Shifting US-Israel relations: Trump 2.0 will not necessarily be Trump 1.0

The past is an imperfect predictor of the future, or – in more straightforward terms – what was is not necessarily what will be. It might be, but it won’t necessarily be.

This dictum is well worth keeping in mind when gauging the impact of Tuesday’s stunning victory of once and future president Donald Trump. There was obviously relief and satisfaction in Jerusalem at the outcome of the election results, as the assumption is that Jerusalem will have an easier ride with a Trump presidency than it would have had with a Kamala Harris one.

This assumption is not something based on thin air but rather on recent history: Jerusalem had a much easier time with Washington during Trump’s first tenure than it did during the tenure of US President Joe Biden. The expectation was that a Harris presidency would have continued the tone and approach of Biden’s policies toward Israel, though perhaps without the same warmth toward the Jewish state that the outgoing president felt and demonstrated.

During his first term, Trump took numerous steps – from moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, to recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, to brokering the Abraham Accords – which demonstrated unprecedented alignment with Israel’s priorities.

Might those pro-Israel policies continue? They most certainly might, but Trump 2.0 is not necessarily going to be a continuation of Trump 1.0. As reassuring as Trump’s past gestures have been, his second term – and his relationship with Israel – will be shaped by new circumstances, new priorities, and new personalities around him.

For instance, constitutionally prohibited from running again for president, Trump will reenter the White House on January 20 beholden to no one. Though he obviously will want to ensure that his party wins the midterm elections, his policies will not be as influenced by classic political considerations – what one of his key constituencies will say or think – as they were during his first term.

It’s not as if he ever really had to factor the Jewish vote into his calculations – he never had the Jewish vote, though his share of the Jewish vote on Tuesday, at least according to the Fox News exit poll, rose from 24% in 2016, to 30% in 2020, to 32% in the most recent election – an 8% increase in eight years, not insignificant in close elections in battleground states.

But the target audience for some of his policies toward Israel was not Jews but, rather, Evangelical Christian voters, a core group of his base. As he said on the campaign trail in 2020 when talking about his decision to move the embassy to Jerusalem: “That’s for the Evangelicals. You know, it’s amazing with that – the Evangelicals are more excited by that than Jewish people. That’s right, it’s incredible.”

Not only does the fact that he will not be running again mean he does not have to do anything for a particular constituency – and, by the way, Tuesday’s election showed that his base is also widening and becoming more diverse – but he will not be as concerned about potential donors. One of his largest donors in the current campaign (to the tune of some $100 million) was Miriam Adelson, the widow of Sheldon Adelson, who backed him heavily in his previous runs for office.

Will Trump's priorities shift?

With no need to secure votes or campaign dollars, Trump’s priorities may shift, leaving room for different dynamics.

Another key factor shaping his policies will be his inner circle. In his previous term, staunchly pro-Israel adviser and son-in-law Jared Kushner played a pivotal role on numerous issues, including the Mideast. It is not clear what role he, or his wife, Ivanka, will play this time around.

Another key pro-Israel figure in the inner circle last time, who will not be there this time around, was vice president Mike Pence, replaced by JD Vance, an isolationist who, however, makes exceptions in his overall isolationist worldview for Israel – though he recently said the US should not get dragged into a war with Iran.

One name that has been mentioned as someone having increasing influence is the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, the Christian Lebanese businessman Massad Boulos. He was in charge of Trump’s outreach, which apparently had some success, to Arab Americans. (Interestingly, most Arab Americans are not Muslim, and most Muslim Americans are not Arab.)

In the waning days of the election, Trump wrote a letter to Lebanese Americans vowing to “stop the suffering and destruction in Lebanon” and adding that “your friends and family in Lebanon deserve to live in peace, prosperity, and harmony with their neighbors.”

For key national security positions – defense secretary, secretary of state, and national security advisor – the names of several stalwart pro-Israel figures have been raised, including former secretary of state Mike Pompeo, senators Marco Rubio and Tom Cotton, and Richard Grenell, a former US ambassador to Germany who also served as the acting director of National Intelligence. It is also unclear what role former US ambassador to Israel David Friedman will play in the new administration, and whether he may return to his post in Jerusalem.

Not until Trump makes these selections in the coming weeks will the contours of his policy toward Israel and the Middle East come into better focus.

Regardless of whom Trump selects for these key posts, one man in Jerusalem whose influence is certain to increase is Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer. Dermer was Israel’s ambassador in Washington from 2013 to 2021 and developed close ties with the Trump administration, the type of ties that it will take new Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar years to develop. As such, Israel’s policy toward the new administration will be driven even more than usual by those outside the Foreign Ministry: by Netanyahu himself and by Dermer.

US political landscape at play

IN ADDITION to the key figures on both the US and Israeli sides who will shape the relationship, the broader US political landscape will also play a significant role.

Amid all the noise over Trump’s recapturing the White House, what has received less attention – at least in Israel – is that the Republicans have also taken control of the Senate, appear to be on the way to retaining control of the House, and that conservatives have a majority on the Supreme Court.

That means Trump has a full house in Washington. Even though the Republican Party is today strongly pro-Israel – with polls showing consistently that its rank and file are much more supportive of Israel than Democrats – a unified Republican White House and Congress may force Netanyahu to reassess tactics.

Why? Because in this constellation, it will be very difficult for Netanyahu to ignore the president’s wishes and try to bypass what the president wants by appealing to allies in Congress. Netanyahu and Dermer are skilled at doing this type of end around, with the best example being securing an invitation from the Republican leadership of Congress in 2015 for Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress about Iran, against president Barack Obama’s wishes.

But if the president and the Senate and House leadership are all of the same party, it will be more difficult for Israel to buck the president’s demands and try to get members of the House or Senate to scuttle the president’s plans or wishes. With a Republican House and Senate, he will not be able to get them to fight the president. What this will do is limit Israel’s maneuverability and ability to say “no” to Trump and there will be times when the two countries interests do not align and Netanyahu will want to take action opposed by the president or oppose moves taken or proposed by the White House.  

This is something that will have an impact on Israel’s domestic politics, because saying “no” to the president – or being willing to say “no” to the US president – is actually something that has helped, not hindered, Netanyahu politically.

During the Obama administration, the president – following some bad advice by aides such as chief of staff Rahm Emanuel – chose to have public confrontations with Netanyahu, believing that this would cost Netanyahu support among an Israeli public that did not want to see their prime minister in a spat with the US president. But the opposite occurred: in toe-to-toe standoffs between the two leaders – as happened on a number of occasions regarding settlements, the diplomatic process with the Palestinians, and Iran – the Israeli public, or at least the Likud base, rallied around the prime minister.

Ironically, Netanyahu was at his strongest politically from 2009 to 2016, when Obama served as his foil in the White House. The endless cycle of five inconclusive Israeli elections in under four years began in April 2019, with three of these elections held while Trump was president and fully backing Netanyahu. Even with that strong backing, Netanyahu did not conclusively win any of those elections.

It will now be increasingly difficult for Netanyahu to bolster his credentials with his base as someone who stands alone against the entire world, when Trump is sitting as president, flanked by a Republican House and Congress, and it will be impossible for Netanyahu to say “no” to him.

This new environment doesn’t just affect Netanyahu’s leverage; it also reshapes the opposition’s arguments. Take Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, for instance. One of Lapid’s central talking points for years has been that the Israel-US relationship is broken, that Netanyahu has broken it because he cannot work with Democrats, and that he would be able to do so.

Well, with Trump now assured of four more years, and the Republicans well ensconced in all the different branches of government, that particular argument – whether elections here are held early or as mandated in October 2026 – will be far less convincing.