavy pressure on Israel, or punish Israel for disregarding its wishes, just before an election.

Consider the following: Israel undertook the ground invasion of Lebanon on October 1 even though US President Joe Biden said just hours earlier that “we should have a ceasefire now,” and – regarding reports of an imminent limited ground incursion into southern Lebanon – said, “I’m comfortable with them stopping.”

Despite his wishes and the position made clear for weeks by Washington, Israel did not stop – confident that concern about the Jewish vote would restrain Washington from extracting a price for not heeding its advice.

The deepening polarization of America

Nothing illustrates the dramatic polarization in America more than the fact that just days before a national election, the race is a toss-up.

This polarization has considerable implications for Israel, since even in a deeply divided country, Jerusalem needs to garner support from both sides of a polarized public. 

One reason is that this nearly 50-50 split in the US creates little political stability, and that the winner of one election cycle may be the loser in the very next.

As such, shoring up bipartisan support is critical. However, this is becoming increasingly difficult as anti-Israel voices are gaining ground in the Democratic Party. 

Israel must realize that support is no longer a given across the political spectrum, and should expend considerable energy to address this shift.

For example, it needs to be much more proactive in countering the anti-Israel narratives – such as accusations of genocide and apartheid – that are gaining traction and exposing those claims as lies, while emphasizing the country’s commitment to democratic values and peaceful coexistence.

One byproduct of the polarization is US electoral volatility. The swings and unpredictability of US elections – from Bush to Obama to Trump to Biden – means Israel needs to be able to quickly adjust its diplomatic approaches, depending on who wins the election. 

This means understanding the changing priorities and strategies of the different administrations and being able to engage with them on their own terms.

It also means expending as much energy cultivating relationships with other elements of America – such as the business and defense communities – as with the administration, in order to build resilience in the US-Israel relationship and ensure it will withstand ever-frequent American electoral changes.